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The years of the war are now somewhere far
off in the past. But the war itself remains with
us, holding us through the power of human
memory and through the profound traces that
it left behind. It holds us despite the fruitless
efforts of those who would like to extinguish
that memory and prevent it from being handed
down to the next generation.
Mikhail Alekseyev, war veteran,
in The Moscow Times, May 9, 1995
All of a sudden it is back. Out of the features
and the seminars the past comes sneaking in
to make itself at home on the front pages of
newspapers amidst current policy. It defeats
U.N. conferences, penetrates courtrooms,
pressures governments. Occasionally it seems
to take the present hostage as in German-
Greek relations or in the dealings between
North and South. From Athens to Durban a new
trend prevails. Old scores are to be settled with
reference to war, suppression, Nazi mania,
colonialism and slavery. The past has a future.
Stefan Ulrich, “The Insurrection of History,” 
in Süddeutsche Zeitung, September 8-9, 2001
Note on sources: Since this is based almost
exclusively on the international press, it is
somewhat haphazard in nature: Although sever-
al thousand articles have been used, they do
not always reflect the most recent development
of an issue, especially since they frequently
contributed to remedying criticized wrongs.
Press campaigns have affected government
decisions from Sweden and Switzerland to
Russia and the Vatican to grant access to rele-
vant archives or to explode cozy myths, ending
conspiracies of silence or other scandalous
dealings with the past. The present study
makes seldom direct reference to scholarly
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works since it is less concerned with finding out “what really happened” than with how this past
is confronted today by the mass media. Still, since public presentations often are in conflict, sides
must be taken. In this, indirect reliance on new research is possible because the media discourse
often sprang from the publicizing of new books. The problem of divergent interpretations still had
to be tackled. In addition, writing about the past, even the recent past, while daily tracing the
effect of World War II on media images and current developments threw this writer onto an emo-
tional roller-coaster of optimism and pessimism; reflected in the changing mood in various chap-
ters.1
Introduction
Once upon a time, foreign diplomats were much impressed by the “fantastic Greek knowledge of
their own history,”2 meaning modern history. Today, however, the history scores on Greek uni-
versity admissions examinations taken by high school graduates are among the worst.3 For the
2003 examinations the Greek Ministry of Education, citing the number of teaching days lost for
various reasons, lowered the history requirements (not for any other subject). Greek history of
the 1940s, which had been banned from the school syllabus until the early 1980s, was again
excluded from high school examinations.4 Notwithstanding the simultaneous success of some
popular history bestsellers, Greek youth runs the risk of being reduced to the “historical illitera-
cy” of senior students at American colleges, whose general cultural knowledge, according to
polls, is now at the level of 1955 high school graduates. We will have to observe the develop-
ment after September 11, which some have asserted “ended the nation's holiday from history”
since even the National Endowment for the Humanities is emphasizing that historical illiteracy
threatens homeland security – people cannot defend what they cannot define.5
This illiteracy makes sense in light of the stunning success of those Hollywood movies that for
many Americans create the pleasant feeling that the United States won the Second World War
single-handedly,6 thus provoking angry reactions in other places. In London, “an A-list of aca-
demics, media dons and media heavies” assembled for a conference to debate the question,
“Has Hollywood Stolen Our History?” Even though there was no pithy answer, there were few
doubts that Hollywood had a habit of being economical with the truth, while seldom letting “his-
tory get in the way of a good story.” For instance, the Guardian sneered at the movie scene in
which “heroic Americans” capture the famous German enigma machine, thereby enabling the
Wehrmacht code to be broken and the war won. This fictional telling has some flaws, however,
most prominently, the “upgrading” of the raiders’ real-life British nationality to “American.” In
turn, the British reinstated truth on this point ignored the role several Poles played in the actual
event. Polish historians and media, of course, then criticized the British for “wanting to take cred-
it for everything.”7
Even so, history today seems more alive than ever. Current policies do not eschew romanticiz-
ing long-gone centuries. Indeed, some even take advantage of it. Familiar examples are the
46
HAGEN/45-130elis  23-11-04  16:10  ™ÂÏ›‰·46
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 21/02/2020 08:09:23 |
mythologized Serbian defeat at Kosovo polje in 13898 and the glorified Protestant victory at Ulster
in 1690.9 More extreme cases are found in Israel, where disparaging observations about King
David’s turbulent love life may provoke a government crisis, while the boundaries of a possible
new Palestine state and the viability of Middle East peace schemes depend upon, among other
things, excavations investigating whether or not Abraham’s final resting place is in Hebron.10 In
Greece, the “other famous ancient” country [Churchill], reenactments of the remote past – such
as the mayors of Athens and Sparta holding an ostentatious ceremony solemnly ending the Pelo-
ponnesian War after 2,400 years – clearly have less impact. The inevitable ironic comments11
become even more pointed since Greek reappraisal of even recent history is still in its infancy.12
After the epochal events of 1989-’90 and their crushing effect upon historico-teleological utopias,
whoever intended to let bygones be bygones soon was forced to realize that the past had resur-
faced, infusing its second (at least) life into the present. All over the world, aged skeletons and
related scandals were discovered in blood-soaked earth or dusty cupboards and exposed to
broad daylight by the media. Above all, Nazi Germany’s Third Reich and its long, gruesome
downfall has surged up at all levels of public discourse. Documentaries on WW II’s big battles
are rampant, sparking new battles among authors, producers, and agents. Although the war gen-
eration is dying out, ancestral and cultural bonds maintain the public’s interest.13 War history, in
particular, is big business. Scholarly and popular bestsellers (accompanied by floods of reviews)
become successes both on the big and, often at prime time, the small screen. In this study, we
will deal with visual media only when it is covered in print.
In the UK, for instance, evidence of the surge in multimedia history can be seen on a daily basis
in the BBC History Magazine and on the History Channel14 – the latter dubbed the “Hitler Channel”
because of its thematic preferences. In general, British television has discovered history as “the
new sex” – following its having been the least popular subject in the high school syllabus. Simon
Schama, the professor who made history “sexy,”15 just signed an exclusive contract with the BBC
for a record í3 million.16 On the side of the onetime enemy, things are similar. German television
“invites almost daily for travels into the past” with a comparable focus on the Nazi period, since
Hitler guarantees excellent ratings (four million viewers per episode), particularly among the steadi-
ly enlarging over-50 age group.17
The new popularity of all this often glossy “edu-tainment” is a mixed blessing. In Britain, where
history is only compulsory until the age of 14, it has produced a rise in the number of students
studying history. But many have misguided expectations and a “desire to be told stories rather
than acquire the skills of the historian.” Concern repeatedly has been expressed that “the popu-
larity of Hitler” and WW II as an option for study – leading to a so-called “Hitlerization of history” –
leaves youngsters without any sense of context.18
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Post-1945: “Healing Myths”
During the decades of the Cold War, many scores from WW II remained unsettled, or at best
patched up, particularly when one’s own citizens or members of the same alliance were involved.
Both superpowers – and, in consequence, the blocs led by them – deliberately closed ranks
against the “real” enemy rather than weaken their alliances with “untimely squabbles” over the
past. As a result, it was not long before Europeans of both camps put their unpleasant legacies
aside, in particular the unfortunate fact that although majorities in most countries had despised
the German occupiers, many accommodated, if not collaborated, with the occupation.19 A con-
sensus of silence covered up the complicity of “ordinary” people with domestic or foreign tyran-
ny – a pattern that often reemerged after 1990 in the eastern half of the continent. 
Following Germany’s defeat and multifaceted punishment by occupation, partition, and legal and
moral indictment, everyone else could identify themselves with the winners against “the evil-
incarnate enemy,”20 whose universal and exclusive guilt was the only issue on which all sides
could easily agree. Even Austrians redefined themselves as “Hitler’s first victims.”21 Thus, the
retouched official versions of national history consisted of varying mixes of history and mythol-
ogy. Collectively believed founding myths of epic and nation-embracing resistance (besides a
handful of traitors22) dominated literature and the media, and official and popular histories.
The gory purge of home-grown collaborators fingered by resistance movements all over the con-
tinent actually began in the twilight period before and immediately after liberation and included ran-
dom acts of revenge from hot-blooded Greece, Italy, and France up to cool and dispassionate Nor-
way. This purging process, however, was soon modified by political factors, since internal rifts
could not be allowed to remain open. This was most evident in the successor states of the main
perpetrators (Germany, Austria, Italy) but also in France and in Hitler’s eastern vassal states, where
collaboration in all its shades had been a mass phenomenon. In the west, from Denmark to
Greece, economic collaborators got off lightly because they were needed for reconstruction. In
most countries, for the sake of local peace, local societies suppressed inconvenient aspects of
their own history. It was impossible to punish huge numbers of compatriots whose crime had
been their “law-abiding” stance toward domestic regimes often identical with or direct heirs of pre-
war governments (such as Italy, Romania, Hungary, France, and Denmark). Because of the Cold
War, the profitable collaboration by neutral countries with the Third Reich was soon pardoned, as,
later and gradually, were the Germans themselves. 
In Greece more than elsewhere,23 the newly founded Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) gained
ground through the official view that German “military virtues” were needed for containing com-
munism. For the same reason, the United States released the FRG de facto from further repara-
tion burdens by suspending the theme to the “Greek calends” i.e. to never-never day. From the
late '40s, the strategic importance of West Germany increased at the same pace as the Com-
munist threat was believed to be increasing, and this entailed fortifying West Germany material-
ly and morally. The US, in particular, was pleased to be killing two birds with one stone. By trans-
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forming the FRG into their forward bastion, they hoped “to keep the Germans down and the Rus-
sians out.” Therefore, when the Germans were urged to meet their external debts within the
framework of an international agreement (London 1953), claims for reparations submitted by the
minor Allies were “deferred until the final settlement of the problem of reparation.” This nebulous
formulation was intended to protect the new German ally from financial drain and the US was sat-
isfied that “time works in favour of Germans.” Obviously, a peace agreement with a reunited Ger-
many was needed for any final settlement of the reparation issue, and this was not expected to
happen under the prevailing circumstances of global polarization. In 1990, when against every
expectation the western FRG and the eastern German Democratic Republic [GDR] united, the
“2+4 agreement” between the two German states and the four principal allies was equivalent to
a peace settlement, though a formal peace treaty was avoided in order to leave a loophole for the
re-united Germans, allowing them not to recompense the former allied states for war damages.
This strategy led to a serious deterioration in Greek-German relations.24
During the Cold War, the West German anti-Communist position was accompanied by clear
echoes of anti-Bolshevik and anti-Slavic prejudices from the Nazi era. Conversely, the West Ger-
mans considered that speaking about the damage inflicted upon them by former enemies who
were now allies would undermine their integration into the West. Similar restraint (or coercion)
prevailed in the GDR and other states, particularly Hungary, conquered by the Soviet Union con-
cerning the atrocities committed by the Red Army in 1945. These atrocities were widely known
among the East’s afflicted populations and were also known to the Western intelligentsia. Few,
however, dared to or wanted to blemish the reputation of the gallant Soviet soldiers who had van-
quished fascism – sheer evil, per se. 
After the war, the German language created the convoluted term Vergangenheitsbewältigung for
the laborious task of dealing with the torturing (and tortured) past. Pons–Collins,25 considered the
most reputable German-English dictionary, offers the politically correct but wooden translation:
“the process of coming to terms with the past.” Isolating the tricky component Bewältigung, we
find different shades of interpretation: a) coping with, b) managing, c) getting over [the past]. The
verb compound can be translated as “to master,” “to resolve,” “to confront,” or “to overcome,”
whereas corresponding negations refer to an “unresolved,” “unmastered,” or even “unmaster-
able”26 past. Some Germans associate Bewältigung with the more common and linguistically relat-
ed terms Gewalt (power, force, violence) or even Vergewaltigung (rape). The latter connotations
easily arise when reviewing six decades of multi-layered history of Vergangenheitsbewältigung and
become even stronger when we learn that only during the last decade the distinguished Swiss
newspaper, the Neue Zürcher Zeitung (NZZ), has used the term in at least 785 articles, among
them many sports stories – in the sense of taking revenge for a previous defeat! In a politico-his-
torical context, Vergangenheitsbewältigung has been applied to many countries, from Latin
America and South Africa to Yugoslavia, from Ireland and Cyprus to Australia and Indonesia, and
includes states with a messianic sense of mission, like the U.S.A. and the Holy See. Since this
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“ugly, clumsy, necessary word” 27 does not exist in other languages, the German term has to be
introduced as terminus technicus or has to be paraphrased. A related article in the largest Greek
newspaper carried the German word as a title, explaining: “The German language is a difficult
one, and the above word is one of the most difficult in the German vocabulary.”28 While the term
has become established, most serious scholars prefer Aufarbeitung [of the past], which
Pons–Collins translates inadequately as “reappraisal,” leaving out the fundamental connotation
of “catching up with unsettled/uncompleted affairs.” 
Along with history of the Nazi period, Vergangenheitsbewältigung has developed into a research
subject of its own. Foreign analysts at times differ about the extent to which the Germans have
dealt with their past. Many see the Germans as “world champions in remembrance,” while oth-
ers see them still vacillating “between amnesia and anamnesis.”29 Both opinions are correct,
though they refer to different acts and actors in an ongoing drama. An erratic gap yawns between
the moral optimum and presumed political feasibility, constantly adjusting to the ever-changing
domestic and international situation.
For decades, official Germany attempted to restrict responsibility for WW II almost exclusively to
the “demon” – or “(megalo)maniac" – Hitler and his wicked entourage. Identifying the Nazi Reich
with its Führer,30 limited public discourse about the heinous past to vague recognition of “crimes
committed in the German name”31 and payment of indemnifications [Wiedergutmachung], espe-
cially to Jewish victims. Legal action against war criminals never was popular in Germany, and
in the early 1950s the subject became overshadowed by Cold War priorities.32 In this context it
was easy to attack Communism and Red imperialism as being very similar to Nazism. The focus
was on the pre-Barbarossa (22.6.1941) period, making it possible to depict Stalin as the Nazis'
shrewd accomplice. Conversely, Hitler's pathological anti-Bolshevism was seldom mentioned in
the West German press, since doing so would have made uncomfortably obvious the unpleas-
ant similarities with the canonized anti-Communism of the FRG and the “Free World” in general.
In Greece, for instance, for more than a decade, FRG embassy reports reiterated that Ger-
manophilia was again on the rise “even though the occupation had not been quite forgotten.” A
causal correlation shined through: Restoration of normal relations with Germany presupposed
overlooking, “forgetting,” the unpleasant past. Those segments of the population that tried to
keep alive injurious war memories were ipso facto suspected as Communists: The labels “anti-
German” and “Communist” became interchangeable. Greece’s biggest WW II resistance move-
ment, EAM/ELAS, was repeatedly referred to as a group of “bandits,” consistent with both
Wehrmacht terminology and linguistic rules in post-Civil War Greece.33
In West Germany, references to German atrocities often were counterbalanced by cautious allu-
sions to German sufferings, i.e. in particular: Allied carpet-bombing of most German cities, caus-
ing mostly civilian casualties; expulsion from over 12 million ethnic Germans from the eastern
provinces subsequently annexed by the USSR, Poland and the CSSR; mass rape of German
women by Soviet soldiers and cruel treatment of German POWs, especially in Soviet camps. The
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only war-related anniversary regularly celebrated by the Bonn government was July 20th, rever-
ing the (conservative) plotters against Hitler [1944] – a convenient homage focussed on con-
trasting good Germans with bad Nazis, while ignoring communist resisters. As a national holi-
day, the anniversary of the failed East German uprising on June 17, 1953, was chosen, which
had the advantage that “on this day the West Germans could profusely bemoan German partition
without having to talk about its causes, i.e. their own crimes during the time of Nazism.”34
However, the ruling elites gradually had to answer persistent questions about their collective atti-
tudes and individual activities during WW II, particularly those asked by academic youth sensi-
tized to the Holocaust-related trials in Germany and Israel.35 There is an ongoing dispute as to
whether or not the rebellious ’68 generation (which, in fact, began disobedience before 1968)
really acted because of strong moral principles, putting commemoration of German war suffer-
ings aside while imposing the Holocaust and, to a much lesser degree, other Nazi crimes on the
collective memory of their compatriots. Conservative analysts insist that it is a myth that the ’68
revolutionaries were interested in the Nazi past and that they did nothing but exploit that very past
against the ruling parental generation.36 The latter, grandfathers now, are still trying to settle old
scores with the ’68 generation, which took power in Germany in 1998, 30 years later. Regard-
less of the futile discussion about primary intentions, German Vergangenheitsbewältigung clear-
ly reached new dimensions thanks to the reshuffle caused by the ’68 generation and the replace-
ment of the Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU), who had been ruling for 20 years, by a center-left
government from 1969 to 1983. The change was symbolized by Willi Brandt falling to his knees
at the Warsaw ghetto memorial in December 1970. 
In the mid 1980s the “revisionist” camp attempted to reverse the tide. The first prominent case
was Chancellor Helmut Kohl’s push for “reconciliation upon the tombs” with US President Ron-
ald Reagan on the 40th anniversary of the end of WW II. Specially chosen for the occasion, Bit-
burg cemetery contains the remains of not only 2,000 Wehrmacht soldiers but also some SS
men. The undertaking was heavily criticized as an attempt to erase the distinction between vic-
tims and perpetrators, but still took place.37 A bigger onslaught came in 1986, when the promi-
nent historian Ernst Nolte initiated the debate about the uniqueness of Nazi crimes, in particular
the Shoah, the destruction of European Jewry. His assertion that Nazism, and in consequence
the Holocaust, should be interpreted as a defensive reaction to, or even as a replica of, Bolshe-
vism triggered the famous Historikerstreit: literally the “historians' dispute,” in fact an intellectu-
al civil war with worldwide coverage, one of the fiercest disputes ever to shake academia over
how to interpret and contextualize the Nazi era. The Nolte camp was defeated, but soon began
preparing the ground for a return to the fray after revisionism was supposedly justified in 1989. 
Post-1989: History Unleashed 
After the epoch-making break of 1989/90 – that is, after state communism had collapsed both
as a military threat and as an ethical counter-model for a critical segment of the intelligentsia –
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most of the nations of “reunited Europe” found themselves carrying out a painful process of self-
assessment. With the end of the Cold War’s bipolar system, the meaning of political correctness
changed dramatically – both here and there. Time-honoured bloc strategies were invalidated,
individual and collective mechanisms of forgetting/remembering were adjusted, and access to
yesterday’s taboos was, literally, opened. The availability of hitherto sealed Soviet archives had
catalytic effects on Vergangenheitsbewältigung that stretched far beyond Russia – even if Boris
Yeltsin overestimated the impact when foretelling that it would make the world tremble.38
Suddenly, the Eastern countries had to face up to “two incriminating pasts,”39 distinct but inter-
twined, linked to two successive but ideologically antithetical periods of dictatorial rule with the
potential to neutralize each other. The situation was particularly delicate in Germany. Its division
had been a tangible demonstration of the consequences of Nazism, while the implosion of the
postwar order had severed this connection. Moreover, the horror of the Nazi past placed blame
on all Germans,40 whereas the communist past implicated only the Easterners in the former GDR.
Thus the ’89 break left problems with the Easterners while seeming to redeem the Westerners. 
The impression grew that in the new Germany the Nazi past was being eclipsed by the GDR past.
Israel Singer, general secretary of the Jewish World Congress, was not alone in his concern that
the mounting preoccupation with GDR history might supersede, if not replace, public discourse
about the Nazi period. Actually, a growing segment of public opinion prayed for a shift in focus
following the demise of communism, which purportedly had kept the “Nazi business” boiling to
divert attention away from its own offenses. Conservative celebrities expressed eloquent satis-
faction that “the specters of the [Nazi] past will sink in the gray river of oblivion, Lethe,” i.e.
“excessive grieving” and the “fuss” with Vergangenheitsbewältigung might at last decline. New
priorities could (and should) turn to the crimes of Stalinism and communism, which were hard-
ly less hideous but much more relevant since they had lasted considerably longer and were more
recent.41 Under such premises it was even possible to discover “Auschwitz in the souls” of the
“Stasi, which had been worse than the Gestapo.”42 Accordingly, in reunited Germany funerals
with military honours today are denied for former officers of the NVA [the GDR army] yet are
granted to those Wehrmacht veterans decorated with the Knight’s Cross or higher. The Ministry
of Defence explains this disparity by stating that the NVA, unlike the Wehrmacht, had not been a
“German army.”43 The same ministry also rules out proposals to include German communist
anti-Nazi resisters in the Bundeswehr [FRG army] tradition, reasoning that these men had fought
just for another dictatorial regime and hence could not stand for the ideals, values, and norms of
a democratic army. Nonetheless, the tradition-building standards are not always lofty when
Wehrmacht veterans are involved.44
Occasional demands for a GDR-related “new Nuremberg Tribunal”45 ignore the difference
between the Nazi and communist regimes, especially when the comparison is limited to the Ger-
man context in which the Soviet drive for hegemony is not to be considered. The GDR had exter-
nal authoritarian rule imposed in 1945. In its post-1949 “autonomous” phase, state-sponsored
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violence was less brutal and confined to its own citizens – in sharp contrast with the Nazi Reich
that unleashed unspeakable carnage on the entire continent. The most incriminating evidence the
GDR left behind were piles of paper [i.e. Stasi files], not innumerable dead, as its Nazi forerun-
ner had done. Organized, industrialized mass murder by the Nazis had created a huge material
and moral burden for subsequent generations. After all, the Nazi regime – with its strong domes-
tic support up to the bitter end – would not have perished had the country not been defeated in
war by foreign powers. The GDR, however, crumbled because of stiffening opposition from its
own subjects, while most opposing foreign powers, especially Great Britain, would much have
preferred to keep the GDR alive and Germany separated.
In 1945 and 1990, “liberated” German populations reacted in similar ways. They soon resented
the victors’ claim of moral, beyond their undisputed material, superiority. Post-1990, after the ini-
tial reunification euphoria, a “victors’ mentality”46 was exhibited by many of the Wessies [West
Germans]; they, just as the Allies had done in 1945 with regard to the whole of Germany,
“imported” re-educators to the defeated German state [GDR] to take up positions in the fields of
politics, administration, education, justice, diplomacy, military, etc. Yet in contrast to the post-
Nazi era, when the new rulers had only a handful of emigrants to shore up the country’s new start,
in 1990 the reservoir of (linguistically proficient) potential teachers of democracy was inex-
haustible, drawing on the FRG’s elite, eager for mass-scale replacement. In consequence, the
purging of communists assumed a much greater scale than de-Nazification did half a century
earlier; the leniency process that had integrated “less-incriminated” Nazis into the power struc-
tures of Austria and the FRG – a process that in spite of disagreeable aftereffects eased popular
acceptance of the new democracy – was denied most GDR functionaries, thereby establishing a
potential for unrest. 
Throughout the former GDR the new Western version of mastering the past gained ground.
“Reworkings of history”47 provoked controversy. In most of Eastern Europe,48 streets and even
cities were renamed.49 Memorials at former Nazi concentration camps were suddenly accused
of presenting nothing more than communist propaganda. Some of the camps, such as Buchen-
wald, mythicized in the GDR as a symbol of anti-fascist struggle and self-liberation, actually had
been re-opened after WW II by the Soviet administration as penitentiaries for Nazis, alleged or
real. In public discourse terms like “rehabilitation” and “indemnification” were increasingly
applied to victims of Stalinism, concealed for 40 years and suddenly deemed more important
than victims of Nazism, too long revered by the “wrong” people. In these two-phase concen-
tration camps revisionist trends show up, paying equal homage to both victims of Nazi crimes
and Soviet oppression, sometimes even singling out the latter, who “after 1945 sacrificed…
their freedom, health, and life in the resistance.” This new remembrance culture first identified
Nazi criminals and acolytes with democratic opponents of Stalinism and then put them on a par
with the victims of Nazism. The integrity of Nazi victims sometimes was impugned – directly
or by discrediting their advocates50– in such a way that the line between victims and victimiz-
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ers became blurred and Nazi crimes became less distinct,51 satisfying the powerful new Ger-
man desire for normalcy.
Before 1989, many leftists expressed the opinion that after Auschwitz the Germans had forfeited
their right to a common state. They interpreted partition as punishment for racial hubris and geno-
cide.52 Following the same reasoning, others could easily interpret the unexpected reunification as
a remission of sins or as “the answer to the German question,” overcoming the previous histori-
cal anomaly. The obvious “end of the postwar era” seemed to be the right time to stop “infinitely
recycling” the past, since other nations had also committed wrongs in their history, while simul-
taneously perpetuating the theme of German guilt, often to promote their own ends.53 Sentiments
were widely aired in Germany that “we have finally become a normal national state again,” need-
ing no longer to be reticent about assuming a leading role in Europe. This “Second Life Fiction,”54
this new self-confidence and self-righteousness, had a more aggressive variant: the Right’s self-
accelerating “new audacity in dealing with history,” portraying the Wehrmacht and its war as nor-
mal. Only after fierce protests was it possible to cancel a 1992 ceremony celebrating the 50th
anniversary of the first launch of a “V-2” rocket,55 a weapon that had cost nearly as many lives in
production (by forced labor) as through its destructive power. Still, many Germans were and are
fed up with never-ending commemoration of Nazi terror. Especially at less known concentration-
camp sites, buildings and monuments were crumbling or were threatened by inappropriate local
“development projects.” 56 Coined by the guru of Holocaust “revisionism,” David Irving,57 the term
“Hitler’s War,” personifying WW II (and thereby exculpating most Germans), had been adopted by
the distinguished Hitler biographer and Frankfurter Allgemeine (FAZ) editor Joachim Fest.58 Revi-
sionism was metastasizing from the fringes to the mainstream. 
1994 - ’95: The Commemorative Marathon
Anniversaries do not only concern the past. They also concern the present.
Michael Mitterauer [Historein, I (1999), 145]
Europe was swept by an almost cabbalistic fascination with consecutive half-centenaries com-
memorating the WW II’s awesome final movements. The last stage of this “commemorative
marathon”59 began with the 50th anniversary of D-Day: the Allied landing at Normandy. After
strong protests by veteran organizations, London and Paris decided against inviting Helmut Kohl
to the top-level celebrations. The chancellor, like most German newspapers, tried to hide the dis-
comfort about being rebuffed by one-time conquerors and current allies.60 East European states,
however, also had not been invited. The festivities, quite obviously, had been reduced to a closed
club’s party to which representatives of the defeated nations (past or present) were unwelcome.
The Russians were particularly offended. In spite of Yeltsin’s attempts to brush it off, the snub
evoked unpleasant Cold War memories of both camps’ downplaying the other’s contribution in
the uneasy WW II alliance. Although post-communist rhetoric had Russia as a new partner, the
West obviously continued to ignore, if not insult, “the millions of Soviet soldiers who, from 1941
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to 1945, fought and died while bearing the brunt of the battle.” Russians reminded the world that
D-Day only succeeded because the bulk of German air and land forces were deployed on the
eastern front.61 This “petty” pattern of exclusivity provoked criticism in the West, too. In France
– where the pioneering trial against the minor Vichy official Paul Touvier was then exposing trau-
mas from WW II – and elsewhere,62 pundits and public opinion (in particular, the under-30 age
group) complained that an historic chance for a pan-European fiesta rejoicing in the continent’s
liberation and reconciliation had been transformed into just another divisive, looking backward,
get-together.63
Still, center-left analysts argued that Germans were not entitled to complain, because their own
“bickering” over the departure from German soil of the remaining Russian troops also was resus-
citating Cold War stereotypes.64 When the last troops of the three Western powers left Berlin they
were given emotional farewell celebrations,65 but the Russian wish to join the celebrations was
formally barred. The reasoning – that the Red Army had not come as liberator but as another
totalitarian oppressor66 – plainly attempted to offset the dual German roles as both perpetrator and
victim. Then, “adding insult to injury,” Berlin’s conservative mayor, with Kohl’s consent, foiled
Russian plans to use tanks at their separate final parade, warning them that they would be billed
for any road damage. The German attitude sealed Western talk of “winning the Cold War”– with
Russia the loser by implication.67 In response, one Moscow newspaper retorted with a “last wish
for the united Germans: That they live in such a way that our soldiers will never have reason to
storm their capital” again!68
May 8, 1945–1995
May 8, 1945, is arguably the most important date of reference in German and European remem-
brance. It separates history into two opposing periods, pre- and post-. Marking “liberation from
Hitler-fascism,” the day already had been decreed an annual holiday in the GDR in 1950. The East
German state had accepted and administered only the “healthy” traditions of German history,
leaving the bad heritage (including indemnifications for the Shoah) to the FRG. In contrast,
Westerners had difficulties with commemorating May 8th even at 5- or 10-year intervals, and lots
of ink was used when, for the first time in 1985, FRG President Richard von Weizsäcker made a
daring reappraisal – partly to neutralize negative repercussions of Kohl’s effort at Bitburg.69
Ten years later, in the jubilee year 1995, the international climate had changed largely because
of the D-Day dispute. Kohl’s wish to take part in Europe’s collective joy over the defeat of
Nazism,70 celebrating along with the main Allied powers, which also had “guaranteed” German
unity in the famous “2+4” agreement, received a keen response in the respective capitals. Ger-
man feelings were divided. Champions of uncompromising Vergangenheitsbewältigung expect-
ed historical consciousness to be given new momentum by the consecutive anniversaries of
concentration-camp liberations and similar events that, for the first time, attracted large-scale
publicity. 
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The revisionists cautiously mocked the “repentance competition” and the new German disease
“memorialitis”71 while simultaneously launching a counteroffensive. On the eve of the anniversary
of the liberation of Auschwitz, they demanded an equivalent commemoration for the “genocide-
like” fate of the Germans expelled from the Eastern territories.72 Before long, a public manifesto73
signed by about 280 conservative dignitaries, including a then serving minister, appeared in FAZ
under the headline “May 8, 1945 – Against Forgetting.” Technically published as an ad, the arti-
cle bitterly complained that the government celebrated May 8th one-sidedly as a Day of Liberation,
when in reality, “this day meant not only the end of National Social tyranny but at the same time
the beginning of the expulsion terror, new oppression in the East, and division of our country…
Any history that muzzles, suppresses, or makes these truths relative cannot be the basis for the
self-image of the self-confident nation we Germans must be in the European family of peoples to
exclude comparable catastrophes in the future.”
The manifesto provoked “volcanic reactions” (as is the case so often when the subject is the Nazi
period). Not mentioning the Holocaust was considered a further attempt to minimize German
guilt. The signatories and their conservative promoters at FAZ and Die Welt found fault with these
protests, alleging that the protesters had submitted to the dictatorship of political correctness.
While Jews and left-wingers warned against the creeping rehabilitation of pre-democratic, author-
itarian right-wing thought, the chancellor signaled sympathy for the manifesto, associating May
8th with sorrow for both Holocaust victims and fallen German soldiers.74 Lumping together vic-
timizers and victims was and still is75 one of Kohl’s favorite motifs, explicitly expressed in the
monument inaugurated in 1993 and dedicated to all “Victims of War and Tyranny.” By “intolera-
ble abstraction,”76 Kohl’s umbrella term covered murdered Jews, fallen Wehrmacht or SS sol-
diers, and executed resisters – both against the Nazi regime and the vaguely identified “post-
1945 totalitarian dictatorship”– equally. 
Evidently, May 8th was and still is77 a “day of dilemma” for Germans. For decades, the date stood
almost exclusively for Germany’s total defeat – though it was called Zusammenbruch [collapse],
as if it had happened on its own. Meanwhile, mainstream media found the middle ground by stat-
ing that May 8th had been both defeat and liberation. Few commentators differentiated between
experiences in 1945 and gradual reassessments in retrospect! Opinion surveys showed that
before the anniversary nearly 80% of Germans saw the end of WW II as liberation78 – a percentage
that should be regarded with caution since a few months earlier only 36% had considered it nec-
essary to preserve memory of WW II.79 Independent of polls conducted under the aegis of politi-
cal correctness, the ambiguity of the question split the Germans also with regard to relations with
former enemies, simultaneously modifying these very relations, as had been seen in the D-Day cri-
sis. This time, the muse of official history considered almost everyone victors. One malicious
observer counted 86  – royals, presidents, prime ministers, and other dignitaries80 – assembled in
Paris on May 8, 1995. Almost the same number had celebrated a few hours earlier in London and
later went on to Moscow. Conversely, at the May 8th ceremony in Berlin, squeezed between the
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big celebrations, only representatives of the “Big Four”81 and the hosts convened. “For the first
time in this century, Germany is on the side of the winners of history.”82
Poland, however, was excluded. Lech Walesa’s wish to be invited had been politely refused
because Kohl was afraid of creating a precedent for other ex-Allied countries. The German Left
reacted positively to the Polish initiative – in contrast to some conservative papers that barely
concealed ridicule about “Poland wanting to be a victorious power.”83 Germany’s own post fes-
tum inclusion in the victors’ club caused mixed feelings in former occupied countries amid fears
that the defeated wanted to reverse the tide of history.84 Many neighbours of reunited Germany
were also concerned about the Bundestag’s much-disputed decision in 1991 to gradually relo-
cate the capital from cozy, peaceful, Beethoven-associated Bonn to the old Reich’s capital, Ber-
lin, with its ghosts of the Nazi regime and other autocrats from the Kaiser to Erich Honecker. The
mayor of united Berlin proclaimed his distaste for creating a “capital of repentance.”85 He plain-
ly appealed to those Germans who were sick of basing their collective self-image on an extreme-
ly negative identification and were expected to celebrate their defeat on May 8th – while, for
instance, the French had July 14th to celebrate themselves.86 For many, “the long march of Ger-
man shame was supposed to have ended… after obligatory 50th-anniversary stops at Warsaw,
Normandy and, bleakest of all, Auschwitz. Following a May 8 finale to commemorate the end of
World War II in Europe, the expectation was that the national mantra of atonement would subside
to background noise.” 87
Wehrmacht Defused
Our grandfathers were no criminals
post-1995 sticker88
German desire for “normal” traditions was particularly delicate in regard to the military. It seemed
legitimate that the (whatever) “positive aspects” of the Wehrmacht could serve as a tradition-build-
ing paradigm for the FRG army. In consequence, frequent reports about sympathies for Wehrma-
cht veterans or methods still rampant in the Bundeswehr particularly alarmed the international
community. This concern was underlined by current events; for the first time in 50 years German
troops were being deployed in war-like operations in a foreign country.89 When in 1995, after
decades of internal debate involving the Defence Ministry, military barracks named for Wehrma-
cht generals, such as Hitler’s personal friend Eduard Dietl, were finally “de-Nazified,” a large pri-
vate initiative was required.90 In particular, the touring Exhibition on the Crimes of the Wehrmacht
(1995-1999) challenged like a bombshell the convenient legend of the decent army, which, unlike
the SS, had remained untarnished by war crimes. For decades, public discourse on Nazi terror had
been mostly limited to Jewish (and German!) victims; suddenly, the exhibition’s message was –
unsurprising to most serious historians but shocking to traditionalists and the general public – that
the Wehrmacht had been devoted to and integrated with Hitler’s concept of a war of extermination
against “inferior” people (including Slavs) in the East and had been a decisive factor in making the
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Holocaust possible. Since, in total, almost 18 million Germans had served in the Wehrmacht, and
the latter represented the biggest interface between the German people and the Nazi regime, the
discourse inevitably touched almost every German family. The almost forgotten specter of collec-
tive guilt or, at least, collective responsibility once more loomed ahead. 
The exhibition triggered a public dispute about German national identity and traditions of unprece-
dented polarization including parliamentary debates, demonstrations, libels, court cases, and
bombs, both literal and literary. This dispute, acquiring “traits of a religious war,”91 was led or
covered by about 40,000 press articles. Most of the letters to the editor were negative, but the
touring exhibition was seen, until 1999, by 840,000 visitors, most of whom expressed positive
reactions. For many the battles of the Cold War were fought again.92 The wider conservative
camp protested vehemently against the alleged defamation of our forefathers stemming from the
German Left’s “self-hate and national masochism” and moulded in part by the “Oedipal rebellion”
of the ’68 generation.93 The Adenauer-Foundation, affiliated with the conservative Christian
Democratic Union (CDU), organized a symposium about the exploitation of history by the media.
Some pundits alleged that the media stage-managed and politicized the big intra-German debates
on the recent past by claiming an interpretative monopoly through which they promoted dubious
sensations – such as the exhibition and the 1996 “Goldhagen hypothesis” – harming the coun-
try’s image.94 In late 1999 the Exhibition had to be withdrawn by the organizing Institute for Social
Research because critics – spearheaded by a Hungarian and a Polish historian – provided evi-
dence (much of it inflated) that several photographs allegedly showing Nazi massacres actually
depicted victims of the Soviet Secret Police NKVD. The quick conclusion was that, along with the
(photo) captions, historical truth had been mixed up and twisted.95 With the exhibition’s organiz-
ers discredited, it seemed possible to restore the self-protective strategy of characterizing the
majority of good Germans as victims of a manipulative bad Nazi minority (Hitler, SS, Gestapo)
embodying all the evil “that had been committed in the name of Germany.”
Accordingly, Schindler’s List obtained in some quarters an alibi function by portraying good Ger-
mans (conveniently forgetting that the protagonist’s views and, in particular, his actions were in
the extreme minority). The film’s director, Steven Spielberg, was awarded an exceptionally high
decoration by FRG president Roman Herzog, since “Germany was more indebted to [him] than
[he] possibly suspected.” His film would serve as a point of reference for German diplomats
abroad.96 Domestic films increasingly singled out good Germans, sometimes even representing
them as being in the majority. In a homage to German contribution to 100 years of cinema, unre-
pentant Nazi film icon Leni Riefenstahl was not only included but even allowed to pose as just
another victim of Nazism.97
At the 21st century’s dawning, the “never-ending” past gathered new momentum from both sides.
In late 2001, the Crimes of the Wehrmacht exhibition returned after a two-year absence, having
been restructured by a new academic team.98 While the original exhibition had used shock and
provocation, the new exhibition preferred “a maximum of meticulousness and differentiation.”
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After the exhibition’s opening, the press universally praised its “indisputably higher scholarly
level,” its “precise analytical approach,” and the lack of ideological dramatization. The very
absence of ideology (and the partial substitution of photographs by documents) rendered unchal-
lengeable the exhibition’s unaltered assertion of the Wehrmacht’s institutional involvement in the
centrally planned crimes of a war that often acquired genocidal dimensions.99
In retrospect, the revisionists had won only a Pyrrhic victory against the first exhibition, which,
despite its flaws, had prepared the ground by breaching the wall of silence and initiating a learn-
ing process. The subsequent exhibition was widely accepted, at least tacitly, generally without
provoking violent emotions, although soon a few thousand roaring neo-Nazi demonstrators
tramped in protest through the streets of Berlin.100 Some voices, particularly from the post-com-
munist Left, expressed their uneasiness about the new “clinically sterile” mode – in printed form.
On the other hand, several analysts even conjectured that a new phase in the German “culture of
the past” had begun, moving from the controversial phase to the consensual phase.101 Within a
few months, however, such hopes (and occasional fears) had to be revised.
German Suffering
The Germans at the top of all war victims. Somehow, 
they always have to be at the top: if not as victors, then as victims.
Kurt Pätzold102
In December 2002, one of the flagship papers of revisionist journalism rejoiced that decades of
distinguishing between good (i.e., innocent, non-German) and bad (i.e., guilty, therefore tabooed,
German) victims were over: “2002 will perhaps remain in history as the year in which mourning
about Germany became allowed again.”103 In fact, within a few months three voluminous tomes
skyrocketed up the bestseller lists, paying unusual homage to the hardships inflicted by the Sovi-
ets or the Western Allies on ordinary Germans during or after WW II. These (civilian) victims
belonged to three main categories: the many million Germans from the eastern provinces who
fled the advancing Red Army; German women taken as “war booty”104 by the Red Army; the
approximately 600,000 civilians killed in the merciless Allied carpet bombing of German cities. 
First, Nobel laureate Günther Grass published Krebsgang [Crabwalk] in 2002. This novel focuss-
es on the sinking by a Soviet submarine of the German carrier Wilhelm Gustloff overloaded most-
ly with refugees. Grass transforms this catastrophe (the 9,000 drowned are the most in naval his-
tory) and its complex aftermath into a literary monument. The title refers both to the crab-like
sidelong approach to a subject (such as the way Germans approach their past), and plays with
the second meaning of the German word Krebs, “cancer.”105 A few months later, Grass was fol-
lowed by the British military historian Anthony Beevor. The success of his massive book Berlin:
The Downfall, 1945 was due less to the details of heavy German-Soviet fighting than to reports
of the subsequent fate of Germans in the fallen capital and other conquered territories. In partic-
ular, Beevor dealt meticulously with the rape phenomenon. In Berlin alone, an estimated 100,000
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violated women sought medical treatment; Beevor agreed with earlier estimations that overall at
least two million German women were raped and “a substantial minority” suffered multiple or
gang rape; perhaps 10,000 died, most by suicide.106
A new peak was reached with the third 2002 bestseller, Jörg Friedrich’s Der Brand [The
Blaze],107 which focusses on Allied area-bombing but, as the author clarified, in its “suffering
voice” [Leideform], punning with the popular German synonym for passive voice. Friedrich
refers to real history. He describes the scholarly and empirical development of a refined Anglo-
American strategy that intended to kill as many Germans as possible, particularly the results of
fire-bombing, which caused wholesale conflagration. This Allied strategy was deadly. “Bomber
Command's technique was already honed to perfection by 1943, and by 1945 the skies over
Germany had gone ‘raving mad.’ First, 100,000 incendiary bombs, then [air] mines, which
ripped away windows, doors and roofs, so creating a draught for the firestorm. Within half an
hour individual fires had coalesced into one massive conflagration. Finally came the high-explo-
sive bombs that ruptured the water supply and forced the fire brigades to seek cover. Nobody
could stay outside the shelters, but those inside were asphyxiated by carbon monoxide or shriv-
elled by the heat.”108
Friedrich's book depicts every technical detail of the bombing and its ghastly aftermath: German
women carrying their husbands’ melted remains to the cemetery in buckets, incinerated children
who had shrunk to doll-size, and countless other Dantean scenes.109 Within the first month
Friedrich’s huge diorama of a “nonnuclear version of Hiroshima”110 sold more than 100,000
copies, and the author presents pieces of the same message in numerous lectures covered by
journalists and television teams. He prefers to speak in towns that suffered severe bomb damage,
such as Pforzheim, where 20,000 people were killed – a third of the population, proportionally
more than died in Nagasaki. In jam-packed halls, he appeals to elderly audiences mostly through
personal experiences, stirring up emotions, obviously by intention: “Fury bottled up within many
years comes free.”111 He emphasizes that most destructive raids, like that causing the inferno at
Dresden, took place in 1945, when the outcome of the war was already decided and the cities
defenseless; in consequence most of the bombing had no strategic value and was mainly intend-
ed to punish the German people for not disassociating themselves from Hitler – as the strategic
planners in the first phase of “moral bombing” had hoped. In the war’s final six months alone, an
average of 1,023 civilians were killed per day. However, Friedrich (and his followers) are too sim-
plistic when they claim that the Allied air campaign did not shorten the war. Up to the summer of
1944 (D-Day), it made up for the “second front” that Stalin vehemently demanded from Churchill,
and until the bitter end the constant German need for aircraft to defend against Anglo-American
bombing drained the Luftwaffe, weakening the Wehrmacht's position in the east. Similarly, the
need to build more and more air shelters and deal with the disastrous consequences of the Allied
air assaults neutralized an incalculably high amount of the Reich's remaining human and material
reserves, reducing (though less than expected) its industrial output.112
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Friedrich does not deny that the Luftwaffe was the first to launch formidable air strikes on civil-
ians, in Warsaw, Rotterdam, London, and Coventry. Noteworthy here, once more, is the geo-
graphical imbalance concentrating on victims in the old (or new) western hemisphere, leaving
blind spots at the periphery. Neither Friedrich nor anyone in his journalistic “train”113 referred to
the Luftwaffe’s terror attack on Belgrade in April 1941, probably in order to avoid parallels to
NATO bombings in 1999. They also ignored Luftwaffe bombings of Guernica or civilian targets
in the USSR. In addition, Friedrich considers the German air assaults inferior when compared to
the numbers, casualties, and especially intentions of the Allied attacks: Civilian casualties were
intended and not considered “collateral” (as allegedly was the case with the Luftwaffe’s strate-
gic raids).114 The primary message to the public is clear: “No other people” suffered as much as
the Germans. Friedrich’s narrative is lopsided, however, in concentrating on the warfare between
the Allied military and German civilians, and avoiding contextualization with German crimes.115
Instead, Friedrich uses terminology hitherto associated with the Holocaust: Germans were suffo-
cated, “gassed,” and “annihilated” in basements, which, owing to premeditated Allied bombing
strategy worked not as shelters but as “gas chambers” or “crematoria.”116
Friedrich’s admittedly impressive book presents the greatest challenge thus far to the canonized
differentiation between a just war [including “collateral damage”] and deliberate war crimes.
Between the lines, the author equates area bombing with war crimes, although never stating this
outright.117 Even so, many German newspapers asked rhetorically, “Was Churchill a war crimi-
nal?” Some answered in the affirmative “without any ifs, ands, or buts.”118 Friedrich, when urged
to clarify what he implied, answered evasively that courts (obviously meaning a second Nurem-
berg) should have decided, and now “everyone has to decide himself.” He was satisfied, how-
ever, that the British would “have to deal with Churchill for a long time.”119 Just for this reason,
The Blaze has been attacked by most British media (often obviously without having read it) and
to date no publisher has been found in the UK. The British were particularly annoyed that a
preprint appeared in Europe’s largest tabloid, Bild, the vulgar sister of classy Die Welt. “British
crimes” were serialized and served up for breakfast to millions of Germans, encouraging them to
feel again (as in 1945) like victims of a war which Germans themselves had started. Moreover,
Churchill was depicted as a butcher just as the British, in a remarkable coincidence, were voting
him in a BBC poll as the greatest Briton of all time – personifying the nation’s “eccentricity, mag-
nanimity, and strength of character.”120
The deadly Allied firestorm launched against the Germans is, unpredictably, going to become a
point of comparison for quite unrelated modern theaters of war, a role that hitherto had been held
only by the Holocaust. Thus Friedrich‘s book met with approval from Arab media rejoicing about
this new evidence that Churchill was “worse than Hitler, without being hanged.”121 In Israel even
liberal voices concluded that “when comparing the indiscriminate bombing of the civilian popu-
lations by the greatest of the democracies, Israel's conduct of its war against the Palestinian ter-
ror organizations that conduct suicide bombing against civilians appears to be saintly.”122
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Taboos and Legends
History, more precisely: history stirred up by us, is a clogged toilet. 
We flush and flush but still the crap comes up.
Günter Grass, German winner of the Nobel Prize for literature, in Krebsgang (2002)
The stunning runaway success of the above mentioned books (and others trying to ride the coat-
tails of this success) is usually explained away with an easy and simple catchword, taboo. Ger-
man war sufferings, such as the deadly firestorms in Dresden, are frequently called the “last
taboo of Europe,” since “the distorting burden of guilt for the great crimes of the Nazis” had pre-
vented anyone from “acknowledging that even some [sic] Germans had been victimized during
the war.”123 Many of these voices consented that, in a tricky way, German suffering was perpet-
uated after the war. The thousands drowned in 1945 in the Baltic Sea’s icy waters were “buried
in silence as much as in water.” The Allied Air Forces had not only demolished German cities,
but the entire German nation had been “bombed into silence” and “collective amnesia” for near-
ly 60 years.124 Günther Grass himself concluded, “Never should his generation have kept silent
about such misery, merely because its own sense of guilt was so overwhelming, merely because
for years the need to accept responsibility and show remorse took precedence, with the result
that they abandoned the topic to the right wing.” Foreign reviewers presumed that Grass wanted
to “still the inarticulate, smoldering resentment” of many elder Germans and “liberate their grand-
children from the burden of the past.”125
Publishers' claims that these books had broken taboos were highly effective in PR terms but
things were not quite accurate, although there are elements of truth. As often happens with media
“revelations” about “taboos,” a great deal had already been known and discussed for a long time.
The war generation’s remembrances were moulded by personal and collective experiences (cap-
tivity, atrocities, expulsion, etc.) until Allied “re-education” refocussed memory on German
offenses against others. Even then, most Germans cultivated a discreet cover memory that com-
bined positive aspects, such as idealized Wehrmacht bravery, with their own suffering. This made
possible a German balance-sheet not too unfavourable, since it suppressed or marginalized the
perception of German crimes.126 A good example is the popular Der Landser [The Private] series
of pulp novels,127 which even after over 45 years in circulation still sells more than 60,000 copies
per week – each with a multiple readership over months and years. None of its 2,500 issues,
most of them re-issued, refers to German war crimes. Here, the myth of the “clean” Wehrmacht
remains intact; the battles of WW II, and the devotion and plight of the German soldier are shown
from the German soldier’s perspective – all of which offers the often adolescent reader possibil-
ities for positive identification.128
On the topic of German flight and expulsion from the Soviet-occupied eastern regions of Ger-
many, much was published during the 1950s and ’60s, especially works of popular history. The
expelled Germans could even rely on the guardianship of a particular ministry and on their own
party (which sometimes shared power). Only the détente of the 1970s was able to reduce their
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publicity, mostly so as not to provoke new frost in relations with Eastern neighbours. Still,
expellee associations made up a strong right-wing pressure group, in particular influencing the
conservative Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) that governed Germany for most of the post-war
period. During Kohl’s long chancellorship state grants for expellee memory work were quintu-
pled.129 After communism’s downfall, while former “expelling” countries queued for EU and NATO
membership, the subject resurfaced, even in the center-left media. Most pundits sided with the
more moderate expellee voices proclaiming merely their “right to history” rather than making
demands for property.130
In connection with the commemorative marathon in 1995, the conservative FAZ once again railed
against the “tabooing” of German suffering; but, FAZ’s complaints can easily be disproved. In any
case, in both parts of divided Germany Allied wrongs were readily denounced if they had been
committed by the patron power of the opposite German state. Popular subjects were, in the
West, the “Soviet rape orgy” and the plight of German POWs in Siberia; in the GDR the Anglo-
American “terror bombing.” Even more, already in 1985 the FRG top journalist Rudolf Augstein,
editor of the outstanding left-of-center political magazine Der Spiegel, had dubbed Churchill the
“arch-bomber of Dresden” who, in accordance with the criteria of the Nuremberg trials, would
have to be hanged, too.131 Ten years later, a comparison of the almost simultaneous 50th anniver-
saries of the Dresden tragedy and the liberation of Auschwitz by Soviet troops shows there was
much more reporting about the former,132 even though the day of the liberation of Auschwitz had
just been declared a national day of remembrance. In contrast, one of the most respected British
journals admitted forthrightly that Allied area-bombing had been “as morally questionable as the
bombing of Hiroshima… In strategic terms, the bombing of Dresden is harder to justify.”133 Sim-
ilarly, in 1995, seven years before Friedrich's “taboo-breaking” implication that British-American
area bombing, a kind of government-induced mass-killing of guiltless civilians, had been geno-
cide, this suggestion already had been made in much more outspoken terms by non-German
authors, although without leaving any particular impression.134
Indeed, Friedrich’s 600-page study seldom refers to new or unpublished material; most of his
information was published long ago, accessible “to anyone who went looking for it.” A promi-
nent reviewer’s subsequent comment that “looking was discouraged”135 is nonetheless an over-
simplification. The field of German collective trauma had never been abandoned to be cultivated
exclusively by the extreme Right. Only the “guilt-addicted” leftist intelligentsia ignored the theme,
which explains a recent self-castigation by some. Here lies one explanation for the success of
the three books discussed here. All are works of literary or scholarly quality, and none of the
authors are suspected of connections with the “revanchist” Right. Grass, the praeceptor Ger-
maniae136 in political-moral matters, publicly admitted a lasting and collective omission; of the
two historians – with reputations if not splendid, then at least solid – one had the advantage of
being non-German, the other of having a leftist background.137
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It has been hinted that these authors sensed the time was ripe as recent events unblocked old
taboos. For instance, reports about mass-scale gang rape in the Bosnian war had increased
scholarly and civic awareness of the subject, and initiated discourse on the phenomenon of treat-
ing women as carnal war trophies half a century earlier. The unsentimental war diary of an anony-
mous woman describing gang rapes of German women (including herself) and their survival
strategies, had low sales when first published in 1959, but it has been on the German bestseller
lists ever since being republished in the summer of 2003.138
The lowering of the legitimacy threshold is stunning. In the late 1980s the biggest names in Ger-
man humanities (not only from historiography) were quarelling about the question of whether or
not Nazi crimes were unique, and finally the view prevailed that no comparison was valid. Not
even Stalinist terror was considered comparable. Now this dogma was overthrown by relative
outsiders – a novelist and two military historians without the title of professor (which still counts
in Germany) – who gained an easy and popular victory. Beevor depicts Soviet terror almost as
black as the Holocaust;139 Friedrich indicates the same with regard to the Western component of
the anti-fascist alliance. And after the publication of Grass’s Crabwalk, dealing with German WW
II-era suffering is no longer considered offensive, but even obligatory.
Since 1989, the legitimacy of comparing totalitarian systems has been confirmed by respected
non-German scholars.140 German authors likewise emphasize that discussion about the moral
legitimacy of Allied transgressions were not necessarily meant to set off Allied guilt against Ger-
man guilt.141 Still, since 2002, the tug-of-war about the future of German Vergangenheitsbewälti-
gung has clearly entered a new phase of uncertainty. Even without taking into consideration the
extreme Right’s feeling of justification – which, however, lost some of its propaganda arsenal to
the mainstream – we would do well to worry about the dynamics of the current victim culture that
validates subliminal German frustration about lasting discourse about guilt.142 In addition, more
trivial factors are at play, such as the cultural industry’s insatiable need for new, unworn themes
(“fresh pasts”143) for commercial exploitation. The consequences, intended or not, could easily
go far beyond the due scholarly and public reassessment of suffering, either inflicted by or
incurred by Germans. Former inadequacies in public coverage of German victimhood contribute
to the present overstressing, along with the reasoning that justice should be given to the war gen-
erations before their last representatives die off.144
Since it is more pleasant to deal with crimes committed by (ideologically or ethnically) “others”
and since people prefer to believe their own perception of events instead of historical facts, the
Germans are increasingly shifting their focus toward offenses committed against Germans, with
no or insufficient references to the historical context, and this inevitably reduces sensitivity to
offences Germans inflicted upon others. This is particularly important in view of the unprece-
dented plethora of articles commemorating the consecutive 60th anniversaries of “firestorms” –
such as the British Operation Gomorrha [sic], killing about 40,000 people in Hamburg between
24.7. and 3.8.1943145 – and many recent books continuing the success of The Blaze. For
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instance, at the 2003 Frankfurt Book Fair Friedrich presented his large photographic sequel vol-
ume called Fire Sites, which culminates in a chapter with dozens of nauseating photographs of
(mainly German) victims and often melodramatic captions. When confronted by critical questions
about his intentions, he rejoins, “Nobody would pose these questions if they were pictures of
bodies in concentration camps or victims of war crimes by the Wehrmacht on the eastern front.”
Again Friedrich draws parallels between victims of the Holocaust and victims of the bombings.146
On occasion he puts even more weight on the latter, as when he calls Churchill “The greatest
child-slaughterer of all time.”147
How many Germans know that just one day after the much-publicized drowning of thousands of
desperate German refugees on the Wilhelm Gustloff, nearby what was probably the last atrocious
act of the Holocaust took place. Other Germans, SS men along with teenagers from the Hitler
Youth, murdered over 5,000 of the remaining inmates of the Stutthof concentration camp after a
death march.148 Many Germans have forgotten, or never cared to remember, that anti-German
violence in the wake of WW II was a harsh response (admittedly often excessive but in its excess-
es hardly ever centrally planned and organized) to the Nazi Reich’s previous systematic efforts
to suppress, humiliate, rob, deport, and, ultimately, annihilate millions of people. 
Obviously, Germany’s remembrance culture is characterized by a vast gap – wider than proba-
bly in any other Western community except for Austria – between “legislated morality”, the com-
memoration rituals of the official state, appealing to foreign public opinion, and the collective
memory of ordinary citizens.149 Apprehension is widely expressed that recent events indicate the
direction in which Vergangenheitsbewältigung will develop.150 More than a decade ago, con-
cerned voices warned about “symptoms of a creeping alteration to the German self-image. And
Germany’s neighbours have to be vigilant when Germans once more begin to pose as victims.”151
Although well-meaning foreign observers do not share such “allergic reactions,” asserting
instead that the German discourse “coming of age” does not restrict but enriches history, others
express fears that this particular new selective reading of history could “once again open Pan-
dora’s box” for all of Europe.152
Indeed, the boom of epigonous books and TV features in 2003 taking advantage of the new cli-
mate in Germany and often manipulating emotions has become a self-accelerating process. The
unprecedented scale of best-selling books exploiting German victim culture is unsettling, partic-
ularly when contrasted with the far smaller sales of excellent books on German guilt. While writ-
ers and readers stress the need to investigate any injury, including those inflicted upon Germans,
German memory that it was the Nazi Empire and millions of its loyal subjects who first introduced
new dimensions of inhumanity seems to be fading. A large number of “ordinary” Germans,
including civilians who subsequently became victims, tolerated, applauded, or assisted in Nazi
crimes from which they often took advantage, e.g. by the Aryanization of Jewish property. 
Another dimension of Allied transgressions hitherto almost totally ignored, since, no influential
lobby has arisen, is quite different. In fact, Allied commanders had few scruples about subject-
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ing friendly civilian populations to collateral damage: people suppressed, occupied, or deported
by the common German enemy and hoping for liberation. The Anglo-American Bomber Com-
mand did not spare occupied cities such as Lille, Rouen, and Louvain. In raids before D-Day
about 12,000 French and Belgians were killed by Allied bombs, and unique historical monuments
destroyed. After the Allied landing in Normandy, Caen was razed more extensively than most Ger-
man cities.153 In addition, not only German women and women from countries that had been
associated with Germany (such as Hungary) but even many women from allied Poland and the
Ukraine were raped by Red Army soldiers.154
Skeletons I (Eastern)
There is nothing so difficult to predict as the past.
Post-1945 East European joke
Diplomatic strains over V-E Day celebrations reflected differences, the tip of the iceberg, over how
the war was interpreted in the countries involved. In spite of solemn exhortations of political cor-
rectness, it was not easy to find a common platform of remembrance. Responding to over-
whelming domestic pressure, the leaders of eight states, among them Polish President Lech Wale-
sa and his three Baltic counterparts, turned down Boris Yeltsin’s invitation to join the Moscow fes-
tivities on May 9, 1995.155 Many of their citizens were still extremely bitter about decades of Sovi-
et occupation, mass deportations, and liquidations. In the Baltic states, in particular, the war was
considered over only with liberation (new independence) in 1991, or even three years later when
the last Russian troops finally withdrew from the region. Some Baltic politicians openly criticized
then US President Bill Clinton for his “ignorance of history,” evidenced by his attendance in
Moscow, rendering credence to Russian claims to be the liberator of Eastern Europe.156
In the former Eastern Bloc countries, the 1989 changes and the ensuing autonomous approach
to their past had a tremendous effect upon contemporary foreign relations (not limited to Russia)
and domestic affairs. In the West, most sins against history had been committed by exclusion;
in the East often by active rewriting. Consequently, the East’s retrieval of memory from the deep
freeze was more difficult and even less linear. The persistent emergence of new evidence and the
ever-changing socio-political climate combined in modifying, updating, and even constantly
revising historical writing and culture in scholarly and public discourse. This is particularly so in
Hungary and the Czech Republic, where nationalist anti-Communists and socialist post-Com-
munists take turns in government, the latter branded by the former as the “Corpses-in-the-Base-
ment-Party.”157 Actually, it was more than a metaphor that the historico-political discourse all too
often received new energy with the resurfacing of hidden skeletons either in paper form because
of more liberal access to hitherto closed sources, or literally, by the unearthing of mass graves.158
Apart from the few instances when someone was “buried” and found alive,159 most of these
skeletons raised the question of whether or not they should be left in their burial place (usually
their killing-place, as well) or if they should be exhumed and exposed to media hype. For promi-
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nent figures, with the conspicuous exception of the Führer himself,160 the second choice seemed
more appropriate. Lech Walesa personally urged the repatriation and solemn re-interment of the
body of General Wladyslaw Sikorski, head of the exiled anti-Soviet government of Poland (1939-
1943),161 as well as the ashes of Bor-Komorowski, leader of the anti-German and anti-Soviet
uprising of the nationalist Army Krajowa [Home Army]. The Army Krajowa insurgents began their
uprising against the German occupation on August 1, 1944. In early October, they were forced
to surrender because the Soviets had halted east of Warsaw allowing the Germans to destroy
Warsaw and extinguish their Polish opponents who had intended to take control of the capital
before the Red Army could arrive and establish a puppet regime. 
Although one of WW II’s bloodiest battles, claiming more than 200,000 lives, and probably the
first battle of the Cold War (with varying degrees of political cynicism displayed by all powers),
the Warsaw uprising is still relatively unknown outside Poland. This is partly an after-effect of
decades-long Communist rule (and Western embarrassment) when it was hushed up or deni-
grated as act of criminal recklessness causing death on a mass scale and the capital’s ruin. The
Army Krajowa was branded as reactionary or worse, and affiliation with it was taken as a pretext
for persecution. Nevertheless, to the huge majority of Poles the 63-day battle is a spiritual point
of reference, the heroic (even if doomed) act of resistance and self-liberation, in consequence,
“a historical imperative.” The uprising is central to how Poles see not only their history but also
their geographical role squeezed between two great and potentially expansive powers. At its 50th
anniversary only the German president came and apologized for the brutal record of his compa-
triots. Yeltsin was “too busy to attend.”162
The post-Communist world has seen many reburials since the late 1980s, beginning with the
state funeral of Hungary’s reformist prime minister Imre Nagy and the other leaders of 1956’s
failed uprising against Soviet hegemony. The reburial took place on June 16, 1989, the anniver-
sary of their execution. This tremendously symbolic venture, held even before the “official” down-
fall of the Soviet Empire, broke one of the strongest taboos and accelerated the further crumbling
of the whole “bloc,” particularly in Germany.163 While the Nagy ceremony was applauded in
almost all political quarters, opinions were divided regarding another “late returnee.” In 1994,
Hungary’s conservative prime minister Jﬁzsef Antall consented to bring back the mortal remains
of the former regent and “tragic hero” Miklos Horthy, who had died in Portugal in 1957. Horthy
had been made welcome in Portugal by the conservative and autocratic Portuguese prime min-
ister, Antﬁnio de Oliveira Salazar. Some 30,000 mostly elderly people attended the memorial
service, which was broadcast live on state television and honoured with a commemorative coin.
The opposition warned against the political rehabilitation of Hitler’s one-time ally – who had per-
sonified and still symbolized Hungarian irredentism. During his 25 years in power (1920-1944)
Horthy had championed the “winning back” of all territories, from Slovakia to Transylvania, lost
by Greater Hungary in the Trianon Peace Treaty after WW I. The fact that the government had
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sponsored Horthy’s solemnly staged reburial affected relations with all Hungary’s neighbours,
some of them with similar nationalistic credentials.164
In Russia, dating back to the gory aftermath of the October revolution, skeletons and feuds often
were diachronically connected. Social standing once more plays a role. While the non-govern-
mental Memorial Society, founded in early 1989, increasingly encounters obstructions in its
search for mass graves and its attempts to personalize the victims of Stalin’s Great Terror,165 the
solemn funeral service held for the Romanov family exactly 80 years after their execution ignited
a continuing row even within the anti-Communist camp – as well as in the Orthodox Church,
which after all (i.e. since WW II) had quite successfully cohabited with the regime that had mur-
dered the tsar.166 Sometimes attention is greater when the victims were foreign. Much publicity
was bestowed on Stalin’s butchering of more than 20,000 officers and other members of the Pol-
ish elite near Smolensk (in the Katyn Forest)167 and near Charkov (Ukraine).168 This carnage has
adversely affected Polish-Russian relations ever since the remains were discovered in 1943,
although the unity of the anti-Hitler alliance had required adoption of the Soviet version that
depicted the massacre as just another Nazi crime. While the final burial site of the Polish victims
is still under discussion (and the mass grave of some thousands still undiscovered,)169 the
remains of the one-time Wehrmacht invaders received even more “dignified” treatment from
Russian authorities thanks to the much greater potential of Germany (and Austria). Consequent-
ly, the 1992 war graves' agreement has led to the construction in Russia of over a dozen Ger-
man military cemeteries and more than 100 monuments for fallen Germans (These constructions
were only temporarily delayed by internal Russian opposition, from communist and veteran cir-
cles, or because of political antagonism stoked by NATO’s bombing of Serbia.170). 
The tangle of recent events with world war memories was demonstrated in the Balkans with their
“ever-present past” more forcefully than elsewhere. This was shown, above all, by reactions to
the reappearance of German soldiers in the region. Their deployment during the Yugoslav seces-
sion wars was initially limited to “friendly Croatia,”171 but after Kosovo, simmering WW II ani-
mosities stirred up again for good. When, for instance, the memorial site of the Wehrmacht mas-
sacre at Kragujevac172 was damaged by NATO bombs and, soon after, state subsidies were can-
celled by the pro-Western government of Zoran Djindjic´, “old” and “new” German inroads were
easily mixed up in public discourse.173 Moreover, digging (for civil war mass graves or merely for
roadworks) all too often brought to light “WW II bones”174 and connected history. This embar-
rassed state authorities, who at times came up with strange solutions for how to deal with the
situation. Such was Franjo Tudjman’s initiative to promote a pan-Croatian “reconciliation”
embracing the Ustasˇi and Tito’s guerrillas alike, reburying at the same place victims and hang-
men (with changing roles) along with “fighters for Croatian independence” killed in the 1990s.175
Especially in Russia, where some areas as the Smolensk region are literally “built on Soviet and
German bones,”176 it is sometimes difficult to separate the finds into ours and theirs; in addition,
accidentally discovered mass graves from the war period might contain both prisoners executed
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by the Germans and victims of the NKVD. There are no funds (and no wish) for any thorough
examination, since “these are not the tsar’s bones.”177 Funding is, as usual, easier to appropriate
when specific interests are involved. For instance, when heavy rainfalls washed away the super-
ficial cover upon a SS killing field, revealing the remains of thousands of Crimean Jews, the
$20,000 needed for a proper reburial were secured finally, after a long and shameful delay, by
Israeli intervention.178 In general, the problem is long overdue for a solution. Nearly 2.5 million
people died in the Leningrad area alone and the bodies of hundreds of thousands of Soviet sol-
diers still lie where they fell, covered with dirt and some vegetation. In Soviet times even volun-
tary searchers were discouraged because the regime, obviously unwilling to admit the appalling
extent of their own casualties, claimed that all the country’s fallen soldiers already had been
reburied. Only since the late ’80s have organized voluntary searches become possible. These
efforts have received official recognition but only few funds, further slowing the pace of identifi-
cations and reburials. Since the volunteers insist that the war will not be over “until the last [dead]
man is accounted for,”179 WW II is destined to continue for some considerable time.
Russia
Despite the 55th anniversary, many of the pages of World War II’s history have yet
to be written fully, some of them are not written at all, and some have to be rewritten
by future generations of historians and researchers in the name of historical truth and fairness.
Yevgeny Kiselyov, The Moscow Times, May 12, 2000
On May 9, 1995, over 50 foreign top-level dignitaries, including then US President Clinton180 and
countless journalists gathered in Moscow for the jubilee, which only in Russia was openly cele-
brated as a victory jubilee – combining “Soviet-style grand ceremony with one of the city’s biggest-
ever street parties,” a unique “outpouring of public joy.” Although Western leaders boycotted181 the
huge military parade that inaugurated the country’s monumental new memorial site to this victory,
they saw enormous Soviet-era posters and other chronological throwbacks all over the capital city.
Veterans with shiny Soviet medals draped across their chests marched through Moscow, enjoying
their history and the brilliant weather. CDs of war songs by the Red Army Ensemble were big sell-
ers. So was the stamp, the first in 40 years, dedicated to Stalin – whose contribution to victory was
extolled by good, old Pravda and in several speeches: “The day mixed nostalgia for the Soviet Union
with new Russian patriotism in free and sometimes confusing style.”182
People unfamiliar with recent developments were particularly confused. Yeltsin’s Russia aspired
to act as the legitimate successor to the pre-1917 empire. When the president declared at the
reburial service for the “innocently murdered” Romanovs that Russia had finally repented for one
of its “most shameful episodes in history,”183 it seemed that after eight decades the decisive last
battle of the Russian Civil War was won by the Whites.184 Long before 1989, however, the old
tsarist empire had taken on a subcutaneous second life inside the communist state, while ordinary
subjects took pride in Soviet power. Many Russians – economically and politically humiliated, and
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disappointed by life under “democracy” – looked to the glorious past for reassurance. The Great
Patriotic War and pride in the victory against Nazi Germany, once the main legitimizing factor for
Soviet rule, is still the only memory that unites all political camps, social factions, and most eth-
nic groups. The surge of nostalgic nationalism and the lack of new and glorious traditions did not
really allow a clear break with the communist past and its Manichean views of the war. 
In contrast to WW II, the Cold War was not ended by unconditional surrender and subsequent
occupation. The end did not establish zero-hour conditions for a new start. In consequence, a
Russian version of German-style Vergangenheitsbewältigung, such as special programs of mass
education, was out of the question. Although an unprecedented boom of often critical remem-
brance literature about Stalin’s rule has added a new tune to the Russian book market and the
huge gap between war history and its (official) postwar mythology is narrowing, this indicates
mainly a trend in intellectual discourse and not general attitudes. The gloomy present and uncer-
tain future foster public tendencies to idealize the – “better, after all” – past. Hence, the govern-
ment has increasingly restrained publicity that would harm the country’s image and the nation’s
unity. Before long, the abandoned Red Army Day was revived, reserving February 23rd as Defend-
er of the Fatherland’s Day and celebrated again with marching crowds reclaiming lapsed glory.
Yeltsin praised traditions and virtues of the Russian army, equating the battles of Borodino
(against Napoleon) and Stalingrad. The same fighting spirit that once brought victory against all
the odds would help Russia overcome current hardships.185 Memory of past glory should foster
optimism and confidence in firm leadership.
Yeltsin’s hand-picked successor, Vladimir Putin, supported by a new/old power elite firmly root-
ed in communist times, took further advantage of the increasing nostalgia for Russia’s imperial
past and glory. Searching for a viable Russian identity and normalcy that would help mend divi-
sions in society at the new millennium’s dawn, Putin advocated the “indivisibility” of national his-
tory: It was necessary to pay tribute to the positive heritage of both the tsarist era, referring in
particular to famous “Russian cultural titans”186 and the Soviet era187 as both controversial peri-
ods had seen substantial accomplishments by Russians. In late 2000, Putin succeeded in bring-
ing a mixed bag of state symbols through the Duma – supported by a motley coalition including
Communists and Vladimir Shirinovski’s extreme Right but excluding Liberals. The legislative
compromise reinstated the tune (only) of the old Soviet anthem – composed in 1944 at Stalin’s
request, abolished by Yeltsin but still popular – and “the [Red] flag that we planted atop the
Reichstag” for the army, thereby securing Communist acceptance of the tsarist tricolour and the
double-headed eagle crest. With such strong symbolism, both imperial periods were finally rec-
ognized as patriotic elements in the line of historic remembrance. The continuity of Russian his-
tory was restored and legitimized.188 The anodyne ideology proposed by the “new tsar” (and KGB
veteran) might be paraphrased as “Russia has been great in all its epochs, despite a few
flaws.”189 Still, the historic compromise in unity's name needed to restrict both principal factions
in order to appease the other. Further elucidation of Stalinist terror was discouraged; today even
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literary classics about Soviet repression, including Boris Pasternak's Dr. Zhivago, are threatened
with removal from the school syllabus.190 In any case, the glasnost era’s enthusiasm for archival
explorations and disclosure had waned. Even most ex-victims prefer amnesia, glossing over
painful memories.191 On the other side of Putin’s coin of political necessity and national recon-
ciliation, however, it is written that Russia must remain “the only country with no Stalingrad.”192
Stalingrad
The total casualties of this battle with the most loss of human life are still under dispute, since
especially civilian losses are unsettled. The death toll surpassed one million, although much high-
er numbers circulate. One of the most decisive military encounters in history, the 200 day Battle
of Stalingrad has been immortalized in epic tomes, films, a metro station in Paris, and even a star
discovered in 1972. By contrast, few people outside Russia are familiar with the city’s current
name, Volgograd. Communists and war veterans have steadily promoted the idea of restoring the
name of the city –  which until 1926 was called Tsaritsyn, after the tsaritsa Catherine the Great –
to Stalingrad. This act, they argued, would not necessarily pay tribute to Stalin, as many empha-
sized, but to the memory of the dead and the decisive victory. In December 2002, in time for the
battle's 60th anniversary, Putin temporarily agreed until domestic opposition and the negative
consequences for “new” Russia’s image abroad changed his mind again.193
During the Cold War, Soviet campaigns against Western falsifikatsiya of WW II history had referred
to the mainstream narrative that systematically minimized the Soviet Union’s contribution while
elevating the Anglo-American “crusade.” Indeed, WW II had been primarily a German-Soviet war.
After June 1941, the Wehrmacht never committed less than approximately 70% of its entire field
strength to the eastern front and the operational engagement there accounted for more than 85%
of overall German losses. On the other side, in Stalingrad alone the Soviets lost more people than
the British and Americans did together during the entire war. On the most appropriate occasion,
the 50th anniversary of V-E Day, US President Bill Clinton had cautiously “acknowledged” that “the
West had long underestimated” the Soviet contribution.194 Still, the new partnership did not much
show up on the occasion of the subsequent – up to the 60th – anniversaries of the big battles. The
Anglo-Saxon media, apart from a few left-of-centre voices, seldom admitted that it was Stalingrad
that reversed the tide of the war and not the sideshow in El Alamein, the “epic” Pacific battles
against Japan, or even the Second Front in France, which are still the beloved versions of Western
war mythology, ad nauseam recycled and hence sanctioned by Hollywood. Commentators ques-
tioned the issue of Red Army heroism by generalizing the brutal coercive measures “keen to depict
the struggle as a contest between totalitarian systems in which the more ruthless emerged as vic-
tor.”195 In this they were facilitated by the coincidence that the 60th anniversary of the Battle of Stal-
ingrad fell close to the 50th anniversary of Stalin’s death. 
Under the umbrella of warning against re-Sovietization, commentators connected the renaming
campaign – and, hence, the whole myth of Stalingrad – with the late dictator’s continuing “hold
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over the Russian psyche.” Indeed, after the dip caused by glasnost, Stalin was again doing well
in opinion polls, especially among older people who saw the vozhd [leader] as father figure and
saviour of Russia from Nazi aggression. Consequently, his supporters, if not the majority of Rus-
sians were criticized with ignoring that the dictator had “killed more innocent people than any
politician [Hitler included] in European history,” – counting at least 25 million victims, if not four
times as many because “the totalitarian communism of which Stalin was the chief architect has
so far killed up to 100 million around the world.” The current discussion on Iraq allowed flanking
attacks against “the intellectual double standard that was applied to Communism and Nazism
throughout the 20th century, the influence of which has survived the collapse of the Soviet Union
itself.” In this context, Russian and Western left-wing “intellectuals who now denounce Bush and
Blair as warmongers” while they had allowed Stalin's crime to sink into oblivion, were accused
of continuing the Cold War by other means.196 Other observers came closer to the point when
explaining why post-Soviet “Russians seemed to reclaim their history.” The war that had touched
and decimated most families became “a source of personal pride, a testimony to the courage and
stubborn endurance of the people, rather than proof of the superiority of the Soviet system.”197
Indeed, Russian remembrance is multifaceted. Stalingrad especially, but also Leningrad with its
endurance of a 900-day siege and Moscow – where the Wehrmacht was stopped in the winter
1941-’42 and the myth of German invincibility saw its first cracks198 – are all still viewed as pow-
erful symbols of Russian (and, by others, Soviet) courage and perseverance, at the same time a
“source of pride and pain.”199 The pain refers not only to the millions of people killed in WW II. Crit-
ics today ask to what degree these losses could have been lessened if the leadership had been
less cynical and contemptuous of life. For this reason, it seems, the regime afterwards calculat-
ingly obscured genuine, sacrificial heroism with official, stylized, stereotyped “heroic” myths. The
human cost, most probably about 27 million Soviet citizens, was regarded by the regime as detri-
mental to its own reputation and therefore was reduced (first, by Stalin in 1946, to 7 and later, by
Khruschev, to “about 20 million”) and “politically manipulated, all to hide unpreparedness, incom-
petence, and uncaring profligacy with human life on the battlefront.”200 Since the current leader-
ship does not hesitate, on Defender of the Fatherland Day, to liken Stalingrad and the ongoing war
in Chechnya,201 critics see a perilous strategic continuity: “Given a choice between the lives of its
citizens and the protection of its interests, the Russian state once again did not hesitate. It is the
consistency over time and over regimes that makes Russian policy scary.”202
Collective glorification perpetuates the myths of war and their continual effect regardless of his-
torical fact. Characteristically, the Russian ambassador in London protested against Anthony
Beevor’s book on Berlin 1945, and particularly against the coverage of mass rapes, calling it an
act of blasphemy and slander.203 Other Russian charges were more justified, such as blaming
their small Baltic neighbours of “one-eyed” Vergangenheitsbewältigung204 – even though such
accusations often were cover for Moscow’s still being unprepared for parting with time-honoured
hegemonic attitudes.
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Former Brothers: Raising Cain 
“Not friends, brothers!”
Most of the states included in this section have been part of the famous Cordon Sanitaire that the
French engineered after WW I with the dual purpose of isolating Soviet Russia and securing the
Versailles system against Germany and “revisionist” tendencies of the defeated. The very exis-
tence of these states depended on their appropriate behaviour. After WW II – and the failed Ger-
man attempt to incorporate the Cordon states into its Lebensraum – it was the turn of the USSR
to reverse the plot, utilizing its new “brother” states as a strategic buffer zone against the West.
Most recently, there are indications of a scheme to employ these states of “New Europe” in a
similar function against the old powers west and east of them. Be that as it may, in the Cordon-
states the past and its present-day significance has quite a different dimension than in other parts
of Europe.
The West and Russia, in spite of all the discrepancies, shared the triumph of 1945 and under-
stood WW II as common war against Nazi Germany; so it was easier for them, after the end of
the Cold War, to find a common platform to rejoin the celebration. Western Europe was liberat-
ed from the yoke of fascism and developed democracy to unprecedented heights. The Russians
could console themselves with a new era as a world power, so that continuity with the Soviet
period was not seen per se as a burden, and anti-communism, as such, was not strongly felt by
a majority.205 Conversely, most of the former Warsaw Pact members and Soviet republics almost
completely ignored V-E Day or made bitter comments. The Baltic people did not want “to cele-
brate anything together with Moscow, especially the victory of the Red Army.” Poland’s then
president, Lech Walesa, likewise refused to take part in the Russian festivities, publicly castigat-
ing the Western Allies for having abandoned Poland and handing it over to Stalin.206 Even in Bul-
garia, traditionally the most Russophile satellite, commemoration of May 8th was accompanied
by a heavy row between post-Communists and anti-Communists.207 In general, the disparate
conceptions of liberation threw established views of the results of WW II into doubt. The image
of British celebrations on V-E Day, for example, raised questions about how Britain had “won,”
considering that in September 1939 it had gone to war to honour its recent guarantee of Poland’s
independence, which was subsequently, in 1945, surrendered to Stalin – evidently the real vic-
tor.208
During half a century of communist rule, the various regimes had one-sidedly propagandized
about the role and atrocities of Nazi Germany, the ideologically convenient occupier. Only after
the downfall of communism and its “unifying” historiographical dogma did it become possible
for latent Russophobia – interwoven with rising nationalistic pride in the glorious pages of one’s
own history – to focus openly on the taboo subject of Soviet occupation, and terror. Suddenly,
Nazi crimes sometimes seemed inferior and inflated by communist propaganda. For the Poles,
the Katyn Forest massacre exemplified the camouflaged crimes the Soviets had perpetrated.
Soon, public awareness of September 17th, the day of Stalin’s double-crossing assault of Poland
H I S T O R E I N
V
O
L
U
M
E
4
(2
0
0
3
-4
)
73
HAGEN/45-130elis  23-11-04  16:10  ™ÂÏ›‰·73
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 21/02/2020 08:09:23 |
T h e  P a s t  B e n e a t h  t h e  P r e s e n t
from the east, surpassed that of September 1st, the anniversary of Germany’s invasion, which
had been officially commemorated since 1945. The Poles were particularly offended by persist-
ent Russian refusal to admit that the 1939 invasion (“authorized” by the deal with Hitler) had been
an act of aggression, virtually reiterating Stalinist propaganda.209
As for the Warsaw uprising, Soviet “treason” was considered more shocking than German brutal-
ity. Nonetheless, Polish assessments of the two black periods were almost equal in value210 and
memories of Nazi rule did not fade away, since in Poland the occupation had been bloodier than
in any other country except the USSR. In most other countries, however, the balance was sur-
prisingly weighted, at least from the Western perspective. This is impressively illustrated by the
upsurge in new museums dedicated to terror.211 In the Baltic countries, for instance, they are
lumping together the Soviet-German-Soviet occupation 1940-1991, with clear emphasis on the
“much longer” communist period.212 The same is true in Hungary, where the Conservative gov-
ernment, in an effort to weaken the Socialists amidst a bitter pre-election struggle, sped up the
opening of Budapest’s newly built “Terror House.” Most of the building – used as a dungeon both
before and after the definitive January 1945, when the Red Army conquered Budapest – portrays
in gruesome detail the Stalinist terror; only two rooms are devoted to the previous terror phase of
Hungarian fascists and German Nazis, while almost no reference is made to Horthy’s “benign
autocracy.” According to Laszlo Karsai, one of Hungary’s top Holocaust historians, “the message
is simple: Almost every Hungarian is innocent. The main guilty are foreign forces: first the Ger-
mans, then the Russians, and very, very few collaborators.” Hungary’s new center-left govern-
ment wants to restructure the museum or slash its budget, provoking “bitter, rancorous discus-
sions.”213 Unsurprisingly, there is a striking contrast with similar museums in new Russia, with
regard both to the lay-out and public preferences. For instance, the former Solovki Monastery,
under Stalin a notorious prison camp, has been transformed into a three-section museum. The first
section is dedicated to the monastery’s pre-1917 history, the second to the Gulag, and the third
to a minor WW II naval training camp nearby, which attracts by far the most visitors.214
In the USSR’s former “brother states,” governmental promises to clear up and deal with the
“darkest period of their country’s history” had in mind first and foremost the communist past.
In the Baltic states, for instance, all 32 memorial sites devoted to the defenders of Stalingrad
have changed character and name, stirring anger in Russia.215 In issues of everyday political cul-
ture – renaming streets or entire cities, the dismantling of monuments216 and the erecting of new
ones – “new” usually means nothing more than returning to pre-Soviet traditions of “national
independence,” which have ipso facto been rehabilitated and hallowed by reason of decades-
long communist disparagement. It was easily forgotten that most of these nostalgically transfig-
ured prewar regimes were socially and ideologically objectionable, authoritarian if not fascist in
nature and often collaborating staunchly with Nazi Germany – as the minion states Romania and
Hungary. The Third Reich had actually installed some of these regimes (Croatia, Slovakia) or had
been viewed by local (e.g., Baltic or Ukrain) nationalists, at least initially, as liberators. 
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The suspicious paucity of any references to native collaboration in the new national remem-
brance culture reveals intentions to skim over the shadier aspects of the pre-communist era, in
particular, the fervent anti-Semitism inextricably bound up with indigenous pre-war nationalism
in most of the Cordon states. Today, in some countries with a significant record of collaboration
with the Germans, the powers-that-be refute or hush up any association with war crimes.217 In
June 2003, the Romanian government issued a blunt denial of their country’s involvement in the
Holocaust. Four days later, after heavy protests, particularly from Jewish circles, and ridicule by
the Western press, Bucharest admitted having played a role in the genocide.218 The desire of
almost all ex-bloc states to join the EU and NATO for political, economic, and military promotion,
was easily used as leverage to remind them that admission was not possible without a certain
amount of common cultural advancement, including political correctness in dealing with war his-
tory. This meant facing up to one’s own responsibility, recognizing it in public discourse, apply-
ing it through education, and purging surviving culprits. It also demanded legislation aimed at
symbolic, at least, compensation for Holocaust survivors. Most governments, eager to demon-
strate their new democratic standards, sooner or later conformed, though in some countries con-
siderable segments of the population resented “preferential treatment of small minority groups”
(meaning Jews), asking instead for the “socially imperative” rehabilitation of the victims of Com-
munist terror. As a further consequence, anti-Semitism and, at times, anti-Westernism
increased.219
The case of a state, which did not apply for integration into the West, is worth mentioning. The
Ukraine’s sui generis post-communist regime has tried to reconcile conflicting memories of patri-
otic resistance and patriotic (i.e. separatist Ukrainian) collaboration during WW II while at the
same time offering less restitution for Holocaust victims than any other involved state.220 It may
be interesting to follow predictable adjustments in consequence of recent Ukrainian feelers to
enter NATO. There are similarities in Belarus, another autocratically ruled USSR successor state,
where eternal president Aleksandr Lukashenko repeatedly has expressed esteem for Nazi Ger-
many but also, after years of prodding, honoured local Jews murdered in the Shoah, proclaim-
ing that he wanted to unite all citizens of his country, irrespective of previous cleavages.221
Evidence of the nationalist surge (with anti-Russian connotations) that had already surfaced
before 1989 is found in the rehabilitation of individuals or organizations such as Stepan Bandera
and the UPA in the Ukraine, Milan Nedic´ and the Cˇetnici in Serbia,222 Jﬁzef Tiso in Slovakia, Ion
Antonescu in Romania, 223 the Latvian (SS-) Legion, and even the Ustas´i,224 who all had collabo-
rated with the Nazis as early champions of independence. Official tributes to Genghis Khan and
Vlad T¸epes [Count Dracula] as national heroes by the regimes in Ulan Bator and Bucharest,
respectively, were extreme cases.225 Since many intellectuals have adroitly converted from com-
munism to new “democratic nationalism,” certain patterns of communist war historiography
have been perpetuated, if in reverse. One’s own people were and are consistently seen as victim
– of the Nazis in the pre-1990 version, of the communists (“surpassing even the Nazis”) in the
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current version. Memory and commemoration repress ugly aspects where one’s own people in
fact had been victimizers. The re-establishment of narrow, ethnically defined nationalism has ren-
dered it dangerous, if not unpatriotic, to unveil dirty facets of national history and possibly reviv-
ing dormant conflicts. While newly accessible archival sources provide considerable evidence
about locals willingly participating in anti-Jewish (or other) pogroms that contributed decisively
to the “success” of the Holocaust in their country, the few researchers who dare to violate the
old/new taboo are usually émigrés or foreigners. Such are, e.g., the cases of Poland,226 the Baltic
states and, in particular, Hungary, where Eichmann’s few German henchmen would never have
succeeded in deporting almost half a million Jews within 56 days without the efficient assistance
of the Hungarian administration and much sympathy from the population.227
The same biased approach can be observed regarding the judicial purge of the past. Sanctions
and punishment, limitation periods for crimes, amnesty, and rehabilitation, all were controversial
catchphrases in a society where perpetrators and victims had repeatedly changed roles follow-
ing the ups and downs of recent history. Since 1990 in most former bloc countries, important
public figures have emphasized the necessity of ending the retaliations and counter-retaliations of
the recent past, meaning that under given conditions a German-style Vergangenheitsbewältigung
would be a possibly self-destructive intellectual extravagance.228 Instead, energies would better be
used for securing the continuity of their countries. Successive non-communist governments
emphasized that such a pragmatic idealism involved the danger of living with the lie of a glossed-
over past, imposing instead a rather vendetta-like “catharsis.” Consequently, an incalculable – still
too low for many – number of suspects of Soviet-era offences were denounced, harassed, inter-
rogated, dismissed from work, often put on trial, and imprisoned.229 In contrast, as for “Nazi-
related” perpetrators in former communist states, to date only two have been convicted. The first
was the Croatian Dinko Sakic, then 78-year-old ex-commandant of the Jasenovac terror camp,
who was sentenced in 1999 to 20 years for multiple murder (but not genocide). Sakic had had
quite a public life in his Argentine exile – giving interviews, meeting Tudjman – until Zaghreb
decided to ask for his extradition in order to distinguish new Croatia from the Ustasˇa past.230 The
other was a Lithuanian who, however, was spared a prison sentence for health reasons.231
The Baltic States
The past is not a five-and-dime store where you pick and choose . . .
what to extol and what to deny. 
Toomas Ilves, Estonian Foreign Minister, January 2001 [speaking of the Russians]
The three tiny Baltic states – Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania – are universally viewed as gallant
small nations who in the late ’80s finally succeeded in throwing off the Soviet yoke and reassert-
ing their sovereignty after half a century of gruesome occupation. This view particularly prevailed
in Western capitals, reflecting subconscious remorse at letting down the Baltic states twice in the
1940s. At the same time, it corresponded widely with the three nations’ self-image. The Baltic
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peoples tend to base their identity, apart from the peculiar languages, on their vision of the past.
Since their pre-WW II autonomous existence had lasted little more than two decades – with the
exception of Lithuania, which has enjoyed periods of medieval imperial glory, though mostly
shared with Poland – the interpretation by the Baltic states of their past and identity is principal-
ly based on memories from half a century of communist suppression. They have transformed the
indubitable suffering of that period into a myth leaving little space for unconventional aspects.
Characteristically, the Latvian prime minister Guntars Krasts, head of the nationalist Fatherland
and Freedom Party, postulated that “no other nation in Europe has suffered as much as Latvia.”232
In this sense, politicians and pundits of the Baltic nations were busy rewriting history to focus on
Soviet/Russian terror. Books, art, films, and education reflect these popular concerns. In conse-
quence, neither the states nor the mainstream publics took the trouble to differentiate, within the
category of “victims of Soviet terror,” between war criminals and innocent sufferers. Lithuania,
for instance, was quick to rehabilitate 35,000 citizens who had been convicted in the Soviet era
of war crimes and collaboration with the Germans, yet it responded slowly and fragmentarily to
mostly foreign demands for having the names on this list published for screening.233 Converse-
ly, the conviction and imprisonment of a former Soviet guerrilla fighter for the killing of some
(alleged pro-Nazi) Latvians in 1944 triggered strong protests from the Russian press, Putin per-
sonally, and Latvia’s large ethnic Russian community.234
In all three Baltic countries there are large minorities of ethnic Russians, who settled there most-
ly after 1945. This group certainly could not share the nationalistic mainstream view, causing fur-
ther strain on inter-ethnic relations. Discriminations by the governments of the Baltic states obvi-
ously were intended to force the “foreign element” either to assimilate or move out. As a rule, cit-
izenship was granted only to pre-WW II residents and their direct descendants. The others, even
if they had been residents for decades, had to apply for citizenship and previously, in Latvia, for
instance, to pass tests in language and even in history – with 1940 the obvious key date once
again. An advisor of Yeltsin’s, in a 1993 interview with The Observer, charged Latvia and Esto-
nia with being apartheid states, triggering another years-long public confrontation.235 Only recent-
ly have legislative discriminatory measures been smoothed down, in part because of pressure by
the EU and the US, which both became increasingly irritated with the one-sided way the Baltic
republics confronted their war past. 
The largest contingent of non-German troops in Nazi Germany’s armed forces consisted of Lat-
vians, though the degree to which they served voluntarily differed from case to case. In Riga,
however, it was cleverly forgotten that during the Battle of Berlin in April 1945 Latvians were
among the most fanatic defenders of Hitler’s den. Every year after independence, veterans of the
Latvian Legion, which once numbered over 100,000 armed men under SS command, marched
through the capital. High Latvian officials, from the president on down, attended, claiming that
this was no show of support for the Nazis, but remembrance of gallant military service and war
casualties. The marches drew warm applause, in particular from elderly onlookers – the excep-
H I S T O R E I N
V
O
L
U
M
E
4
(2
0
0
3
-4
)
77
HAGEN/45-130elis  23-11-04  16:10  ™ÂÏ›‰·77
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 21/02/2020 08:09:23 |
T h e  P a s t  B e n e a t h  t h e  P r e s e n t
tion being, understandably, ethnic Russians.236 Only after increasingly strongly expressed
protests from Russia to Israel and the Western states, did, for the first time in 1998 on the
Legion’s 55th anniversary, the president not attend. In 1999 the Latvian government forbade the
army from taking part, and in 2000 the parade was cancelled.237
At the same time, Western pressure was mounting upon all three republics to look honestly at
their pasts and come to grips with their parallel roles as perpetrators. Actually, the position of
the Baltic states in Holocaust history is unique. Everywhere else in Hitler’s Europe, Jews usu-
ally were deported to the death camps in Poland. Baltic Jews were slaughtered on the spot,
with many of their fellow countrymen, awash in intense anti-Semitism, cooperating with the
German death squads. Nevertheless, the Baltic public at large (most historians included) had
a vacuum of knowledge about the Holocaust, for the subject already had been marginalized
under Soviet rule.238
A Lithuanian prime minister, Adolfas Slezevicius, was the first Baltic leader who, on the newly
established Genocide Day, encouraged his countrymen to acknowledge their “painful past”
– meaning involvement in the annihilation of over 200,000 Jews – and to ask for forgiveness.239
But only in late 1997, after foreign pressure, did the parliament amend its criminal code to allow
suspects of genocide to stand trial regardless of their age or their state of health. In 1998, Wash-
ington hailed the decision to enter charges of genocide against a 90-year-old high ranking secu-
rity police officer, Aleksandras Lileikis, which was the first trial for WW II crimes in any of the
USSR successor states. But the suspect died before the trial began; only his 93 year old deputy
Kazys Gimzauskas was convicted, in early 2001, but was spared a prison sentence for health
reasons.240 Latvia did even less in this respect, and did it later.241 After strong international criti-
cism and pressure, Latvia did at least erect a Holocaust memorial, and the country’s president
admitted the long-denied role played by local collaborators.242
Still, many of the Baltic peoples continue to live in denial. Nationalists, some in high government
positions, equate the loss of lives to Soviet terror243 in 1940-’41 with the Holocaust – propagat-
ing the concept of “two genocides,” while emphasis should be given to the allegedly forgotten
first, committed by Soviets (and Jews) against the Baltic people. There are demands for a Nurem-
berg trial, for Soviet crimes (including the alleged disproportionate involvement of Jews in the
NKVD terror), since the trials of Baltic war criminals – few and ineffective as they did not put a
single person behind bars, stirred mainstream criticism against supposedly one-eyed justice.244
Consequently, public debate between the three republics and their gigantic neighbour continues
as a dual monologue: The Russian media focus on cooperation by Baltic renegades with the
Nazis, and showing no remorse; Baltic officials blast the “new” Russian leadership for not
accepting any moral responsibility for Soviet crimes.245 The intensity of this altercation has come
to overshadow the traditional Polish-Russian conflict.
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Poland
There is a comparable traditional (auto-)stereotype of Polish martyrdom,246 dating back to the
country’s partition among the three voracious adjacent powers that led to the finis Poloniae,
Poland’s disappearance from the map between 1795 and 1918. This disappearance was repeat-
ed in 1939, when Poland was sliced up once again, this time between Hitler and Stalin. The Pol-
ish myth of suffering, however, differs from the Baltic version because of a traditionally more defi-
ant attitude stemming from greater self-assurance and the conviction that the Poles, with their
“fourth-largest Allied military force” had decisively contributed to the final victory in WW II with-
out, however, receiving due recognition. In Poland there are vivid memories of the foundation of
a complete underground state and of Free Poles fighting in North Africa and on almost every other
front. Although it is virtually unknown in Germany, Poles remember clearly that two Polish armies
participated in the Soviet conquest of Berlin and that a second flag was hoisted in triumph atop
the Brandenburg Gate: Poland’s white-and-red banner. To the Poles, it seemed only reasonable
that Lech Walesa requested to be invited to the gathering of the main protagonists in Berlin on
May 8th, 1995 and the refusal disturbed Poland’s traditionally traumatic relations with her princi-
pal neighbours.247
In Poland, earlier than in other states of the Soviet bloc (with the possible exception of Hungary
in 1956) and long before the rise of Solidarnos´c´, strong opposing segments of society attempt-
ed to uncover and cultivate controversial or tabooed issues of the non-Communist past, even
though the country was dotted with monuments of the Katyn massacre falsely attributing respon-
sibility to the Germans. This nonconformist approach to Polish history became an efficient
weapon for the opposition movement which, a few months after coming to power, was vindicat-
ed in April 1990 when a TASS statement dryly admitted that the Katyn Forest murders had per-
sonally been ordered by Stalin.248 Later, Yeltsin repeatedly handed over copies of some docu-
ments on the Katyn massacre and on other blank (or black) spots in Russian-Polish shared his-
tory. Political and economic talks between the two countries often contained references to the
“bitter chalice” of the recent past. Nonetheless, how to honour the victims and, even more, if and
how to compensate their families, remained difficult because Yeltsin insisted that “democratic
Russia” bore no responsibility for Stalin’s crimes. When Walesa visited Katyn for a memorial
service, Yeltsin declined an invitation to join him for fear that some Polish groups might use the
occasion to “make unreasonable demands for compensation or apologies.”249 This strategy was
duly adopted by Putin and only recently have things started moving again.250 On the last anniver-
sary of May 8th/9th, it was again possible to show on Polish television an old war series about the
joint Russian-Polish offensive against Berlin, promoting feelings of partnership251 – making
headway since Walesa had complained that although the sting had been removed, the injury had
not yet healed.252
With Germany, the healing process and the consecutive rapprochement had advanced more rap-
idly and was often mentioned as an example for hostile neighbours in other world regions – in
H I S T O R E I N
V
O
L
U
M
E
4
(2
0
0
3
-4
)
79
HAGEN/45-130elis  23-11-04  16:10  ™ÂÏ›‰·79
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 21/02/2020 08:09:23 |
T h e  P a s t  B e n e a t h  t h e  P r e s e n t
contrast with the strained relations between Prague and Berlin, as well as Vienna, continually poi-
soned by the ongoing debate about the Sudeten Germans.253 There are many joint German-Pol-
ish ventures in research and education, some of them dealing with the most delicate subject of
the ethnic Germans expelled from the former East German territories. Many gaps had been
bridged254 before the new deterioration in the summer of 2003.255
For Poles, distant memories of post-occupation Polish brutalities against the expelled Volksdeutsche
were largely compatible with their own culture of martyrdom, since they could be explained, if
not excused, by the much worse precedents committed by the German occupiers. Things were
different when in 2000 a Polish émigré to the US revealed256 that in July 1941 the Jews living in
the village of Jedwabne had been slaughtered not by the Germans but by their Polish neighbours.
This revelation not only made Jedwabne a worldwide symbol for Polish anti-Semitism but soon
came to dominate the country’s social and political life, forcing the Poles to reassess their his-
torical self-image. A few months earlier, public opinion had reacted extremely negatively when
American Jews with Polish roots sued the Polish state for having taken advantage of the Holo-
caust by nationalizing “heirless” Jewish property and “going on with the murderous Nazi plot of
racial cleansing.”257 Now, in contrast to the Baltic states and other former Eastern Bloc countries,
in Poland a painful debate swept mainstream public opinion with impressive sincerity. After two
years of research, on the 61st anniversary of the Jedwabne massacre, the Polish Institute of
National Memory (IPN)258 concluded that, in fact, close to 100 Christian Poles – not counting the
bystanders – had hunted, tormented, and finally killed hundreds of Jews. According to the IPN
report, the pogrom may have been “inspired by” but it certainly was not ordered by the Germans.
Nor was it an aberrant exception, for there were similar incidents in about 30 neighbouring vil-
lages and towns. The reasons were in part economic, while lingering anti-Semitism was boost-
ed, as in the Baltic states, by experiences and rumours of Jewish collaboration with the Soviet
authorities during the Soviet occupation of eastern Poland between 1939 and 1941. Even after
the report, discussion continues about where to assign responsibility for the massacre: ordinary
Poles, or society at large, or people from the fringes of society.259 Each nuance in the answer
makes a difference for the new Polish self-image.
Skeletons II (Western)
In the western half, too, of our260 continent, remains of countless WW II victims are still dis-
persed, gradually being discovered by random or intentional digging, and then being properly
reburied. This relates particularly to US soldiers, who suffered high casualties during last heavy
fighting close to Germany’s western frontiers. Thousands were declared missing in action, and
discovery of their remains is ongoing. The remains have to be reburied in a military cemetery in
a former Allied country, since they are not allowed to be interred on “enemy soil” – the FRG still
included.261 All of these dead were killed by conventional warfare, which gives the local papers
an occasion to deal with WW II, with gallant and merciless fighting, or to present didactic con-
clusions.
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No tale of heroism or patriotism (even if misguided), no feel-good story in which good fights and
ultimately defeats evil, could be associated with other mortal remains recently discovered; those
of Nazi euthanasia victims, children slaughtered in the name of science. After having been used
for decades, particularly in a Vienna-based institute, as unique research material on which bril-
liant post-war careers were built, 791 brains were laid to rest in 2002, allegedly the last victims
of this sort, but in 2003 more such “scientific material” was detected in Austria.262
In this study we will make only cursory reference to skeletons in two countries torn by civil wars
overlapping WW II: Greece263 and particularly Spain264 where, even after the Caudillo’s death in
1975, discussion of Franco-era crimes continued to be taboo because it was considered neces-
sary for a peaceful transition to democracy. Indeed, Spain would become one of the few coun-
tries where the establishment of a viable democracy had been possible without the sinful past
first having been resolved. A re-examination of history would be undertaken only at the dawn of
the new millennium, when Spain’s recently founded ARMH (Asociaciﬁn para la recuperaciﬁn de
la memoria histﬁrica [League for the Recovery of Historical Memory]) succeeded in having leg-
islation passed that would allow systematic searches for the tens of thousands of bodies still
buried anonymously.265 In August 2003 alone, a mass grave containing the remains of 5,000
Republicans was accidentally discovered by digging for construction foundations.266
Conversely, in long established Western democracies hidden skeletons normally emerge less
dramatically from the cupboards of state bureaucracy or conformist historiography. Though it is
beyond the cope of this study, it should be mentioned that fresh perspectives on blank areas in
national consciousness concerning WW II often have revealed other guilty secrets or traumatic
taboos, mostly from the aftermath of WW II – either directly267 or indirectly.268
Reality is rarely as splendid as myth. In the West, too, the unpleasant image of war was bright-
ened up by conveniently slanted myths, such as the legend of nationwide resistance, or at least
defiance, from the first moment, common to all countries promoting national pride, cohesion, and
– particularly in such young nations as Norway and Luxemburg269 – national identity. In pre-1986
Austria (before the Waldheim scandal exploded), the myth of a collective victim status secured
both external respect and an internal national identity distinct from Germany. Virtually all coun-
tries persistently denied that any substantial portion of their own people had collaborated with the
enemy or profited from his crimes, in particular not from the destruction of domestic Jewry.
The resulting picture, with clear-cut contrasts in black and white terms, was soon blurred when
the massive Eastern European archives were opened, revealing enormous quantities of explo-
sive records, of both domestic and (captured) German provenance. Another significant impetus
for a new, more honest approach to one’s own past was given by the symbolism of May 8,
1995. The 50th anniversary of Nazi Germany’s unconditional surrender was connected with
growing moral and material pressure from abroad, especially regarding Holocaust-era related
assets.270 Norwegians, for instance, on the occasion of the half-centenary learned that much
Jewish property confiscated by the Quisling regime had never been returned.271 In Switzerland,
H I S T O R E I N
V
O
L
U
M
E
4
(2
0
0
3
-4
)
81
HAGEN/45-130elis  23-11-04  16:10  ™ÂÏ›‰·81
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 21/02/2020 08:09:23 |
T h e  P a s t  B e n e a t h  t h e  P r e s e n t
President Kaspar Villiger publicly apologized to the Jews;272 his Austrian counterpart Thomas
Klestil explicitly recognized the Austrian role in Nazi wrongdoing. In Denmark and even more
deeply in the Netherlands, the 50th anniversary caused a “belated bout of soul-searching” as crit-
ics denounced decades-long insincerity in facing their own past.273
Others seemed less inclined to sincerely reassess their war past – or at least to adjust to the new,
international political correctness in vogue. President Martti Ahtisaari of Finland reiterated that his
country had had no other choice but to ally with Hitler. On the other side of the world, the Social
Democrat Prime Minister of Japan, Tomiichi Murayama, at last rendered some apology for
Japanese crimes in the Great East Asian War but once again refused to pay indemnifications. The
Tokyo parliament then slipped away with a compromise declaration, expressing – in the absence
of the nationalist opposition – condolences but still avoiding any apology to their Asian neigh-
bours.274 The United States – “the only power to emerge both as victor and beneficiary of the
war”275 – repeatedly expressed concern about other countries’ records of coming to grips with
their past but did little to address its own record.
First, many Americans had forgotten that the United States went to war, or was dragged into war,
because of Pearl Harbor, not to undertake a crusade [Dwight D. Eisenhower] for saving the world
from Nazi evil. (NB: It was Hitler – and Mussolini – who declared war on the USA, not the other
way around.) With regard to the Pacific War, in 1995 the US agreed not to issue a postal stamp
depicting a nuclear mushroom cloud in commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the Hiroshima
bomb after Japanese and peacenik protests. The same circles also objected in late 2003 when,
after a 19-year restoration, the Enola Gay, the aircraft that dropped the atomic bomb on Hiroshi-
ma, went on display in the Smithsonian Museum in Washington, D.C. While it was proudly pre-
sented as the “most technologically advanced” bomber of WW II, no reference was made to the
thousands of deaths it caused. Once more, the clash of opinions and their champions were famil-
iar. American non-conformists focussed on the suffering caused by the bombing of Hiroshima
and Nagasaki, doubting President Truman's assertion that it had been necessary to break Japan's
resistance (which, in fact, already had been on the verge of breaking) and “save hundreds of thou-
sands” of (Allied) lives, while veterans' groups and conservative opinion continued to insist that
“nuking the Japs” had been necessary to shorten the war and was “the Eagle's” rightful response
to Japanese aggression. Franklin D. Roosevelt's description of the surprise attack on Pearl Har-
bor as “a date which will live in infamy” is still widely used for that unprecedented traumatic expe-
rience and metaphor for the country's humiliation and vulnerability.276
In Britain, some earlier inconvenient findings277 faded into the background during celebrations
marking the 50th anniversary of the end of the war while the press closely followed what was
going on overseas, often making caustic comments about “wobblers.” A favourite target was
France, preferred at this time even over Germany. The Economist, in an otherwise fair survey on
Vergangenheitsbewältigung, was damning: “Of all the countries occupied by Germany, the one
that finds it hardest to look in the mirror 50 years on is France. Its performance by and large
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remains a cause for shame, myth, and evasion.”278 The media once more were banging against
doors that were already opening.
In France, certainly, decades long “national amnesia” veiled the common secret that during the
années noires the great majority of the French had been loyal to Pétain’s regime in Vichy, which
(after coining the term “collaboration”) had been the first regime to actively collaborate with the
German occupiers. But gradual exposure of the notorious “taboo Vichy”279 beneath the covering
myth of the resisting nation had begun long before the epochal year of 1989, though this expo-
sure was initiated principally by foreigners. A decisive step was then made in 1994, the year of
the Touvier trial, the 50th anniversary of France’s liberation, and, last but not least, of then Presi-
dent François Mitterand’s emotional interview confessing his long-rumoured youthful sympathies
for Vichy.280 Still, according to polls, 90% of the French population clung to the post-war repub-
lic’s founding myth – cultivated for different reasons by the Gaullists and the Communists, bear-
ers, respectively, of political and intellectual supremacy – that they themselves, the Résistance
inside the country and Charles de Gaulle’s Free French from abroad, had decisively contributed
to freeing their country from German occupation. At the same time, only 29% of the respondents
felt that the French should feel bad about Vichy.281
Surprising to many, France’s new conservative president, Jacques Chirac, dared new initiatives
where all post-war politicians, including his socialist predecessor, had recoiled. In a speech deliv-
ered July 16, 1995, the 53rd anniversary of the large scale round-up of Jews known as the grand
rafle du Vél d’Hiv, when French security units arrested over 13,000 Jews in Paris to hand them
over to the Germans, Chirac admitted the long suppressed autonomous involvement of Vichy, l’É-
tat français, in the Holocaust.282 Chirac then stopped providing the protection his predecessors
had given Maurice Papon – a Vichy functionary with responsibility for deportation during the war
who had enjoyed a brilliant career after the war – making his trial possible.283 The Papon trial,
however, was not primarily a juridical issue (i.e. whether or not this 90-year-old unrepentant
functionary should be convicted). Its primary intention was to reveal “truth” about the real char-
acter of Vichy, its transgressions, and the degree of its involvement in this unprecedented crime.
Any verdict against Papon would be projected from the individual to the regime, and this, because
the regime had been widely supported throughout the country, would in turn implicate the entire
country, especially when the focus was widened from the crimes of a small minority to the great
majority’s indifference. There were fierce debates on the problems of judging history in court and
by the media, about the margins of interaction between historians, journalists, and justice as well
as about their ability to act in a “cathartic” way.284 Some historians, such as the Vichy expert
Henry Rousso, refused to take part in the trial. According to him, the former taboo had been
replaced by militant obsession with the past. The Vichy syndrome285 had gained a life of its own
as the nucleus of an often excessive remembrance, and Vichy had turned into un passé qui ne
passe pas.286 Although Rousso, like others, doubted the pedagogic effect of legal proceedings
and the attendant guilt-caused “obligation to remember,”287 July 16th (Vél d’Hiv) has been
H I S T O R E I N
V
O
L
U
M
E
4
(2
0
0
3
-4
)
83
HAGEN/45-130elis  23-11-04  16:10  ™ÂÏ›‰·83
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 21/02/2020 08:09:23 |
T h e  P a s t  B e n e a t h  t h e  P r e s e n t
declared an official day of remembrance. This meant a negative commemoration of the French
nation’s sins and omissions, an act that earlier had been found appropriate almost exclusively for
Germany. British observers, however, remained unimpressed, sarcastically commenting on the
new “Vichy Business,” by contrasting attitudes of the average French and strategies of pundits
and writers.288
The original French image of their national identity and the role they played under German occu-
pation was matched in miniature by the particularly resilient Dutch version of the familiar self-
image of the small but brave country. Although the Netherlands had not been involved in a war
since Napoleon’s time, the Dutch supposedly put up a heroic resistance during WW II, just as
they had in earlier centuries against Spanish, British, and French invaders. Since the mid ’90s,
however, research has broken new ground and roused the public289 by showing that the number
of recognized members of the resistance had been equal to the number of conveniently forgot-
ten SS volunteers, to say nothing of other less conspicuous varieties of Dutch collaboration. The
moving tale of Anne Frank, convenient for national pride and tourism, covered up the less pleas-
ant fact that she, as well as thousands of others, had been given away (i.e. to Auschwitz) by local
informers and that 78% of Dutch Jewry was destroyed in the Holocaust, a much higher percent-
age than in France or Belgium.290
In spite of angry dissent from veterans and nationalist circles repudiating the new trend as calum-
nious falsification of history, debunking the Dutch myth persists. There is even a study on foot-
ball during WW II, expanding on the historically rooted violent anti-Semitism of Feyenoord Rot-
terdam soccer fans, which is still regularly evident when the club plays its “Jewish” rival, Ajax
Amsterdam. Considering these findings that strike “a blow against Dutch complacency,” a
reviewer of the football study contrasted personal memories of growing up in an alleged country
of heroes with the recent findings that only “about 0.25%” of the population were active in the
resistance. Sarcastically, he concludes that the average Dutchman, just as the average citizen of
all occupied countries, resented German occupation. Nonetheless, with the exception of the last,
much more brutal phase, “life went on much as it had before the German invasion: placidly,
peacefully, orderly, law-abiding… Even the ‘Jewish problem’ was solved in an orderly Dutch
manner… The Dutch didn’t collaborate out of conviction but out of habit. Rules were rules.”291
History in the Cupboard: Italian Version
Bella Ciao 
[famous Italian guerrilla song]
The volte-face of the fascist veteran and new Italian Prime Minister Pietro Badoglio in September
1943, in fact indicating a split in the ranks of those who had been responsible for two decades of
fascist rule and aggression, was the basis for the Italian post-war founding myth about a “second
risorgimento” – comparing supposed self-liberation from fascism to the 19th century Italian move-
ment striving for the country's liberation and unification.292 The subsequent struggle of La
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Resistenza, the “biggest resistance movement in Western Europe,” against Italy’s former ally, Ger-
many, and then in a civil war against an allegedly small clique of fascist collaborators gave super-
ficial substance to the Italian self-image as a nation of resisters. Symbolic weight was attributed
to April 25, 1945 when guerrilla units entered (and “liberated”) the most important cities of north-
ern Italy. Half a century of official history became based on Italy’s role as both enemy and victim
of Nazi Germany during the period 1943-1945, while memories of earlier Axis complicity were
suppressed by some nation-embracing version of omertà, the Mafia’s oath of secrecy. The catch-
phrase Italiani brava gente [good Italian people] was already coined in 1946, in a war bestseller
aptly written by the Italian colonel Giuseppe Angelini, wanted in Yugoslavia for war crimes.293 The
popular slogan, by definition, excluded any involvement in atrocities, any memory of aggressive
war, this being the Italian version of the decent Wehrmacht legend in Germany. At the same time,
it provided the needed consensus for the new state’s “anti-fascist” ideology by the “de-fascistifi-
cation” of most former fascists. “Webs of denial spun by the state, academe, and the media have
reinvented Italy as a victim, gulling the rest of the world into acclaiming the Good Italian long before
Captain Corelli strummed a mandolin.”294 Although for almost half a century the Italian Neo-Fas-
cist party MSI was largely excluded from the politically correct mainstream, the two decades of
domestic fascist rule (from 1922) were at least latently exonerated by being compared with Ger-
man Nazism with its brutal dimensions of anti-Semitism and genocide.
Matters changed dramatically in the early nineties when the demise of “real-existing Socialism”
demonstrated the hollowness of officially decreed anti-fascism. The subsequent decay of the
established Italian party system gave space for the foundation and, in 1994, the electoral victory
of a Right-dominated alliance led by Silvio Berlusconi. For the first time after half a century the
“Center-Right” coalition and hence the (new) mainstream included the MSI, renamed Alleanza
Nazionale. The new government fostered ideas of a “Second Republic” different from its prede-
cessor founded, at least nominally, on anti-fascism. The historian Claudio Pavone's scholarly cor-
rect interpretation (Una guerra civile, Torino 1991) that the Resistenza's struggle for liberation had
been both a social conflict and a civil war as well was used by the Right to put both domestic Ital-
ian camps during and after the war on a par as a first step for further reversal. In 1994 and again
in the jubilee year 1995, Silvio Berlusconi and his post-neo-fascist partner Gianfranco Fini pro-
claimed April 25, the day that so long had symbolized liberation from Fascism, as the “real end of
WW II” when Italy was “pacified.” In spite of mass demonstrations and President Oscar Luigi Scal-
faro distancing himself from obvious attempts of rehabilitating fascism, the Berlusconi government
initiated their new foundation myth for the intended nationalist “renaissance” of Italy.295
After his second victory in May 2001, once again in coalition with Fini's Alleanza Nazionale, Ber-
lusconi set about to definitively erode the Left’s cultural dominance. This seemed feasible since
“de-demonizing” Benito Mussolini by stressing the “progressive aspects” of Italian fascism and
its Duce, hitherto allegedly neglected, had become increasingly accepted. According to foreign
observers, “recollections of fascism are practically exploding from Italy’s subconscious” while
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writers, filmmakers, and tourism officials generated a heritage industry that turned Italy into “Ben-
itoland,” presenting fascism as a “Disney-like extravaganza” or a matter of folklore. Often the cur-
rent fascination with the subject approaches full rehabilitation: honour guards at the Duce’s tomb;
his picture adorning calendars and wine bottles; his former residences places of pilgrimage and,
last but not least, “his apologists in the government.”296 This nostalgia, unimaginable in Germany
and perhaps even in Japan, was spawned by the “singolare schizofrenia dell’ opinione pubblica
italiana”297 – that is to say, the persistent and multi-layered Italian policy of covering up their own
crimes and highlighting their victimhood. 
In spite of this, surprisingly few German perpetrators were pursued by Italy. In a belated case, in
June 1994, a military prosecutor searching for evidence against the SS war criminal Erich
Priebke298 discovered an armoured cupboard sealed and rotated so its door faced the wall in the
barred vault of a Roman palazzo. It contained 695 dusty investigation files, largely of Allied prove-
nance, on German war crimes against Italians, crimes that resulted in approximately 15,000
deaths. Most of the documents had not even been translated. The “shame cupboard” [armadio
della vergogna] scandal was officially explained with typical Italian nobility: in the 1950s a flood
of trials dealing with the criminal past of a great number of Germans would have impeded the
FRG’s admission into NATO.299 This explanation and its extenuating mythology, however, was
quashed in 2000-01, when a young Italian historian, Filippo Focardi, found and published – with
a German colleague300 – documents revealing the real reasons for the cover-up. In the wake of
WW II, long before the FRG’s foundation, Rome decided not to take legal action against German
offenders for fear of triggering a boomerang effect against many Italians wanted in Greece and,
even more so, in Yugoslavia. Trials against Italian war criminals would have eroded the country’s
victim image. Consequently, suspects were even warned and helped to keep under cover. None
has ever faced justice. Only a few mainstream Italian newspapers ever reported on these revela-
tions, embroiling among others two former Christian Democratic prime ministers, Alcide de
Gasperi and Giulio Andreotti.301
The bulk of the media, the government, and many traditionalist academics have “greeted the
research with stony silence.”302 Instead, historian Ernst Nolte, whose reputation holds sway in Ger-
many only with rightist hardliners, is being courted.303 A recent biography of Mussolini, clearly “an
attempt not at revisionism, but at restoration,” is selling well, praising its hero who “got things
done” and who “saved more Jews than Oskar Schindler.” Another book, Il sangue dei vinti [The
Blood of the Defeated], focussing on the allegedly tabooed subject of the cruel post-liberation
vengeance taken upon fascists, topped the bestseller lists. In general, Italian “historiography has
become particularly interesting since the arrival of a government that isn’t, obviously, fascist, but
which is definitely – in a label that would make sense only in Italy – anti-anti-fascist.”304
In September 2003, in an interview given to the author of the Mussolini biography mentioned
above, Silvio Berlusconi described the Duce’s regime as “benign,” seeming to bring the wheel
full circle. Nonetheless, as part of a political deal, the government finally agreed to establish a
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parliamentary fact-finding committee to investigate why the records related to Nazi [nazifascisti]
crimes had been concealed in the “shame cupboard.” The committee convened for the first time
in October 2003 and has to submit its conclusions within one year from actually beginning its
investigations. The battle for Italy's historic face is still undecided.305
Neutral states
For most of the post-war period, just as was the case during the war, neutral states have been
viewed as privileged islands of bliss in a war-torn continent. The concomitant envy may partly
explain the ferocity of the attacks launched against them by the international press after recent
research revealed the extent to which these states pursued their own self-interest by colluding
with the Nazi Reich. It is still unresolved to what extent this collusion, economic though with a
distinct politico-strategic dimension, contributed to prolonging the war, an aspect often exagger-
ated by public history. For European neutral states, largely cut off from overseas trade partners
by the war, producing goods for and supplying raw materials to Germany had meant jobs and
financial profits for both the state and big enterprises; at times it also meant multiple gains for
politicians, particularly in dictatorially ruled Spain and Portugal. In exchange for profit, most gov-
ernments of neutral states further compromised themselves by making political concessions to
Berlin, mainly by restricting entrance for Jews and others fleeing Nazi persecution. In recent years
these issues have kept a new generation of scholars – some of them serving on state sponsored
commissions – occupied, making headlines in the international press.306
The country discussed most, the supposed symbol of the greed and appeasement of neutral
states during WW II, was Switzerland. Already in 1945, because of its transactions with the
Reichsbank processing and laundering huge amounts of Nazi gold mostly looted from occupied
countries and murdered victims, the small Alpine state was under fire for being “Hitler’s banker”.
At a moral low then, Switzerland took advantage of its economic vigour and the swift escalation
of the Cold War.307 Swiss patriots proudly believed that it had been the Swiss army exclusively,
not Swiss submissiveness, or usefulness, that had deterred Hitler from invading. During the war,
correctly, the country was considered a haven for refugees from adjacent Nazi-controlled coun-
tries. Increasing restrictions on asylum either were not known or were considered necessary.
Domestic records for the WW II period were accessible only to proven and loyal historians, and
soon the country recovered its pre-war image.
In the 1990s, when public interest in new aspects of the Holocaust worldwide skyrocketed, the
so-called Nazi gold stolen from Jewish victims became a tangible symbol of Nazi crimes and their
unresolved aftermath. Since the lion’s share of the spoils was presumed to be hidden away in
Swiss vaults, Swiss banks became the focus of growing public debate on both sides of the
Atlantic. Although other countries308 (and private corporations) were also targeted, Switzerland
was consistently singled out, a fact resented by many Swiss.309 If we exclude later humanitarian
compensation and investigative progress, the main result of the expensive Independent Com-
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mission of Experts: Switzerland – WW II, established in 1996, probably was resentment. The
commission’s head, Jean-François Bergier, was granted first-time access to archives but com-
plained of meeting with obstacles from economic circles. The commission’s report did not
engender a satisfying political debate on moral ambiguities. Most Swiss politicians had grown
weary of the issue310 and half the population did not want to press charges considered exagger-
ated.311 The mostly younger scholars who, occasionally too vociferously, denounced “pro-Nazi”
Swiss wartime policies (such as on asylum, the press, banking, and trading) were branded
masochist iconoclasts, supporting a campaign whose “foreign” origins annoyed the populace
even more.312 President Cotti’s public reference to widespread domestic anger about unjustly
generalized anti-Swiss criticism, in particular from the “American East Coast,” caused sharp
reactions from Jewish and American circles, which in turn caused, as polls revealed, a rise in
anti-Semitism in Switzerland. Perhaps as a consequence, in the elections of October 1999, xeno-
phobic Swiss People’s Party made its best showing ever, becoming the strongest political party
and a force to be reckoned with.313
Apologies and Apologists 
The apology made by Swiss President Kaspar Villiger in May 1995 was not a general admission
of guilt for the country’s role in WW II. It was limited to the country’s refusal to let Jewish refugees
enter Switzerland across the German-Swiss border, an act which resulted in almost certain death
for those Jews turned away.314 Even this selective apology was preceded by heated domestic
debate that divided public opinion.315 The opponents of acknowledging guilt, which would impli-
cate the entire nation, were more pleased with their next president, Arnold Koller. In 1997, while
announcing the establishment of a Swiss Solidarity Fund for the Relief of Human Need (which
ultimately was doomed to failure) including but intentionally not restricted to Holocaust victims,
Koller declined to make any further apology. “We don’t need to be ashamed that we have
escaped war,” he said, because in WW II every country had thought primarily of its own inter-
ests. The arguments used in the Swiss-foreign apology discourse,316 compared with examples
from other countries, indicates a few of the parameters involved in the issue.
Since individual guilt is almost never implied, apart from a handful of aged perpetrators who rarely
express remorse, apologies are attempts to demonstrate moral distance, to dissociate from a
greater collective’s sinful past. The main variables in this new guilt discourse are: Who (by what
authority and what relation to guilt) is apologizing to whom? Why, how, where, on what occa-
sion, and to what end (including the chance of “being forgiven”) is the apology being made? 
Accordingly, the biologist Hubert Markl, president of the illustrious Max Planck Society, wrote an
essay explaining why he could not apologize for the pseudo-scientific experiments of his institu-
tion’s forerunner, the Kaiser Wilhelm Society. He even questioned the motives and moral author-
ity of anyone, except elected leaders of a nation, who asked for forgiveness on the account of
others who were probably unrepentant or even dead. A year later, he was no longer rejecting what
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he had described as a “shame performance” and offered an apology.317 With the criteria of
Markl’s initial reasoning, it could be argued that the mayor of Hiroshima usurped authority when,
on the 50th anniversary of the nuclear bomb, he apologized “for the unbearable suffering” inflict-
ed by Japanese militarism and colonial domination on the whole region318 instead of dwelling, as
was traditional, on Japanese victimhood. His gesture carried no explicit political weight but was
in sharp contrast with the scandalous self-righteousness of most Japanese politicians, showing
that a similar step should be taken by higher authorities. In contrast, Czech President Vaclav
Havel certainly had the authority when he expressed regret about the vengeful expulsion by the
Czechs of the Sudeten Germans in 1945, even though his avowal was neither shared nor author-
ized by a large segment of domestic opinion.319 The Lithuanian Catholic episcopate was no less
authorized than the country’s president or prime minister to deliver collective apologies for
involvement in the Shoah on the part of the bodies they represented; alas, both statements would
be worth more had they not been at least partly the result of foreign pressure.320
How legitimate or useful is it to extract requests for forgiveness? Such attempts can be construed
as reciprocal when both sides are in a position to give forgiveness and ask for forgiveness [do
ut des].321 When there is no reciprocity, however, things are more difficult. The Poles, for exam-
ple, have waited a long time for an outright apology from Russian leaders, but, to the best of my
knowledge, they are still waiting because Moscow fears that this would give credence to Polish
claims for recompense.322 Similar worries have influenced the leaders of other nations. As for the
Germans, such reservations dissolve before the Holocaust, both because of its uniqueness and,
to put it bluntly, because at least on this subject the FRG long ago stopped resisting the idea of
financial compensation. That is exactly why the Germans were quite surprised in early 2000
when the prominent Jewish writer Elie Wiesel urged that during his scheduled visit to Israel the
new FRG president, Johannes Rau, apologize for German crimes against the Jews – implying that
the Germans were not genuinely repentant. During the subsequent visit Rau did, in fact, request
forgiveness for the Shoah in his speech to the Israeli Knesset.323 However, how much such a for-
mal request sense when no such forgiveness can be expected, and certainly not from one col-
lective (i.e. nation) to another and over generations. Ezer Weizman, then president of Israel, had
already declared that he could never forgive the murderers of 6 million Jews, even less could he
do so in the name of those Jews killed. In this, he was not alone.324 Many Germans feel frustrat-
ed by such rebuffs. They sincerely believe, as politicians never tire of stressing, that they have
learned their lessons from history and have accepted and commemorated their wrongs. Now
they view reconciliation as something to which they are morally entitled – as if continuous acts
of collective atonement were necessarily bound to lead to forgiveness.325
Greeks also have persistently asked for German remorse to be proven in word and deed, but Ger-
man leaders have carefully avoided wording that can be taken as an apology:326 the closest any
came was a statement by President Rau, who expressed “deep sorrow and shame” at the memo-
rial of the Kalavryta massacre.327 This clearer wording328 may have been because of his presence
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at the scene of the Kalavryta crime), since he used exactly the same words two years later at
Marzabotto, the site of the largest massacre of Italians (770) in Italy329 by their former German
allies.
The triggering factor of geographical affinity is not restricted to extermination sites but, when the
act of contrition is related to the Holocaust, defined by any “Jewish context,”330 a flexible term
including Schindler’s List331 and even the White House. When in 2000 Argentine President Fer-
nando de la Rua visited then US President Bill Clinton, he forestalled habitual public censure of
Argentine leaders by apologizing “with a deep feeling of pain” for his country’s role in providing
post-war sanctuary to Nazis and collaborators. His statement was duly commended by the World
Jewish Congress and the American media, who acclaimed De la Rua’s promise “that his gov-
ernment will investigate how Nazis were allowed to enter Argentina.”332 This was a charade, for
De la Rua could have just as easily pointed at his hosts. The United States and the Vatican had
assisted thousands of incriminated Nazis and cohorts – including Ante Pavelic´, the notorious
chief of the Croatian Ustasˇa – to escape to Juan Peron’s Argentina and other havens.333 There
has been no request for forgiveness about this, although both the US and the Vatican recently
have been busy about apologies. In his first 21 years in office, the incumbent pope John Paul II
has asked for forgiveness for various transgressions by the Catholic Church at least 94 times.
His apologies concerned offences committed by the Inquisition or other Catholic institutions
against such groups as witches, women in general, slaves, heretics, and Muslims (during the
Crusades). As for the Jews, the Holy See has recently recognized faults and the guilt of Catholics,
but Holocaust-specific references, if any, have remained vague because of the ambiguous role
of Pope Pius XII (1938-1958), who is internationally accused of having appeased fascism and
remaining silent about the plight of the Jews.334 For the same reason, obviously, no apology has
been given about the Croatian context, in which the Ustasˇa had been a lethal amalgam of fascism
and Catholicism. Instead, overruling Serbian and Jewish protests, in the presence of 400,000
enthusiastic Croats, the pope beatified cardinal Alojzije Stepinac´, who had decisively contributed
to legitimizing the Ustasˇa regime in 1941.335
While the Vatican’s post-war assistance to Nazis and the Ustasˇi could be interpreted as human-
itarian solidarity with Catholics fleeing Communist revenge, this is not the case with other self-
declared arbiters of morality. Even after the outbreak of WW II, large US firms did business with
the Nazis.336 The current president George W. Bush’s grandfather, Senator Prescott Bush, made
a considerable share of the family’s fortune through long and profitable collusion with Nazi Ger-
many up to 1942.337 After WW II, skeletons were found even within the cupboards of federal
agencies. In 1945-46, not only were more than 100 German rocket scientists taken to the
States,338 but also thousands of Nazi war criminals were recruited as experts on Soviet affairs,
skills gained through service in the SS, Gestapo, and the Wehrmacht. Obviously, “Washington
was in a Cold War mode sooner than most people realize.” Even Eichmann’s obnoxious hench-
men Alois Brunner and Klaus Barbie were at times on the CIA’s clandestine payroll. This payroll
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was openly headed by Hitler’s anti-Soviet spymaster General Reinhard Gehlen, whose post-WW
II American-sponsored intelligence agency in West Germany “functioned as the CIA’s eyes and
ears in Central Europe,” doing its best to exacerbate tensions between the superpowers to secure
their own indispensability.339 In exchange for biological and chemical warfare know-how, the US
granted amnesty to German experts and even the Japanese leaders of the infamous Unit 731,
whose experiments on human beings surpassed in viciousness anything of which the Nazis had
thought.340 During the early Cold War, US agencies became even more generous, largely accept-
ing, as staunch anti-Communists, former Nazi associates from Communist countries applying for
immigration.341 In the 1990s after Washington reprimanded the Baltic and other former Commu-
nist states for their slowness in taking war criminals to court, most of them had to be extradited
from the US where they had found an asylum after WW II.342
Bill Clinton established the Nazi War Criminal Records Interagency Working Group to scrutinize
US records on these sordid affiliations. The release of a preliminary report in 2000 was not
accompanied by any public apology by Clinton, as he had apologized with regard to the crimes
white Americans had committed against blacks, native Americans, and Asian Americans,343 most
of whom were US citizens, and voters. The current White House leadership does not favour
apologies, since “post-Cold War triumphalism and arrogant unilateralism are rampant among US
officials.”344 The consequence has been a “murky” and opportunistic use of history. In particu-
lar, the current so-called reconstruction of Iraq was and is compared with what is portrayed as
the impeccable American post-war record in bringing democracy to Germany and Japan: “His-
tory proves we’re doing fine.”345
Revisionism: (Far East) Addenda
Be proud of grandpa
In this study I have repeatedly criticized post-1989 European revisionism. Both the term itself and
criticism of the term can be misunderstood, since revising dominant versions of the past – a
never-ending process using new sources and new approaches – is, in fact the raison d’être of
historians, at least in democratic countries. In the United States, revisionist history has a proud
and rich record with authors such as Howard Zinn annoying the guardians of conventional histo-
ry by unmasking dubious heroes from Columbus to Teddy Roosevelt, Henry Ford, and WW II
generals. We are still awaiting a new truly revisionist historiography from Russia and most other
Eastern states that challenges the frozen Communist image of history, though care should be
taken to avoid a hasty replacement characterized by the inability to admit one’s own faults (see,
for example, Romania). Challenging and revising prevailing interpretations must not include the
remaking of history by reconstructing incontestable historical facts. In Germany, correctly, denial
of the Holocaust is not covered by the constitutional right of free speech, while particularly in the
USA, despite its genuine revisionist tradition and the influence of the powerful Jewish lobby,
Holocaust deniers successfully pose as “revisionists”. This is, right or – probably – wrong, how
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the West generally understands the term “revisionism.” This prevailing Western perception of
revisionism, which attempts to sanitize and relativize (i.e., play down) fascism and its offshoots,
is not restricted to Germany, Italy, and nationalist post-Communist states. In Spain, for
instance,346 the belated awakening of memory has provoked a revisionist counterattack.347 As one
expert warned, “in Switzerland, Austria, Denmark, Sweden, and Italy, nationalist movements see
WW II as the main barrier to rehabilitating nationalism. From Europe to Japan, revisionism about
genocide and WW II is on the rise.”348
Japan, however, should be singled out, as it seems to remain largely in an atavistic stage of view-
ing its war history. Dealing with the transgressions of others is always more pleasant, therefore
sensitivity to crimes committed by one’s own country or camp is seldom spontaneous. In most
cases, it must be instigated by an outside force. Revisionism counteracts such sensitization
through various strategies, such as attempting to erase the demarcation line between victims and
victimizers, the same line that crystallized amid the often painful process of facing up to one’s
own past. In Japan, however, this line is still largely identified with the separation between natives
and non-natives. Consequently, self-serving forces and trends that elsewhere are considered as
revisionist, here represent the initial (i.e. 1945-era) interpretation, which still heavily influences
public opinion and obstructs attempts to shed light on Japan’s past. This delayed review is part-
ly to be blamed on Japan's great rival and model, the USA (which, ironically, today finds itself in
a similar situation.)349 In 1945, the American occupiers needed the imperial bureaucracy to run
the defeated country. For the same reason, they kept emperor Hirohito in place, exempting him
from any investigation into his part in aggressive wars and bloody occupations. Because of its
geo-strategic importance during and after the Korean War, in 1952 Japan was granted a relatively
favourable peace treaty with low state reparations, enabling Tokyo to continue refusing payment
of any other compensation.350
In 1995, Japanese daily commemoration of WW II focussed on the victim role, on the war’s con-
sequences to Japan, not on Japan’s role in provoking the war. The Ministry of Education subsi-
dized and recommended to students books and films glorifying the heroic deaths of juveniles:
Blood leaking through the white gauze, shaping a big round red spot, the Japanese flag. The self-
sacrifices of kamikaze pilots are presented as inspirational motifs, passed down from generation
to generation, and commemorated in the official Yasukuni Shrine Museum, which contains
sacred relicts, and divine souls, of dead war heroes and even convicted war criminals.351 The
stunning success of war comics also is disquieting because they appeal primarily to the young,
calling on them “to be proud of our grandfathers.”352 These symbols of a commemorative cul-
ture, like 19th century war memorials all over Europe, display a conspicuous absence of refer-
ence to enemies, to foreign victims of Japanese massacres, to pseudoscientific experiments, or
to slave labour, including at least 200,000 mainly Chinese and Korean women and girls abduct-
ed to military brothels, euphemistically called comfort women.353 Among others, Japanese con-
servatives in 1995 and prime ministers as recently as 2000 declared that politicians should not
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apologize for the collective past since history alone (or future historians) would judge everyone’s
responsibility for the war and its balance-sheet.354
Yet our unfortunate muse Clio has been reduced to a kind of comfort woman, harassed by politi-
cians who, in addition to indemnifications, also block access to archives on sensitive issues.
Since 1948, textbooks have been controlled by the Ministry of Education by means of a license
system. The late historian Saburo Ienaga, whose most famous book was banned on the
strength of 323 ministerial objections, repeatedly sued the state for censorship; he had only a
few partial successes in a sequence of lawsuits over thirty-two years. Meanwhile nationalists –
historians, politicians, and economic pundits, all campaigning against “masochist views of his-
tory”– successfully lobbied for a government decision to remove any references to Japanese
war crimes from new textbooks. South Korea and China have demanded that his decision be
revoked.355
Japanese governments will anachronistically persist with obsolete images as long as they remain
in tune with the militant Right, which still views the Pacific war as the Great East Asian Liberation
War against white colonialism. Frequent protests by neighbouring countries, who experienced
that so-called liberation at the hands of the Japanese military, have had only little effect, although
some Japanese ministers who have produced statements more unrepentant than usual have
been forced to resign.356 Even the present prime minister, Yunihiro Koizumi, persists in worship-
ping at the Yasukuni shrine, symbolizing Japanese militarism.357 In spite of profitable economic
and other358 cooperation, mistrust is widespread throughout Asia as long as Tokyo refuses to
face up fully to its war history, expressing polite regret but no official apology. In a recent Gallup
poll, 79% of the respondents in China cited Japanese lack of remorse to explain their enduring
reservations about Japan.359
Between Uniqueness and Trivialization
As we have seen above, public interest in history has soared since 1989, focussing on the Holo-
caust more clearly than previously. New accessibility to archives, caused by the downfall of the
Soviet Empire or by American pressure, has to be mentioned once again. Not only have massive
amounts of new sources revealed new aspects of Nazi genocidal policy but also, for example,
millions of pages of Ultra intercepts have revised the picture of what the Anglo-Americans knew
about the Shoah.360 The oft-mentioned paradox that, in seeming contrast with the growing dis-
tance from the actual events, the discourse has intensified, becoming even more emotional, is
consistent with the Shoah’s quasi-sacred dimensions not obtained by any other genocide,
including Stalin’s Gulag.361 The term Holocaust, meaning systematically planned and performed
murder of racially defined “inferior” groups usually is confined to Jews (the Hebrew term Shoah
always). Attempts to include gypsies and the mentally handicapped remained peripheral in the
mainstream discourse. The same is largely true for other “forgotten” victims of the Nazis, such
as homosexuals who, however, recently have been receiving increasing attention.362
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Still, there are regional differences. In Russia, the Shoah is not considered as dramatic as the
losses of the – defined by religion and other aspects – mainstream population,363 and the views
in Greece and Poland are similar.364 In some countries, such as France, crimes against humani-
ty, i.e. involvement in the Holocaust, are the only crimes for which there is no statute of limita-
tions. Not surprisingly, in the FRG the focus on the Jewish genocide is more intense than any-
where else as the German discourse attempts to redefine the country’s historic-moral position.
This was made painfully clear by the lengthy debate about a project, conceived even before the
fall of the Wall, to create in the perpetrators' country a central memorial site365 to preserve the
memory of the six million murdered Jews from all over Europe. In April 1992 the German gov-
ernment decided upon a deeply symbolic location – larger than two football fields – in the heart
of reunited Berlin, near the Brandenburg Gate and the most famous icon of German nationhood,
the Reichstag. But only in June 1999, the German parliament decided on the design, after years
of controversy and delay. Construction was formally inaugurated on January 27, 2000 (Holo-
caust Memorial Day) and construction actually began on April 4, 2003.
The fierce and persistent inner-German debates on the Holocaust memorial and on Daniel J.
Goldhagen’s scholarly contestable but politically important 1996 bestseller, Hitler’s Willing Exe-
cutioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust, reformulated old questions.366 Was Auschwitz
the outcome of a deep-rooted curse on German history, a predictable consequence of a rabidly
anti-Semitic predisposition of “ordinary Germans,” or a tragic, atrocious, but unique aberration?
Did political correctness include the “permanent representation of German ignominy?” In con-
nection with the 50th anniversary of the infamous Kristallnacht pogrom on November 9, 1938
more than 10,000 commemorative events took place all over Germany, while the president of the
German parliament, Philipp Jenninger, had to resign because of insensitive formulations in his
official speech. Ten years later there arose a new dispute over whether remembrance of
Auschwitz was a moral obligation or a “moral cudgel”367 with which Germans could unfailingly
be knocked down whenever it suited someone else’s wishes. Was it possible to criticize Israel or
individual Jews without being accused of anti-Semitism? On the other hand, “Holocaust
hypocrisy” was condemned for causing passivity toward present-day wrongs. The “Nazi
themes” in the media should long ago have been “replaced by Bosnia and Serbia, Somalia, and
the Sudan,” the thinking went. Others complained that Jews “presume to give rules of conduct
to the Germans.”368
The prevailing emphasis on the Holocaust at times led to neglect of other aspects and victim
groups of WW II. This was demonstrated by FRG President Roman Herzog’s multiple gaffe when,
in an interview with Der Stern, he confused the August 1944 uprising by the Polish nationalist
resistance in Warsaw, which he had been invited to honour, with the Jewish uprising in the War-
saw ghetto in spring 1943, to which his predecessors had already paid homage.369 Neither his
press attaché nor any of the journalists and editors involved noticed this blunder, which elicited
bitter comments in Poland.370 This confusion, however, is not confined to the Germans, as the
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following two examples may demonstrate: 1) Repeatedly, the scope of the exhibition highlighting
the full spectrum of the Wehrmacht’s crimes was narrowed down by foreign correspondents to
a “Holocaust exhibit.” 2) Even more absurdly, some of the over 500,000 tourists who visit the
Verdun battlefield every year (almost as many as died there in 1916), insistently ask to be shown
the gas chambers.371
As for the FRG, a uniquely delicate relationship will always exist with Israel because of the Holo-
caust. In 1998, when German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer was asked about the chances for
official German criticism of Israel’s policy towards the Palestinians, he replied, “Even when jus-
tified, criticism coming from Germany would have the opposite effect.” Nevertheless, Israel’s
“Holocaust bonus,” meaning the political incorrectness of criticizing Israel, is no longer uncon-
ditional, since the FRG has integrated a common European policy on the Middle East, shaped
together with nations that do not carry the same stigma.372 Yet in Germany as elsewhere, anti-
Semitism frequently is masked as “anti-Zionist” criticism of Israel's current policies. 
Although denial of the Holocaust, at least in Germany and Austria, has been made a punishable
offence,373 no legal consequences seem possible for trivializing it. In order to discredit political
adversaries, politicians increasingly identify them with stereotype images from the Nazi past, lev-
elling meanings and proportions. Since Nazi Germany remains the archetype of a destructive,
genocidal regime, any massacre can be denounced as genocide or Holocaust, any aggressor or
even domestic opponent can be compared with Hitler. For example, the 2002 election campaign
in Germany was marked to an unprecedented extent by arguments taken from the heavy double
German past.374 With the growing distance in time from WW II and the subsequent waning of
knowledge of the true extent of the unique crimes committed then, Hitler has become a metaphor
for evil, a secularised version of the devil. Even Jews who should know better have fallen prey to
this inflationary misuse of superlatives. One of the last survivors of the Warsaw ghetto uprising
called the Serbian war on Bosnia “Hitler’s late victory,”375 a term that was later widely used by
pro-Serbian analysts after NATO began bombing.376
In Germany, the 1999 NATO bombing of Serbia brought about a complete reversal of the pre-
1990 national consensus, not confined to the Left, that the uniqueness of Nazi war crimes ruled
out forever any German military involvement abroad. Suddenly, media and politicians turned their
moral argumentation upside down and justified their political and physical backing of the Western
intervention in Yugoslavia by calling upon what they called Germany’s historic obligation to fore-
stall “another Auschwitz,” by which they meant that Serbian ethnic cleansing was taking on
genocidal dimensions. So the new-fledged coalition supported the deployment of German sol-
diers in the Balkans “on peace-keeping missions,” asserting that not only did Germany’s Nazi
past not forbid such an intervention, but required it.377
In Western propaganda, particularly, “Hitler analogies have long been the stock-in-trade” – not
surprisingly, since “WW II still retains near-universal legitimacy” in discerning good from evil.378
After equating Serbian President Slobodan Milosˇevic´ with Hitler and Serbian concentration
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camps with Auschwitz, the next easy step was to claim the need to deal with “equivalent situa-
tions” in equivalent ways, as then US President Bill Clinton urged the American Society of News-
paper Editors: “We must follow the example of the WW II generation, by standing up to aggres-
sion and hate.”379 Conjuring up D-Day provided seeming justification for intervening in
Yugoslavia. The current US President George W. Bush gave a clumsy repeat performance in
2002 regarding Afghanistan,380 while proposals for falling back upon historic examples were ram-
pant. Concepts from the aftermath of WW II also were invoked. Daniel J. Goldhagen referred to
the conclusion made by the Western Allies that reorienting the Germans away from their prone-
ness for militarism was the only way to prevent WW III, proposing a “German solution” for Ser-
bia: Since aggressions, ethnic cleansing, and mass murder committed by Serbian imperialism
were supported by a large majority of “ordinary people,” just as had been the case in Nazi Ger-
many, NATO ought to conquer and re-educate the Serbs in order to transform them into peace-
ful democrats.381 Accordingly, the Czech Prime Minister Milosˇ Zeman drew parallels not only
between the Austrian populist leader Jörg Haider and Hitler but also between Yasir Arafat and
Hitler, conveniently during a visit in Israel, suggesting to his hosts the “solution” of expelling the
Palestinians, as his country had wisely done with its own “Fifth Column” – as he lumped togeth-
er all Sudeten Germans, stirring up protest not only in conservative German quarters.382
A new climax was reached in 2003, with Iraq, when history became just one more piece of col-
lateral damage. Since political hardliners and rightwing tabloids on both sides of the Atlantic, swept
up in political hysteria, had equated Saddam Hussein with Hitler and declared action against him
as being as “morally just” as WW II,383 it was consistent to denounce opponents of war as traitors
or appeasers. US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfield warned that a lack of decisiveness had
caused the collapse of the League of Nations and claimed that millions had died because certain
countries had thought there wasn’t “enough evidence” about Hitler’s plans. The Daily Mail, for-
getting its own philo-Nazi past during the 1930s, charged France and Germany with “unforgivable
betrayal.”384 The warmongers were even seconded by more serious voices. Jeffrey Herf, a well-
known historian, expressed his profound disappointment that the German chancellor had been
unwilling and “perhaps intellectually unable” to reflect “on the implications of facing the Nazi past
for ongoing policy” – meaning to adopt a policy of “armed anti-fascism” as Churchill and F.D.R.
had done – and join the war against Saddam. At the same time he conveniently traced the Iraqi
Baath regime's ideology back, below its currents of Arab nationalism, to “a combination of ideo-
logical legacies rooted largely in Europe’s twentieth-century totalitarian era – of French fascism,
elements of Nazism, Stalinism”– hinting at association with the stance of the three main antiwar
powers. The Pope was once again included among the appeasers, while British Prime Minister
Tony Blair took top prize since he obviously had learned from Britain’s historical mistakes.385
Perhaps with more justification, the antiwar camp also did not hesitate to draw arguments from
the context of WW II, reminding us that the warmongers were lining up “with the political heirs of
Mussolini and Franco” and that Iraq was eventually attacked “on the very Hitlerian grounds of pre-
96
HAGEN/45-130elis  23-11-04  16:10  ™ÂÏ›‰·96
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 21/02/2020 08:09:23 |
ventive war.”386 A German minister had to retire after comparing President Bush’s methods with
those of Hitler, who, likewise, had used foreign issues to divert public attention from domestic
problems. Bush and his crew were enraged since they clearly have “a vision of themselves as
neo-Churchills, not neo-Hitlers.”387
For Washington, the proliferation of Holocaust analogies and the patronage of surviving victims
of the Holocaust and Nazi slave labour finally backfired because they offered other victimized
populations, in particular African Americans and native Americans, the opportunity to claim mate-
rial and moral compensation for the “black” and “red” holocausts committed by white America.
Black activists held up German Vergangenheitsbewältigung as an example just as the USA had
done toward Japan in previous years. So blacks, despite a lingering anti-Semitic note in the con-
temporary American black community, even hired top Jewish lawyers specialized in WW II
issues, such as the internationally known Edward Fagan, to demand reparations for slavery. 388
Never-ending History?
Until the end of time, mankind will remember 
Auschwitz as part of our, of German, history.
Philipp Jenninger
The German politician who made the horrifying but cogent prophecy quoted above unintentional-
ly gave credence to the apprehension expressed by a Jewish psychoanalyst who predicted that
Germans would “never forgive Auschwitz to the Jews.”389 Both were more than pointed bon mots
and left heavy marks on the ongoing discussion of whether the Nazi period was a black but
closed chapter in German history or was of constant relevance for the Germans (and their neigh-
bours).390 Correspondingly, the long public dispute about the planned central historical triptych
initiated in the heart of Berlin (the Jewish Museum, the Holocaust memorial site, the Topography
of Terror exhibition in the former Gestapo headquarters; only the first has been completed)
revealed both fears and hopes that the time had come to “historicize” that ugly past, to dispose
of it by giving it a privileged but quiet place in the tidy museum of German history [Museal-
isierung]. Across the political spectrum this process of “historicization” was seen as necessary,
although the many interpretations of the term produced by pundits varied even more than their
political ideologies; once again “belches from an undigested past emerged from the belly of the
FRG.”391
When Peter Eisenman – designer of the Holocaust Memorial scheduled to be finished, after sev-
eral delays, at least by May 8 [sic], 2005 – recently expressed his wish that the memorial would
become part of the new debate on German identity,392 he was annoyed by his wish coming true
almost immediately. In October 2003 a survivor warned that she would not be able to set foot on
the site if the chemical giant Degussa, with its infamous wartime past, would provide the graffiti-
proof coating Protectosil for the 2,700 concrete steles (with a total surface of 56,000 m2) form-
ing the centrepiece of the memorial site. Indeed, a company affiliated with Degussa's wartime
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mother firm had manufactured and supplied the pesticide Zyklon B with which millions of Jews
were murdered in the death camps. With reference to this objection, the board of directors of the
Memorial Foundation agreed, after a “long and painful meeting,” to bar Degussa from the proj-
ect, although the latter's anti-graffiti product was by far the best and offered at a bargain price.
The decision to “de-nazify the stones” would delay construction and increase the budget of the
28 million euro project. 
The board's ban plunged Germany into “another agonizing debate over the hold of history through
generations,"393 causing a torrent of commentary in Germany and abroad. While some public fig-
ures applauded the decision, others – including many Jews, among them Eisenman – branded
the decision as surrendering to political correctness, which should not be allowed to hold people
hostage 60 years after the event. In fact, Degussa's past had been widely known since 1946
when a British Military Court sentenced and executed the two men mainly responsible for sup-
plying Zyklon B. Degussa, however, was among the German enterprises that had sought to
redress their sinful past by publicly acknowledging it and establishing the Foundation for Remem-
brance, Responsibility, and the Future, which raised millions of dollars for a government-indus-
try compensation fund distributed to victims of Nazi concentration camps and slave labour. As
Eisenman angrily stressed, the firm had been exemplary in its attempts to come to terms with its
past. And the Berliner Zeitung added in an editorial that “anyone who wants to have a memorial
in Germany, by Germans, to recall the extermination of the Jews, will have difficulties to find peo-
ple or companies whose ancestors had nothing – absolutely nothing – to do with the Nazi dicta-
torship.” Other left-of-center columnists expressed irritation, sometimes stronger than right-
wingers, at critics who, some of them usurping the role of victim, insisted on a sort of “eternal
and insurmountable German guilt” or “original sin,” passed on from generation to generation.394
In this ongoing debate evidently two irreconcilable principles confront each other. One, stated by
Eisenman speaking for many others, considers it irrational to make all Germans responsible for
the sins of their fathers and grandfathers, denying forgiveness to those who endeavour to atone
for their (not even personal) past. None of Degussa's 48,000 employees had worked for it 60
years ago, so it was wrong to penalize and stigmatize them in a collective and anachronistic man-
ner. In addition, as many commentators pointed out, the memorial was expressly a project to be
carried out not in a vacuum but in Germany by Germans, descendants of the perpetrators. Any
exclusion after 60 years would contravene the concept of remorse and atonement. The other
principle, in contrast, maintains that even though commitment to remembrance provided some
measure of exoneration for firms with a tainted past, somewhere a line had to be drawn, and Zyk-
lon B was obviously beyond this line. All considerations endorsing the first principle had to be
subservient to the feelings of the Holocaust survivors themselves, who could not be judged by
rational criteria only. This was stressed by Lea Rosh, initiator of the memorial project in 1988
(and ironically the board member who had insisted upon graffiti protection in the first place): “If
someone lost his parents in Auschwitz through Zyklon B, he must be permitted to react emo-
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tionally.” This argument already seemed the ultima ratio in the ongoing debate invalidating all
attempts to bring Degussa back to the project, and it reopened the question: “At what point, if
ever, can Germany's succeeding generations be freed from the sins of their Nazi forefathers?” 395
Apart from moral objections, however, practical difficulties increased when new information
emerged that hundreds of steles had already been installed and, even worse, a concrete-thinning
agent supplied by a Degussa subsidiary had been used in the site's foundation. Only then, in
order to save the entire undertaking (whose opponents in both camps were again taking the
floor), did a majority of the board decide, “on both moral and practical grounds,” to continue the
project with the original subcontractors, Degussa included. Critics insist that pragmatism was the
main reason: “In order to save 2.3 million [euro in additional costs], Degussa became accept-
able to Auschwitz sensitivities.” At the same time, the gigantomania of the whole project, trying
to confirm the Germans as “world champions of facing up to their guilt,” once more was
denounced.396
A few months earlier, when the present author had just begun working on this study, the above
issue had almost seemed defunct. On the 50th anniversary of the June 1953 East German upris-
ing, which was crushed by Soviet tanks, the conservative camp repeated their charge that intel-
lectuals of the East and West, and the German Left in particular, had amnesia in dealing with
communist crimes while focussing a highly acute memory on the Nazi period.397 The Left, how-
ever, was, and is, far from monolithic. The much-discussed Schlussstrich – the “final stroke of
the pen” that supposedly would finish the painful discourse about the past and, according to
polls, is desired by roughly half the population in Germany, Switzerland, and Austria398 – was no
longer an exclusive demand of the conservative camp that had failed to impose it. The wish for
the painful discourse to end has spread increasingly from the far right of the political spectrum
to other sections399 of the population, even towards the left. The present left-of-centre German
government, since assuming power in 1998, has given signals of adopting that wish in terms of
establishing a new German normalcy and self-assurance, seeing these as indispensable prereq-
uisites for a sovereign foreign (and domestic) policy. 
Certainly, in spite of all Kohl’s ambiguities in applying policy, Germany’s current chancellor, the
pragmatic Gerhard Schröder, has fewer historical points of reference than did his predecessor,
who holds a Ph.D. in history. One of Schröder’s intellectual associates publicly complained that
“our history, in particular that of the ‘Third Reich,’ is the obsession of the academies. In the Ger-
man media there is a history lesson every day.” Even though it was “not necessary to abolish
history lessons,” priority should be given to present and future challenges.400 Correspondingly
Schröder, the first chancellor with no firsthand memory of WW II, early on showed a tendency to
throw off the yoke of the past, such as when he skipped the usual wreath laying ceremony dur-
ing his visit to Warsaw or when, in 1998, he turned down French President Jacques Chirac’s invi-
tation to the 80th anniversary celebrations of Armistice Day. Fears thus stimulated of a leftwing-
led Schlussstrich401 trying to do more than provide normalcy to a “self-conscious nation”402 are
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out of proportion. In democratic countries in the age of globalization, any such intention would
be impossible, since realizing it would require historical research to stop and the country to
become isolated from similar discourses abroad.
In most national discourses – not only in Israel and Russia,403 whose people experienced the
highest death toll – the reputation of WW II as being the most disputed period404 is very much
alive, as was shown again on V-E Day in 2003. At that time, even in bucolically peaceful Den-
mark, justifiably proud of its lonely European record of saving almost all its Jews,405 new revela-
tions suggested that it was time to revise the rosy official version and current historiography of
what happened in the country during WW II other than in relation to the Holocaust.406 Indeed, on
August 29, 2003, Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen for the first time publicly condemned
the Danish state's collaboration (which had been backed by all parties except the communists),
on the occasion of the anniversary of the Danes' 1943 celebrated August-oprøret [uprising] that
put an end to it.407 World War II memories frequently overlap with current strife – most visibly in
Russia, where Victory Day celebrations in 2002 and 2003 were shattered by bomb attacks relat-
ed to the war in Chechnya.408 In the USA, the 60th anniversary of Pearl Harbor in 2001 became
the point of reference set against the most recent day of infamy, September 11, which had ham-
mered the message once more into Americans that they were not invulnerable.409
Yet even in Central Europe, current policy is often the battleground on which rusty weapons from
WW II are still deployed. In Prague, the Resistance Veterans’ Association cancelled a commem-
orative speech by a top Czech politician because of his perceived accommodating attitude toward
the expellees, while in Germany ministers were booed by Sudeten audiences for similar rea-
sons.410 A swath of articles reveal the “contest of [partial] truths” between Czechs and Sudeten
Germans, who both see themselves as victims. Despite a solemn German-Czech declaration in
March 1997 that “political and juridical issues originating from the past” should not encumber
their relations, the conservative German opposition backed demands by the BdV (Association of
Expellees) that before the Czech Republic could be admitted to the EU, Prague had to cancel the
notorious Benesˇ decrees, named after Czechoslovakia’s President Eduard Benesˇ, which right
after the war had provided the legal basis for the wholesale expulsion of the Sudeten minority.
Conversely, most Czech politicians and media warned that such demands were intended to over-
turn the results of WW II.411 When Prime Minister Milosˇ Zeman declared that expulsion submitted
the Sudeten Germans to a “comparably mild” fate for a “Fifth column,” Schröder in turn cancelled
a scheduled visit to Prague, not making an official trip there for another eighteen months.412
Obviously, the Nazi past will occupy the German discourse for many more years, since it “can
only be superseded by an even worse catastrophe.”413 In any case, the desired new normalcy
will be difficult to achieve in view of the enduring German discomfort concerning WW II-related
matters, demonstrated here with episodes from two different periods: 1) In 1994, a soccer match
in Berlin between Germany and England had to be cancelled after the organizers suddenly real-
ized that the designated date coincided with Hitler’s 105th birthday.414 2) When, in the summer of
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2003, German state television followed a British example and conducted a mass poll for the
greatest German of all time, Nazi (and GDR) figures were expressly excluded as candidates, pro-
voking sarcastic comments abroad.415
Substantial factors ruling out early historicization of WW II (to be understood as being accom-
modated in archives and museums) are media interaction and the wider trend toward cross-
national approaches. This was first noticed in Holocaust-era related themes, such as restitu-
tions416 and indemnifications, on a practical level or a scholarly research level. International coop-
eration is also required when dealing with refugees or war criminals,417 matters that cannot be
investigated from the perspective of one country. More significant than this technical feature of
facilitated global inter-linking is the increasing “Europeanization”418 of national histories and his-
torical perspectives. For instance, the Sudeten issue touches not only Germans and Czechs but
also Austrians419 and, indirectly, Poles and Hungarians. Particularly for the latter, ethnically based
altercations are not things of the past but still affect relations with neighbouring Slovakia, Serbia,
and Romania. 
As well, cross-national approaches are often triggered by dramatic experiences in other contexts.
For instance, during the post-Yugoslavia wars the daily flood of news and pictures awakened WW
II memories of ethnic cleansing and mass rapes and sensitized broader international audiences
to so-called peripheral subjects, such as the suppression and expulsion of minorities.420 With the
shrinking of distances, this trigger effect works on a national, European, or global level. Thus,
awarding the 2002 Nobel Prize for Literature to the Hungarian Auschwitz survivor Imre Kertesz
raised in his country, and perhaps in other former Eastern Bloc countries as well, the public’s
extremely low awareness of the Holocaust.421 Rwanda, in turn, serves internationally as a con-
temporary case-study of the rapidity with which victims [the Tutsi] are able to mutate into vic-
timizers,422 reviving memories of the bloody aftermath of WW II in many countries.
Revelations in one country often trigger similar processes elsewhere. The Belgians, for example
admitted that they “needed the example of France to act,” before facing up to the tabooed sub-
ject of their own involvement in the Holocaust.423 Recently, news of a suppressed fact affecting
many European countries became wider known. In late April 1945, the hard-core Nazis who
fanatically defended the last Nazi perimeter in Berlin around Hitler’s bunker consisted mainly of
young Waffen-SS volunteers from all over the continent; Frenchmen, Danes, Norwegians, Dutch,
Latvians, even neutral Swiss and Swedes.424 For Denmark, the deployment of over 6,000 volun-
teers at the Eastern front, side by side with the Wehrmacht, had been the country’s largest mili-
tary involvement since its war against Prussia and Austria in 1864.425
The new awareness of common similarities and continuities, in history and myth, increased sen-
timent for common features and fates, increasingly perceiving WW II as a European civil war.426
In consequence, the Europeanization of national histories has been stretched farther back
chronologically, at least to the Balkan Wars and the First World War,427 beyond the Versailles
Treaty – often taken as Hitler’s starting point428 – and even back to the Thirty Years War in the
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17th century that wiped out one third of Central Europe’s population.429 This Europeanization of
WW II has at times been connected with fears or hopes of a dilution of German responsibility.
When everyone is guilty of having wronged others, the conclusion can be reached that no one
carries particular guilt.430
Such mistrust has become evident in connection with the escalation of a BdV initiative, sec-
onded by the leaders of CDU/CSU, to found in Berlin a Memorial Centre for (i.e. against) expul-
sion and even decree an annual national holiday, to commemorate expulsion of in total almost
15 million Germans, of whom about two million died before they were able to reach the German
rump state. However, in accordance with most of the Centre-left camp but not his entire gov-
ernment, Chancellor Schröder has declared his opposition to and refusal to provide government
funds for such a predominantly “Germanocentric” approach to this delicate subject. The
planned centre, because of its institutional connection with a specific victim group, would,
despite all promises to the contrary, unilaterally focus on German sufferings, while there obvi-
ously are ulterior intentions to counterbalance the enduring anti-revisionist effects of the Holo-
caust Memorial in the same city. The chancellor’s warning against the damage to foreign rela-
tions has proven immediately true. Poles and Czechs, the public at large much more than the
elites, feel their old fears and images of Germany are justified. They consider the expellees’ proj-
ect as another attempt to minimize German responsibility and re-write history, another step of
a new revanchist hegemonic Drang nach Osten [Drive towards the East]. Polish newspapers
repeatedly have demanded: “No compassion for the Germans… who again are posing as a vic-
tim nation.”431
In fact, the Poles do not fear a rewriting of history only, but also more practical consequences of
“German legal aggression”: Recently the Prussian Claims Society was founded in Bonn to give
legal and logistical assistance to expelled Germans mainly from Poland but also from Czech and
Russian territories in efforts to reclaim their homes or sue for indemnification in German, Euro-
pean, and American courts, this last clearly following the promising example of the Jewish
Claims Conference. There are even plans to request compensation for Germans forced to work
under slave labour conditions in the East European states after May 1945.432
The dispute goes on at many levels. Prominent intellectuals from the five countries involved with
the expulsion problem submitted joint counterproposals for a European Centre of Expulsions –
referring to all (perhaps as many as 70 million) people expelled from their homes and their coun-
tries in the 20th century throughout the entire continent, starting and ending with the Balkans at
the dawn and towards the end of the century. This centre should not be located in Berlin but in
Wroclaw (Breslau), Poland, or even in Sarajevo. Others prefer a touring exhibition or no centre at
all. Whatever the outcome, freshly healed wounds have re-opened. Yet on the eve of the Euro-
pean Union’s enlargement, it is time to be concerned not only with such issues as farm subsi-
dies, but also with the controversial historical experiences histories of member states. These ulti-
mately should merge into a common, multi-layered European identity.433
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There is, however, one more important aspect of this crisis. In Germany but also in other coun-
tries,434 almost every time new historical interpretations and insights have grown out of scholar-
ly disputes that then expanded to include large segments of the population. Public dissent broke
consensual silence and standardized official commemoration that had lasted for decades. Simi-
lar developments can be expected again, not only in Germany (and, we hope, Austria). In Poland
the issue of the expulsion memorial caused the first, after the Jedwabne massacre debate, great
discussion about its own history, but this time virtually the entire nation, from the post-commu-
nist Left to the ultra Right, is unified in opposition to the BdV project. Nonetheless, there are signs
of a softening in attitudes about general war-related stereotypes. In a Gallup poll, 57% of Polish
respondents said that Germans also had been victims of WW II. This was a higher percentage
than a similar poll had shown in Germany. The conservative paper Rzeczpospolita was at a loss
to explain this surprising result, commenting, “Not only the Germans, but we too, are forgetting
who was victim and who was perpetrator.”435
Between Past and Future
The past has a future.
Stefan Ulrich, SZ, September 8-9, 2001
History is the future of the past's present.
Bernhard Schlink436
We must move on. That does not mean we should forget.
Peter Eisenman437
In recent disputes about real or alleged German provocations, the harsh style of argumentation
used by many younger Poles and Czechs has surprised observers. Clearly, the descendant gen-
erations also have selective memory, with the victims’ descendants tied more emotionally to the
transgression than the perpetrators’ descendants. The persistent notion that the gradual passing
away of the war generation would smooth the stony path of Vergangenheitsbewältigung is only
partly valid, even though direct confrontations between “good” and “bad” veterans are going to
cease. This mainly refers to courtroom clashes between war criminals and victims/witnesses and
to provocative performances by veterans of the Wehrmacht, SS, or collaboration units (e.g. in
Latvia). The last annual gathering of one of the most bloodstained Wehrmacht units, the 1st
Mountain Division, with logistical help from the Bundeswehr and the governing in Bavaria CSU
party, stirred up considerable opposition, including the physical presence of some surviving vic-
tims, mostly Greeks and Italians, among them the 93-year-old “real Corelli,” Amos Pampaloni.
There will not be many more repeat performances.438 The quality of the descendants’ memories
(and commemoration culture) will depend on where these “memories” come from, with what
they are compared, and how they are moulded by ancestors, education, and, inescapably, the
ongoing (omni)presence of history in the media. 
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First, the often observed historic amnesia, ignorance,439 or disgust440 of the younger generation,
deplorable in any case, will not help reduce ethno-cultural prejudices and stereotypes, but can
even render them potentially more dangerous, as has been confirmed by recent research.441 Sim-
ilar reactions could be expected from superficial fascination with narrowly selected sensational
chapters from a former enemy’s history. In spite of more positive public opinion polls, British rela-
tions with Germany clearly are coloured by memories of war, largely cultivated. In the tabloid press
and among politicians, suspicion is strong that Germany, via the EU, is still trying to win WW II,
which, after all, was and is “for some Britons at least, a kind of icon or our inner superiority.”442
Even in the biggest London bookstores the German history section is limited almost exclusively to
the Nazi period. Britain’s Office for Standards in Education recently criticized the Hitlerization of
high-school curricula, in which German history is narrowed down to those twelve dark years from
1933 to 1945, about which pupils are taught more than any other chronological period.443
The frequent identification of Germany with Nazi Huns – led by the notorious tabloid, the Sun 444 –
encouraged football hooliganism and even physical harassment of German students studying in
England. After such an incident, the German ambassador rebuked British newspapers and school
curricula for perpetuating stereotypes. Reaction to the ambassador’s remarks was encouraging
in several respects: A young German journalist on an exchange program in London commented
publicly that the media, including war films “with those eternally imbecile Nazi Germans and the
ever sharp-witted British,” spread clichés, but she doubted that the populace was prejudiced
against the Germans to a dangerous degree. Furthermore, she disagreed with the ambassador,
instead backing the British curricula because “the Nazi part of German history is something that
teaches a lesson not only to Germans.” The Guardian, conversely, in an editorial, (“Prisoners of
the Past”) acclaimed the ambassador to have rendered Britain a great service by exposing
“obsessive continuing equation of Germany with its Nazi past,” which is “unfair to two great
countries.” Then the editorial extolled German society for being “far more serious than we are
about facing up to the past, far more knowledgeable about it, and far more committed to putting
its lessons to the service of the future.” 445
In connection with the dispute on Allied area bombing, some other British voices asked if, since
the Germans had confessed their guilt, it was “perhaps time for us to express our regret?”446 In
July 2003, the British ambassador to Germany honoured the 40,000 civilian victims of Operation
Gomorrha, which sixty years earlier had demolished Hamburg. Three months later, he travelled
to Kassel, where a British raid had killed 10,000 people in one night.447 By May 2005, when the
60 years’ round of the commemorative marathon will come to an end, the British ambassador
probably will have visited more German cities to lay wreaths, just as German diplomats and min-
isters increasingly do at sites where the Wehrmacht or SS committed massacres.448 It has yet to
be seen if all this is a surge in political correctness or something more substantial.
In spite of frequent setbacks, these developments do seem promising. A common European
future cannot be approached without reflecting upon on one’s own faults,449 by smugly harping
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only on the transgressions of other member states. Such an attitude is counterproductive, espe-
cially when the most of the “guilty nations” have more or less accepted collective shame and
responsibility, though not collective guilt.450 In autumn 2003, even Ion Iliescu, president of “unre-
pentant Romania,” established a committee of experts headed by Romanian-born Nobel laureate
and Holocaust survivor Elie Wiesel and promised to give access to all archives in order to clari-
fy the nation's role in the genocide, still denied a few months earlier.451
The ostensibly simple idea of admitting one’s own transgressions in WW II is more difficult in for-
mer occupied countries than in those, like Britain, which went relatively unharmed by Nazi terror.
At the same time it is unfair to require greater maturity from those nations that have little more
than a decade of at least some form of democracy under their belts. A German journalist pro-
posed a simple solution to unblock the current Sudeten dispute. Both sides, he suggested, should
agree on two sentences: “The expulsion was a breach of human rights. Yet it was the conse-
quence of Nazi terror, in which Sudeten Germans were not without guilt.”452 A Czech probably
would reformulate this to be phrased more sharply, but we are still waiting for any such high-
level declaration to advance that of 1997, which has already been quoted. Meanwhile, the debate
goes on, weighing down EU offices. 
Nevertheless, it is not only in Western countries453 that images of WW II history have acquired
greater dimensions compared with the previous clean but simplistic distinction between us (vic-
tims) and them (perpetrators). Such discoveries have increasingly been made in Czechia and
Poland as well. This delicate process, however, must not be disturbed by self-righteousness gloat-
ing in formerly hostile countries454 or by self-defeating initiatives such as the one currently being
pressed by the German expellee association. Certainly German victims are entitled to commemo-
rate their own or their ancestors’ plights, but only as long as they do so in the proper context. Fear
of revitalizing the post-Versailles fatal myth of the mistreated victim nation is still rampant. 
Whenever two unresolved incriminating “pasts” exist, we must come to terms with both, not
merely the convenient one at the other’s expense. Particularly Germany, which received the gift
of its reunification thanks to the “mercy of history,” has an increased obligation to remember the
lessons of 1945, since people mainly learn from negative experiences.455 In 1999, Weimar,
Europe’s cultural capital for that year, honestly confronted its double past as “home to Goethe
and to Buchenwald.”456
Since reconciliation is not possible unilaterally and should be done on an everyday basis, this
process must be encouraged through bi- or trans-national initiatives that promote sharing histo-
ries and perspectives with neighbours so that they may learn from each other’s experiences. In
reading the press, it is clear that such groundbreaking common projects, on a grassroots level
or higher, are not frequent enough. Such projects as the German-Czech Foundation for the Future,
which itself followed the lead of successful earlier examples from other countries, need to be
copied.457 In contrast to previous bi-national cooperation between sister cities similarly destroyed
by the Germans, current twinning programs are more ambitious, bringing together even the likes
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of Coventry and Dresden with their antithetical symbolic connotations.458 Moreover, war graves
are mutually tended by youth from the countries involved, as a memorial to peace.459 For the 60th
anniversary of the Battle of Stalingrad German and Russian historians discussed the lessons
from the battle and its myth, a co-produced TV series was transmitted on the same days in both
countries with identical commentaries, and in the German-Russian Museum in Berlin a co-spon-
sored exhibition is dedicated to Stalingrad in the memory of both nations.460 On the 40th anniver-
sary of the Elysée Treaty of French-German Friendship in early 2003, Berlin and Paris decided
that a new common history textbook for German and French high schools would be prepared for
distribution by early 2005.461 As a Christmas present in 2003, President Jacques Chirac removed
“one of the last thorns from the past” in German-French relations by inviting Chancellor Gerhard
Schröder to join the 60 year commemoration festivities for the Allied landings in Normandy. The
chancellor happily accepted the invitation that had been denied his predecessor Helmut Kohl ten
years before.462
While the need to converge images of history seems obvious, methods and responsibilities loom
large. Many older historians from the former Eastern bloc countries, with the prominent excep-
tion of Poland, seem unprepared for such a convergence,463 which for many of them would spark
a personal Vergangenheitsbewältigung. We will have to wait until a generation of unencumbered
scholars, at present still heavily overshadowed by the older generation, dares to begin innovative
scholarly discourses that can affect the public at large.
As mentioned in the introduction to this study, after the war generation departs, the quality of
remembrance depends upon education and the media. Serious voices are sounding the alarm
that any further decrease in the teaching of history demanded by economy-dominated lobbies is
dangerous because it will further reduce knowledge as the basis for mutual and self-under-
standing. Modern history courses are needed to overcome narrow national perspectives, to take
into account the new European landscape and avoid easy conclusions and stereotypes.464 In Gör-
litz, on the German-Polish border, pupils and their teachers approach Nazi history in the local
context and helped restore a monument honouring the victims of a nearby concentration camp.465
Poles are honouring sites in their country connected with the German anti-Nazi resistance466
while international seminars are being held at the most famous site, Kreisau.
Even in Austria – named in the latest report by the Wiesenthal Centre as the country that has done
the least to bring Nazis to justice467 and where “general awareness of history” is “still immature” –
in a poll taken in 2001, 61% of the respondent youths said that it was “very important” to teach
students about the Nazi period of Austrian history.468 A nationwide grassroots education project
to keep the memory of Austrian Holocaust victims alive for post-war generations was highly suc-
cessful by personally connecting pupils with events and individual victims.469
Because of its proximity, the media have the important task of making new scholarly knowledge,
including information about formerly ignored subjects, more widely known to the public at large,
although the dissemination of news often is restricted by political considerations. History televi-
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sion, in particular, with its “colour, action, biography, and narrative” can bring “charisma and
passionate argument to bear on the meanings of the past.”470 However, since “edu-tainment”
aspires not only to entertain and excite but also to educate, there is a growing risk, at a time when
even history students seldom read history books, that ambitious media moguls could stimulate
historical imagination in self-serving ways. Even more, the inflationary surplus of documentaries
raises the danger of overexposure, possibly resulting in aversion; the media stampede is racing
ahead on a narrow path. We are able to check its progress almost on a daily basis because, with
the 2003 Stalingrad event as a forerunner, a new commemoration marathon has already begun.
TV teams have started working early on big documentary sequels for the 60th anniversary of D-
Day471 and other major events and topics, while others have not waited for the calendar. The
epochal 1945 “returned” already after 58 years, in 2003. The media surge dealing with WW II in
2003 and apparently not slowing down in 2004 engages and thrills large sections of the public
to an extent inconceivable even in 1995.472
In most countries, the argument between the defenders and the challengers of obsolete myths
and shibboleths goes on. In Germany, one camp calls out, “Never again!” (meaning may we
never see the likes and consequences of Nazism again)473 while the opposite camp bellows ever
louder, “That’s enough!” (meaning we should end the confrontation with the Nazi past). Charac-
teristically, the latter camp thinks it absurd when legal action against aged and mostly senile sus-
pects is taken so long after the events concerned,474 whereas the former camp reverses the ques-
tion and insists on asking whose fault it has been that legal action was not taken earlier. This
strife has entered a new stage with still undecided dynamics. Readily or not, the progressives
have accepted that the dimension of German victimhood, widely neglected (even considered
suspect by themselves and most foreigners) for most of the post-war period, has finally become
a legitimate part of the nation's collective memory of WW II, provided this sense of victimhood
does not proliferate wildly. If the mainstream accepts this condition and stops dealing with the
new German victim culture out of context, the achievements of more than half a century of Ver-
gangenheitsbewältigung will continue to grow.
With good reason, prominent historians have warned that the “abundance of past” and negation
of the past were “antithetical symptoms of the same inability to accept bygones, master the pres-
ent, and ponder the future.”475 Still, I think that, in steering by necessity between Scylla and
Charybdis, the fragile barque of collective remembrance should sail closer to abundance while
not allowing the crew responsible for coming to grips with the present to be swept away: The
past beneath the present, largely converted into history, should no longer dominate our time, but
the present generation must learn the foundations upon which they move and build. Fifty years
after V-E Day, a Jewish historian pleaded against keeping present-day Germans captive to a col-
lective diachronic stigma transferred from generation to generation.476 Now, nearly a decade
since this call, most people in the former Allied countries seem to agree, even accepting, with
conditions, the unfamiliar image of German victimhood. 
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The Jewish psychoanalyst Aron Ronald Bodenheimer, while referring to the Jewish (and Israeli)
tendency “to convert suffering into a virtue,” said, “We, the Jews, should forget the Shoah, the oth-
ers never.”477 Half a century earlier, in the 1950s the French President Vincent Auriol, when asked
by German students how long the French would need to forget German occupation crimes, gave
virtually the same advice, “If you will remember them, it will be much easier for us to forget.”478
As we have attempted to demonstrate, there is widespread acceptance (with varying degrees of
sincerity) of the necessity to keep in mind also the darker aspects of one’s own national history,
while a growing public admits479 that this is not to be limited to the 20th century’s established vil-
lains on the international scene. Even so, redemption is not guaranteed to countries or individu-
als facing up to the grim aspects of their past, since no individual or group has the right, in
exchange for repentance, to expect more than reconciliation and demand absolution and forget-
ting. Expressing impatience with delays in transforming the painful past into (academic or pub-
lic) history has always been counter-productive. This double message should be broadened to
all dimensions and to all bearers of the heritage of WW II, the mass media playing an ever-larg-
er role.
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11 To Vima, 10.3.1996; Kathimerini, 24./25.3.2001, 17.2.2002.
12 In this study, there are only few references to Greeks’ facing up to their past of war and civil war, with
which this author is dealing elsewhere.
13 Die Zeit, 6.6.2002; NZZ, 14.3.2001, 5.1.2003, and many others.
14 Because of its success already bought by foreign channels, among them the Greek state owned TV chan-
nel ET1. 
15 This does not allude to sexually-tainted “medial sensations” asking, e.g., “Did gay affair provide a cata-
lyst for Kristallnacht?” (The Guardian, 31.10.2001), or whether Mussolini had been cuckolded by Donna
Rachele (quotes in: The Washington Post, 22.11.2001). 
16 The Times, 20.5.2003; The Guardian, 20.5.2003.
17 NZZ, 21.1.2000; Main-Rheiner Allgemeine Zeitung, 24.6.2003 - Cf. for Russia: MT, 11.5.1995.
18 The Guardian, 17.12.2002, 21.7.2003, 25.7.2003; The Independent, 21.7., 22.7.2003.
19 On this see my “Nationalsozialistische Besatzungsherrschaft im Vergleich: Versuch einer Synopse” in
Wolfgang Benz, et al. (eds.), Anpassung – Kollaboration – Widerstand. Kollektive Reaktionen auf die Okku-
pation. Metropol, Berlin 1996, pp. 257-302. For an outstanding analysis of postwar dealings with this past,
cf. Tony Judt, “The Past is Another Country: Myth and Memory in Postwar Europe,” in Istva´n Dea´k, et al.
(eds.), The Politics of Retribution in Europe. World War II and its Aftermath, Princeton University Press,
Princeton, 2000, pp. 293-323.
20 Susan Eisenhower, Moscow Times, 1.6.1994 [reprint from The Washington Post].
21 H. Fleischer, ΔÔ ‘˙ˆÙÈÎﬁ „Â‡‰Ô˜’ ÙË˜ ∞˘ÛÙÚ›·˜, [Austria's Shameful Existence] To Vima, 20.2.2000.
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22 Often conveniently identified with ethnic or other minorities to be “cleansed” – particularly German ones,
if they were available.
23 Compare the case of Italy below.
24 See, e.g., Hagen Fleischer, Thetis, vol. 7 (2000), p. 370f.; Kathimerini, 11.1.1998; Athener Zeitung
15./22.10.1999.
25 Pons - Collins, German-English Dictionary. Unabridged 4th edition, Stuttgart et al., 1999, pp. 870, 139.
26 The term “unmasterable” was used, especially for the Nazi past, by the then Federal President Richard
von Weizsäcker in his famous speech giving viewpoints about WW II 40 years after its end (see below).
27 NZZ, 9.3.1995.
28 Ta Nea, 20.2.2002 / cf., among many others, The Moscow Times, 16.9.2000.
29 Cf., e.g., To Vima [from The Times], 24.4.1994; Freitag, 22.5.1998; Thane Rosenbaum, NYT, 8.11.2003.
30 On the medial picture of the “Third Reich” and WW II in the Fifties and early Sixties see: Reinhard Kühnl,
Das Dritte Reich in der Presse der Bundesrepublik. Kritik eines Geschichtsbildes, Frankfurt 1966.
31 This euphemism, as if crimes had been perpetrated by others usurping the German name, prevailed in
public discourse (e.g.: Die Zeit, 16.11.1990; for a recent example, see: MT, 7.8.2001).
32 NZZ, 21.8.1995. Cf. also Hagen Fleischer, “Kriegsverbrechen in Griechenland: Schuld ohne Sühne” in W.
Wette and Gerd R. Ueberschär (eds.), Kriegsverbrechen im 20. Jahrhundert, Darmstadt 2001, pp. 208-221.
33 Hagen Fleischer, “Der lange Schatten des Krieges,” Athener Zeitung, 15./22.10.1999.
34 taz, 17.6.2003. 
35 Against Eichmann (Jerusalem 1961) as well as the “Auschwitz trial” (Frankfurt 1963-1965).
36 Cf., among many others: Die Zeit, 11.12.1992 (J. Habermas); NZZ, 11.12.1999; Die Zeit, 1.2., 8.2.2001;
J. Fest, Stuttgarter Zeitung, 9.5.2003.
37 Time Magazine, 29.4.1985. On the dispute about Bitburg cf.: Jan-Holger Kirsch, “Wir haben aus der
Geschichte gelernt.” Der 8. Mai als politischer Gedenktag in Deutschland, Köln, Weimar, Wien 1999, p. 79ff.
38 Die Weltwoche, 21.7.1994.
39 Die Zeit, 31.7.1992.
40 Although in the GDR as in other communist states the onus soon was restricted to an ideologically as well
as geographically remote influential clique of reactionary, chauvinist, and imperialist elements of plutocracy,
thereby flattering an alleged majority of “anti-fascist-minded people.”
41 See, e.g., “Stasi kommt–Nazi geht?,” Die Zeit, 31.7.1992; MT, 15.9.1994.
42 Quotes from Daily Telegraph and Evening Standard in The Guardian 5.7.2003; and from German source
in Detlef Bald et al., Mythos Wehrmacht. Nachkriegsdebatten und Traditionspflege, Berlin 2001, p. 163.
43 Der Spiegel, 17/2001. 
44 Neues Deutschland, 21.6.2003. See also footnote 90.
45 Quote, e.g., in: B. Pampel, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 6.1.1995, p. 33; compare below.
46 MT, 15.9.1994.
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47 Ibid. 
48 Eleftherotypia, 21.10.1990; Die Welt, 13.4.1995; NZZ, 24.4.1996; Die Zeit, 30.7.1993, 5.7.2001.
49 In some cities there was a quick change of all street names that commemorated members of the com-
munist resistance, in others authorities abstained from renaming when the resisters had been executed by
the Nazis! (Die Zeit, 31.7.1992) Already in April 1990 “Karl-Marx-Stadt” landed “on the garbage heap of his-
tory,” when a plebiscite decided to rename the town in Chemnitz (Die Welt, 9.5.2003).
50 When it was uncovered that Beate (and Serge) Klarsfeld, with their impressive record of (German and
French) Vergangenheitsbewältigung, and the investigative journalist Günter Wallraff had received informa-
tion from the Stasi, it not only called into question their personal moral integrity but also left a taint on the
content of their revelations (Cf., e.g., “O Ios tis Kyriakis,” Eleftherotypia, 29.6.1997; Berliner Morgenpost,
12.8.2003; To Vima, 24.8.2003; Der Spiegel, 1.9.2003; NZZ, 9.9.2003; FR, 25.9.2003).
51 Apart from the discrepancy in the “quality” of victims, there were more distinguishing features between
the two phases as to number and reasons of casualties. Though thousands died under Soviet control through
“criminal neglect,” no mass murder was planned or committed. Soviets had been killed in Nazi custody
deliberately and in much higher numbers (Die Zeit, 30.10.1992; MT, 27.11.2000, cf. MT, 11.4.1995,
21.3.2000).
52 taz, 8.5.1995; O. Lafontaine, quoted in Der Spiegel, 24/2001, p. 169; G. Grass, quoted in NZZ, 12.1.2003.
53 FR, 31.8.1994; Freitag, 23.12.1994; Kathimerini, 5.5.1995. Already on the eve of unification, a slight
majority of all West German parties, other than the Greens, agreed on this. (Der Spiegel, 15/1989). 
54 Jürgen Habermas, Die Zeit, 11.12.1992; in English: New Left Review, January/February 1993.
55 Die Zeit, 30.10.1992; Standard, 26.7.2003.
56 Kathimerini, 11.5.1993 [from Liberation]; Freitag, 23.2.96; FR, 30.1.1997; and many others.
57 See, e.g., Jacob Heilbrunn, “Revisionist Nationalism", MT, 20.4.2000 (Hitler’s birthday!), [from Los Ange-
les Times]. Cf., however, the strange publicity in Greece rendered to the recent and, in addition to everything
else, outdated Greek translation of “Hitler’s War” (e.g., To Vima, 30.3., 13.4.2003). 
58 Die Zeit, 16.11.1990.
59 Jüdische Wochenzeitung, quoted by: taz, 5.1.1995; also: NZZ, 24.2.1995.
60 Cf. MT, 7.6.1994; SZ, 31.3-1.4.1994. Liberal voices expressed support for those wanting to commemo-
rate on their own a victory that, in the end, also helped liberate Germany. (Die Zeit, 3.6.1994). Other
observers, conversely, considered this argument valid only for celebrations confined to veterans.
61 MT, 7.6, 8.6, 16.6, 22.6.1994, and many others.
62 Similar arguments were made by Susan Eisenhower, granddaughter of Dwight D. Eisenhower and chair-
person of the Center for Post-Soviet Studies (MT, 1.6.1994, from The Washington Post).
63 FR, 9.3.1994; Berliner Zeitung, 18.3.1994; NZZ, 18.3, 19.3.1994.
64 FR, 9.3.1994; Freitag, 27.5.1994.
65 “Berlin is still a siren to Allied soldiers,” MT, 9.9.1994.
66 Cf. Foreign minister Klaus Kinkel’s jubilee speech stating that, “May 8th brought freedom and democracy
to the West, tyranny to the East.” (Bulletin [issued by the Presse- und Informationsamt der Bun-
desregierung, Bonn], 15.5.1995).
67 MT, 8.6, 25.6, 30.8.1994, 22.2.1996. The Berlin authorities had “forgotten” that without Gorbachev giv-
H I S T O R E I N
V
O
L
U
M
E
4
(2
0
0
3
-4
)
111
HAGEN/45-130elis  23-11-04  16:10  ™ÂÏ›‰·111
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 21/02/2020 08:09:23 |
T h e  P a s t  B e n e a t h  t h e  P r e s e n t
ing the green light in 1990, the city and all Germany would still be divided! (Eleftherotypia, 8.5.1995).
68 Moskovsky Komsomolets, 31.8.1994, quoted in The Moscow Times, 3.9.1994.
69 See the text of his meanwhile canonized speech in: Bulletin, 9.5.1985. 
70 “Only a thinly veiled way of saying defeat over Germany” (MT, 9.5.1995, cf. also MT, 6.5.1995)
71 Die Welt, 21.3.1995; and quotation from FAZ, in: Michael Naumann, Die Zeit, 3.2.1995.
72 FAZ, 23.1.1995.
73 Published in a sequel of three large ads, in which numbers 2 and 3 served as retort to the “aggressive
campaign of Leftist media” (FAZ, 7.4., 28.4., 5.5.1995).
74 E.g.: MT, 8.4., 6.5., 11.5.1995; SZ, 10.4.1995; NZZ, 11.4.1995; cf. Kohl’s speech on 8.5.1995.
75 For a recent example, see: FR, 10.6.2003.
76 Jürgen Habermas, Die Zeit, 31.3.1999. Cf.: MT, 30.8.1994; FR, 31.8.1994; FAZ, 18.12.1996. Similar
all-round dedications can be found at German military cemeteries in the former USSR (Die Zeit,
9.9.1994).
77 FAZ, 8.5.1995; similarly: Die Welt, 17.6.2003, stating that May 8 for “many” Germans meant not libera-
tion but the “final fall of [good?, H.F.] old Germany”; cf. FR, 17.6.2003. 
78 MT 8.4., 9.5.1995; SZ, 6-7.5.1995; Kathimerini, 7.5.1995; Eleftherotypia, 8.5.1995; Die Welt, 8.5.1995.
79 Die Welt, 4.5.1995; MT, 9.5.1995. Cf. polls in 1994 (Neue Ruhr-Zeitung, 1.6.1994).
80 J. Willms, “Siege und Sieger,” SZ, 10.5.1995.
81 The French president, the Russian and British prime ministers, and the US vice president.
82 Speech by Finance Minister Weigel, Bulletin, 15.5.1995. 
83 Cf. FR, 22.3, 29.3, 31.3.1995; FAZ, 22.3.1995. As substitute, Kohl invited Foreign Minister (and ex-
detainee in Auschwitz) Wladyslaw Bartoszewski for a separate commemoration ten days earlier in the Ger-
man Parliament.
84 To Vima, 21.5.1995; Kathimerini 27.5.1995; Apoyevmatini, 28.5.1995; FAZ, 8.5.1995; SZ, 10.5.1995.
85 A few samples from the dispute: FAZ, 18.12.1996; The Economist, 15.8.1998; Der Spiegel, 25.5.1998.
86 Die Welt, 17.6.2003; Kathimerini, 5.5.1995; Cf. Newsweek, 17.3.2003: “Searching for an identity that
consists of more than just crimes.”
87 “New Book Reopens Door on German Guilt Debate,” MT, 6.5.1996.
88 Cf. the Neonazi slogan on t-shirts “Grandpa was o.k.” (Note 352).
89 MT, 3.9.1994, 25.12.1997; FR 3.5.2003. 
90 Die Zeit, 5.11.1993; NZZ 11.11.1995. However, the post-Communist Neues Deutschland still (21.6.2003)
counts three dozen Bundeswehr barracks named after Wehrmacht officers.
91 Lübecker Nachrichten, 28.11.2001; Bayernkurier, 13.12.2001; The Bayernkurier – the central organ of the
Christian Social Union (CSU), the (even more to the right) sister party of the CDU, governing in Bavaria for
almost the entire post-war period – had attacked the people behind the exhibition of “leading a campaign of
moral annihilation against the German people” (e.g., 22.2.1997).
92 Kölner Stadtanzeiger, 29.11.2001; Die Zeit, 9.11.2000; SZ, 27.11.2001; Der Tagesspiegel, 28.11.2001.
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93 E.g., Die Welt, 26.3.1995; FR, 27.3.1995; cf.: taz, 3.12.2001.
94 NZZ, 11.12.1999.
95 Cf., e.g., SZ, 21.11.2000.
96 Bulletin, 16.9.1998; cf. The Guardian, 9.12.2002.
97 NZZ, 2.6.1995. Cf., however, the obituaries on Riefenstahl's death (all German papers, 10./11.9.2003).
98 The present author was responsible, thematically, for “reprisals and executions of hostages” and geo-
graphically, for the Balkans, including Greece, which had not been included in the first exhibition.
99 Die Zeit, 30.11.2000; Kölner Stadtanzeiger, 29.11.2001; and hundreds more.
100 Unfortunately, even in some serious foreign papers, this “biggest-ever neo-Nazi march” and the subse-
quent clashes received almost more attention than the exhibition proper. See, e.g., The Guardian, 2.12.2001;
The Independent, 2.12.2001.
101 E.g., Die Zeit, 6.12.2001.
102 K. Pätzold [one of the leading WW II historians of the former GDR], Junge Welt, 22.10.2003.
103 Die Welt, 9.12.2002; cf. The Times, 12.2.2003.
104 taz, 27.11.2002; also Stuttgarter Nachrichten, 24.6.2003.
105 E.g., Der Spiegel, 6/2002; Freitag, 8.2.2002. Cf. also the motto of the next chapter.
106 London Review of Books, 28.11.2002; Beevor, MT, 5.6.2002; Die Welt, 2.11.2002; The Observer,
3.11.2002; taz, 27.11.2002.
107 J. Friedrich, Der Brand. Deutschland im Bombenkrieg 1940-1945. Munich, 2002. 
108 “Speaking the unspeakable,” The Guardian, 27.8.2003 [from The London Review of Books].
109 Friedrich, pp. 512 ff., quoted in most press reviews.
110 Friedrich, quoted in The Los Angeles Times, 28.3.2003; cf.: The Times, 12.2.2003; Die Welt, 24.7.2003. 
111 Der Tagesspiegel, 9.1.2003; Nürnberger Zeitung, 5.4.2003; Berliner Morgenpost, 27.11.2002; Junge
Welt, 22.10.2003; a.o.
112 Cf. Kurt Pätzold, “Deutsches Leid,” Junge Welt, 22.10.2003.
113 Cf., e.g., Die Welt, 9.12.2002; FR, 23.12.2002; Die Zeit, 50/2002; Berliner Morgenpost, 4.2.2003.
114 Die Welt, 21.11.2002; see also Die Zeit, 49/2002.
115 Some critics felt reminded of Goldhagen, his form of self-presentation and “blood-seeking historiogra-
phy” (Die Welt, 9.1.2003); cf. Der Spiegel 49/2002. A reference to Auschwitz stresses an Allied fault, i.e.
the American and British decision not to bomb the railways leading there (Friedrich, op. cit., p. 130).
116 Die Zeit, 49/2002; FR, 23.12.2002; Die Welt, 9.1.2003; e.g., Friedrich, op.cit., pp. 110 ff, 378. Cf. note
134.
117 NZZ, 5.1.; 12.1.2003.
118 Neue-Ruhr-Zeitung, 12.12.2002; Stuttgarter Nachrichten, 25.11.2002; SZ, 27.11.2002; FAZ,
26.11.2002; Heilbronner Stimme, 4.12.2002.
119 Die Welt, 21.11.2002, 16.12.2002; Nürnberger Zeitung, 5.4.2003; and many others.
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120 The Times, 12.2.2003; “Mr. Important,” Die Welt, 7.8.2003.
121 Quotes from Al-Ahram in Die Welt, 16.12.,19.12.2002.
122 “The carpet-bombing campaign of the great democracies,” Ha'aretz, 8.10.2003.
123 Kathimerini, 13.4.2003; Los Angeles Times, 13.4.2003; cf. Indian Express, 11.2.2003.
124 Die Zeit, 25.4.2002; The Times, 12.2.2003; NZZ, 12.1.2003.
125 Boston Globe, 20.4.2003; New York Review of Books, 12.6.2003; cf., among many others, Sp.
Moskovou, To Vima, 21.4.2002; Le Point, 27.9.2002; The Guardian, 10.5.2003.
126 SZ, 27.11.2001; cf. NZZ, 12.1.2003.
127 Der Landser uses the sympathetic vernacular term for the ordinary frontline soldier.
128 “So realitätsnah wie möglich,” FR, 11.8.2003.
129 Die Zeit, 14.2.2002, and 40/2003.
130 Die Zeit, 23.10, 30.10.1992; FR, 30.10.1994; Berliner Zeitung, 12.9, 13.9.1998; cf. however, note 432.
131 Quoted in: Junge Welt, 22.10.2003. Cf. also notes 72 and 73.
132 FAZ, 18.2.1995; cf. Kirsch, 72. FRG president Herzog considered it necessary to stress the “fundamen-
tal difference” between Dresden and Auschwitz (FR, 13.2., 14.2.1995). Much earlier left-of-centre papers
called Dresden’s destruction “a barbarian act.” (Die Zeit, 30.10.1992). 
133 The Economist, 6.5.1995. Cf., however: The Guardian, 7.2.2004; The Independent, 13.2.2004.
134 Eric Markusen and David Knopf, The Holocaust and Strategic Bombing: Genocide and Total War in the
Twentieth Century. San Francisco and Oxford 1995. Remarkably, Friedrich does not mention this title in his
bibliography, although he most probably knows it. Similarly, the present author was not able to find any ref-
erence to it in the plethora of reviews on Friedrich's books.
135 A. Beevor, London Review of Books, 28.11.2002. Beevor's explanation of silence about mass rapes, i.e.
that German men had obstructed revelation of this, their worst humiliation (MT, 5.6.2002), is also insufficient.
136 Die Zeit, 25.4.2002.
137 Recurring charges of revisionism against Friedrich were rendered undeserved because of his former
scholarly work (FR, 23.12.2002; To Vima, 5.1.2003; Die Presse, 5.4.2003) and his ex-Trotskyite back-
ground. (Die Welt, 9.1.2003). Indeed, his former publications have no revisionist undercurrent but we know
of similar cases where left-of-centre historians allowed themselves to get adopted by the conservative camp
and only then became prominent. Already in context with the first Wehrmacht exhibition, Friedrich had
attacked an allegedly dominant “Left totalitarian opinion climate” (FR 30/31.10.1999).
138 Stuttgarter Nachrichten, 24.6.2003; The Observer, 5.10.2003; SZ, 18.10.2003. Recently, the author’s
identity was revealed.
139 taz, 27.11.2002. In consequence, Beevor’s book is highly disliked in Russia, while in Britain it is even
much more popular than in Germany (MT, 5.6.2002; The Observer, 3.12.2002).
140 Die Zeit, 8.6.2000, 42. I am not referring only to rather crude ventures, such as Le Livre noir du com-
munisme (Paris, 1997). 
141 Die Zeit, 49/2002.
142 A few years ago, the following, not isolated case would have been unthinkable in the mainstream press
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– in spite of its elements of truth. A journalist lamented that “horror (and evil) per se” was still depicted in
the millennial crime of Auschwitz, and not, for example, in the destruction of Indians in North America, in the
Turkish genocide against the Armenians, in the mass murders committed by Stalin or Pol Pot against their
own people. According to this view, any change in the stereotype of Germans as a nation of culprits was
hindered by the universal “commercialization of Nazi wrongs in word and picture.” Even FRG state television
would, “every grey November” [alluding to the “Crystal Night” pogrom on November 9, 1938] indulge in
“documentation and elucidation work.” In consequence, at home and abroad, the multi-facetted German his-
tory was “narrowed down to those 12 dark years from 1933 to 1945” (Heilbronner Stimme, 4.12.2002). 
143 Die Zeit, 25.4.2002. 
144 Bernd Ulrich, Die Zeit, 30.10.2003.
145 Die Welt, 24.7.2003, and many others.
146 J. Friedrich, Brandstätten, Munich 2003. Cf., e.g., Die Welt, 16., 24., 27.10.2003; SZ, 18.10.2003; The
Guardian, 21., 22., 24.10.2003; FAZ, 24.10.2003; and many others.
147 “Germany's forgotten victims,” The Guardian, 22.10.2003.
148 MT, 1.2.2000; Die Zeit, 14.2.2002; The Guardian, 10.5.2003, 23.1.2004.
149 Cf. “Debate over tolerance hangs over Germany,” Los Angeles Times, 13.7.2003: “A country where the
Constitution is a paean to political correctness but the soul is often a place of quiet prejudice.”
150 NZZ, 3.4.2002. Indeed, the tide does not seem to abate, even in media considered as “progressive.” Cf.,
e.g., the cover story in Der Spiegel (6.1.2003), initiating a new series on German suffering.
151 Die Zeit, 30.10.1992.
152 Cf. Spyros Moskovou, To Vima, 5.1.2003 and Titika Dimitroulia, Kathimerini, 13.7.2003. 
153 Dresdner Neueste Nachrichten, 2.9.2003; Ha’aretz, 8.10.2003. Friedrich (pp. 122 ff.) rightly refers to
these cases in order to demonstrate the brutality of, particularly, British strategy. Characteristically, he left
out the devastating bombing on the “periphery” (e.g. Piraeus in January 1944). Cf. note. 113.
154 FR, 22.9.2003; cf. The Observer, 5.10.2003, and others.
155 The Wehrmacht signed the document of unconditional surrender twice: first at Eisenhower’s headquar-
ters in Reims, then, almost two days later, in more official form, at Shukov’s headquarters in Berlin-Karl-
shorst. This explains the West’s and East’s different dates for celebrating the end of WW II.
156 MT, 5.4, 6.5.1995, cf. MT, 8.9.1994.
157 Die Zeit, 15.9.1992, and many others.
158 In the western half of Europe to be compared only with Spain. (See below).
159 Such as the Hungarian soldier who was captured by the Red Army in 1944 and “buried” since 1947 for
more than half a century in a far-off Soviet psychiatric clinic. This made headlines also outside his home
country, where he returned in 2000 (e.g.: The Moscow Times, 15.9, 18.10.2000, 30.10.2001).
160 The holders of Hitler’s skull fragments, “99.99% authentic,” in the former KGB archives, want to keep
their trophy “forever” in Russia (Der Spiegel, 18/2000; MT, 25.4.2000). In any case, neither Austria nor Ger-
many has yet applied for its “repatriation.”
161 NZZ, 1.10.1993.
162 MT, 11.6, 29.7, 30.7, 2.8, 4.8.1994; Die Zeit, 22.7.1994; NZZ, 2.8., 3.8.1994. Cf., most recently: Adam
Zamoyski, “Solving the Polish conundrum,” The Spectator, 1.11.2003.
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163 Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 31.7.1992, p. 48; The Moscow Times, 18.7.1998.
164 Die Zeit, 3.9.1993; NZZ, 26.8, 6.9.1993. Subsequently, Budapest urged Boris Yeltsin to return the
remains of Count Istvan Bethlen, pre-war democratic prime minister, who had been deported in 1945 to
Siberia because he was a potential rallying point against a communist regime. Since his ashes had been dis-
posed of in a mass grave, the reburial ceremony centred on a coffin draped in the Hungarian flag, contain-
ing three shovels of Russian earth (NZZ, 18.6.1994).
165 To Vima, 27.10.2002 [translation from NYT]; see also below. Maybe serious consideration should have
been given to the idea to bury the tsar along with the embalmed Lenin (e.g., MT, 8.7., 17.7.1998).
166 “Burying Past Confusion,” MT, 17.7.1998; FR, 17.7.1998; MT, 18.7.2002; The Guardian, 15.7.2003. 
167 See the stunning difference in the caring of the “privileged” Polish section of NKVD mass graves and the
neglected Russian part. Even better care was given to the war graves and memorials honouring the former
German invaders. See, e.g., MT 26.6.2001.
168 Together with 5,000 Ukrainians: “Memorial honours massacre victims,” MT, 20.6.2000.
169 MT, 20.6.2000.
170 MT, 7.6.1996, 8.8.1998, 22.4.1999, 16.9.2000; Der Spiegel, 43/1998, 19/1999.
171 See, e.g., “Germany’s Return to Yugoslavia,” MT, 6.12.1995, cf. 24.6.1995.
172 On October 21, 1941, the Wehrmacht slaughtered 2,300 Serbs in Kragujevac.
173 Cf. Junge Welt, 2.11.2002; see also below.
174 So the headline in MT, 26.6.1999, referring to the discovery of thousands of skeletons in Slovenia.
175 NZZ, 24.4.1996, cf. “Skandale und Skelette”, NZZ, 12.5.2000.
176 MT, 24.9.1998.
177 “Man finds World War II mass grave,” MT, 27.8.1998, cf. 21.6.1994.
178 “Yalta Jews’ Bones Remain Unburied,” MT, 9.9.1994.
179 See, in particular: “In Honour of the Dead,” MT, 1.6.1996, cf. MT, 21.6.1994, 29.12.1995.
180 At the previous celebrations in the Western capitals he had been represented by Vice President Al Gore.
181 This boycott, because of the parallel Russian war of suppression in Chechnya, was attributed by many
observers to Kohl’s pressure attempting to offset the German defeat, the occasion for the celebration, with
the new German role as principal victor of the Cold War. (See, e.g.: Spyros Linardatos, To Vima, 21.5.1995;
Apoyevmatini, supplement “An,” 28.5.1995; and other Greek papers. 
182 Cf, e.g., MT, 6.5., 9.5.1995, 12.5.1998; SZ, 9.5.1995; Die Welt, 8.5., 10.5.1995.
183 “Russia lays its bitter legacy to rest,” MT, 18.7.1998. 
184 “Yeltsin shows country 80-year Civil War is over,” MT, 18.7.1998.
185 MT, 2.2., 4.3.1993, 24.2.1994, 23.2.2000.
186 The reconciliation process with nationalist anti-Communist traditions goes on. See the rehabilitation of
“White” generals (MT, 8.8.2002; Der Spiegel, 15/2002), excluding explicitly collaborationist anti-Commu-
nism [General Vlasov, hanged in 1946!] in WW II (MT, 2.11.2001).
187 Putin referred also to peaceful achievements, such as in health care, science, space travel, and sports. 
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188 Moscow Times, 5.12.-21.12.2000, on a daily basis; cf. Die Zeit, 14.12.2000; Der Spiegel, 51/2000.
Recently, to the dismay of Communists and Liberals, the Duma accepted Putin’s proposal for a new Red
Flag for the army featuring Soviet-era stars and a large tsarist-style double eagle (MT, 5.6.2003). 
189 “Russia seeks an ideology you can sing,” MT, 8.12.2000.
190 See for the ongoing discussion: The Guardian, 28.7.2003.
191 NZZ, 21.8.1999. Only a few NGO’s, in particular the Memorial Society, go on collecting evidence.
192 Thus the title of an article from which this author took his (first) introductory motto (MT, 9.5.1995).
193 MT, 16.3.1995, 23.5.1998, 22.8., 23.8.2001; 5.2.2003; NZZ, 2.2.2003; cf. The Observer, 1.12.2002.
194 “ ‘We are one,’ Yeltsin tells War Allies,” The Moscow Times, 9.5.1995; cf. MT, 15.3.1995, 29.1.2000. 
195 G. Roberts, The Guardian, 28.2.2003, cf. Kölner Stadtanzeiger, 16.9.2002; Junge Welt, 1.2.03; MT,
5.5.1995; Die Zeit, 50/2002; The Guardian, 13.2.2003.
196 The Daily Telegraph, 5.3.2003, 21.2.2003. See also: The Scotsman, 4.3.2003; The Times, 3.3.,
5.3.2003; NZZ, 6.3., 19.3.2003; The Washington Post, 5.3., 6.3.03; CNN, 5.3.2003.
197 Jean MacKenzie, “Confessions of a Russophile: V-E Day party has fresh face,” MT, 12.5.1998.
198 MT, 4.5.1995, 28.1., 3.2.1999, 6.12.2001, 3.6.2003, and many others.
199 MT, 3.2.2003.
200 “The Great Patriotic War,” MT, 5.5.1995; MT 5.3.1993, 25.6.2003; Die Weltwoche, 11.5.1995. The
Guardian, 13.2.2003, contrasting the Russian losses of perhaps 27 million people with the 135,576 US
casualties in the European theatre. The Soviet strategy contrasted sharply with that of Communist
Yugoslavia, which grossly exaggerated casualties in order to substantiate Tito’s founding myth. Among oth-
ers, there were similar tendencies in Greece to maximize (material and human) losses [e.g.: Kathimerini,
14.12.1997], though or even because the Greek resistance movement failed to gain power after the war.
201 See, e.g., “Putin honours Army past and present,” MT, 23.2.2000. (The ceremony took place at the
gigantic Mother Russia statue in Stalingrad.)
202 I.e., the submarine Kursk and the sacrificing of hostages taken by Chechen guerrillas in a Moscow the-
atre (MT, 11.11.2002).
203 MT, 5.6.2002.
204 See below. Similarly, Moscow objected to revisionist tendencies in German commemorative policy in
the two-phase concentration camps with a potential to play down Nazi crimes (e.g., MT, 27.11.2000; Der
Spiegel, 3/2002). Indeed, Russia connects both its imperial pasts with current polemics. When Denmark
gave shelter for the separatist Tchetchenian World Congress, the Danes were accused by Isvestija of hav-
ing committed repeated “treacherous” acts against Russia – from refusing asylum to the Romanovs in
1917 to Danish SS volunteers fighting along with the Wehrmacht on the eastern front (Der Spiegel,
45/2002).
205 MT, 8.12.2000; Die Zeit, 14.12.2000.
206 MT, 9.5., 11.5.1995.
207 Süddeutsche Zeitung, 10.5.1995.
208 “The other side of the war,” MT, 5.5.1995. The same question often came up in the context of German
unification: Mitterand had qualms, while Thatcher even expressed fear that united Germany would, before
long, have won WW II (e.g., “Britain and the war,” The Economist, 20.2.1999). Correspondingly, after the
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disintegration of the USSR, Russian veterans were bitter that finally Germany emerged victorious (MT,
22.2.1996). See also, in the Baltic context: A. Liakos, To Vima, 13.7.2003. 
209 “Polish anger at 1939 invasion lingers,” MT, 16.9.1999, see also MT, 18.9.1999.
210 “Poland’s President honours victims of […] Nazism and [i.e., Soviet] totalitarianism,” MT, 18.9.1999.
211 Remembrance of terror sells: In Cambodia – along with Angkor Vat, designated a World Heritage site –
the “killing fields” of the Khmer Rouge outside Phnom Penh are the biggest tourist attraction, where “horror,
memory, education, and livelihood commingle.” (National Geographic Today, 10.1.2003).
212 Die Zeit, 5.7.2001; A. Liakos, To Vima, 13.7.2003. Lithuania has also the “Gulag-Park,” a Disney-Land
of (Soviet) terror (Der Spiegel 18/2001), much better attended than the Jewish (Holocaust-) Museum.
213 “Budapest revisits its recent horrors,” Boston Globe, 6.4.2003; cf. NZZ, 25.2.2002; The Times,
10.2.2003; Der Standard, 6.8.2003.
214 MT, 8.12.2000. Anyhow, the bulk of Russian modern history museums are still limited to the Great Patri-
otic War (e.g., MT, 16.5.1995).
215 “Stadt der Erinnerung,” NZZ, 21.7.2003.
216 In Croatia, for instance, not only “classic” communist-era monuments have been removed but also those
honouring the guerrilla movement (NZZ, 24.4.1996).
217 Kathimerini, 7.5.1995, and many others.
218 The Daily Telegraph, 14.6.2003; taz, 19.6.2003; Boston Globe, 18.6.2003; Los Angeles Times,
18.6.2003. See, e.g., for the Romanian pogrom in Iassy: NZZ, 6.11.1999, 6.2.2002, 21.11.2003.
219 See, e.g., NZZ, 30.11.1996, 20.5.2000; MT, 6.2., 11.2.1998; Der Spiegel, 17/2002, 40/2002.
220 Compare, e.g., The Guardian, 16.8.1993; MT, 20.8.1996; NZZ, 30.11.1996; Der Spiegel, 48/2002.
221 E.g.: “Lukashenko visits Jewish grave site,” MT, 7.5.1997.
222 The head of the Serbian collaborationist government is extolled as “Serbia’s saviour” by many exponents
of the mainstream and new/old academic elites. (ak - Zeitung für linke Debatte und Praxis, 15.8.2003).
223 In 2002, to convince the West of Romanian suitability for admission to Euro-Atlantic alliances, the Ilies-
cu regime passed legislation making it illegal to revere fascism and war criminals (i.e., the war leader Mar-
shall Antonescu [1940-1944], executed in 1946). Meanwhile post-1990 Antonescu monuments have
reportedly been removed and streets bearing his name were renamed yet again. However, the second
strongest party (For Greater Romania) has already declared its intention to rehabilitate Antonescu for good
if it is victorious in the 2004 election (taz, 31.7.2003).
224 The “improved” version of Croatian history tries frantically to distinguish between the creature and the
creators, i.e. between the NDH – the first “Independent Croatian State,” 1941-1945, which realized a “thou-
sand-year-old dream” – and the Ustasˇa movement that had created and ruled it. 
225 O Ios, Eleftherotypia, 21.10.1990.
226 See below, note 256 (Jedwabne).
227 Die Zeit, 9.5., 6.6.2002; NZZ, 17.4.2002; SZ, 14.10.2003. In Western countries also, taboos were often
broken by outsiders from abroad.
228 See, e.g., Die Welt, 6.6.2003. Cf., below, the case of Poland.
229 The most significant exception is Poland, where the regime change was the result of a “negotiated” rev-
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olution (on a round table between regime and opposition) and internal peace was considered more impor-
tant than “searching for [divisive] truth” (e.g.: NZZ, 14.3.2001). In consequence, incriminated old elites were
not removed, as long as they cooperated with the co-called lustration procedure, a kind of catharsis by elu-
cidation, and were even able to return to power in the November 1995 elections.
230 NZZ, 14.5., 5.10.1999.
231 MT, 10.12.2001; see below.
232 MT, 25.4.1998; cf. also: Die Zeit, 5.7.2001.
233 MT, 6.2.1998; NZZ, 20.5.2000.
234 MT, 25.1.2000; NZZ, 20.5.2000.
235 See, e.g.: The Moscow Times, 9.2., 24.6., 30.6., 21.7., 2.11.1993, 10.7.1996, 10.3., 18.3.1998. The
mayor of Moscow spoke even of “a consistent policy of genocide” (MT, 25.4.1998).
236 “The marked difference in the parade’s reception illustrated the passions that divide the country’s two
communities when it comes to WW II.” (MT, 17.3.1998).
237 MT, 25.3., 25.4.1998; 17.3.1999, 26.2.2000; NZZ, 20.5.2000.
238 MT, 12.11.1993, 24.11.1998.
239 “Baltic States must face their past,” MT, 27.9.1994.
240 MT, 12.11.1993; 24.12.1997; 11.2.1998, 28.9.2000, 10.12.2001; NZZ, 9.1.1999; SZ, 14/15.7.2001.
241 NZZ, 20.5.2000; MT, 20.6.2000, 10.12.2001.
242 BBC News, 29.11.2002.
243 At times “Jewish-Bolshevist terror”. It was conveniently forgotten that in the multi-national inner circle of
the NKVD and its forerunner agency as well as in Lenin’s entourage, there were strong Latvian factions.
244 MT, 25.4.1998; NZZ, 9.1., 26.11.1999, 20.5.2000.
245 NZZ, 20.5.2000; MT, 16.1.2001. Cf. the introductory motto for this chapter.
246 NZZ, 14.10.2000.
247 FAZ, 22.3.1995; MT, 2.8.2000; Die Welt, 8.5.2003; and many others.
248 For Katyn see, e.g., To Vima, 22.4.1990; MT, 26.8.1993, 29.10.1994; FAZ, 13.4.2000; SZ, 17.9.1999.
249 MT, 2.6.1995, 9.4.1995, 18.9.1999.
250 MT, 17.1.2002; SZ, 17.1.2002.
251 “Polen als Siegermacht in Berlin,” Die Welt, 8.5.2003.
252 “Gedenken an Katyn in Polen,” Die Welt, 3.6.1995.
253 See, e.g., Der Spiegel, 39/2000; Die Welt, 14.6.2002, 11.4.2003; cf. below.
254 Die Zeit, 10.12.1993; MT, 24.4.2000; Der Spiegel, 15/2002; Die Welt, 17.5.2003; SZ, 8.1.2004. 
255 See below, notes 431-432.
256 Jan Gross, Neighbors. The Destruction of the Jewish Community in Jedwabne, Poland. Princeton, 2000.
257 “Polen empört sich über jüdische Klage,” Berliner Zeitung, 4.8.1999.
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258 The ex-Commission for the Investigation of Nazi Crimes in Poland, renamed after the regime change as
have been many such institutions, now deals with “crimes against the Polish people, 1939-1989,” but also
with Polish post-1945 offences against Germans and other ethnic groups.
259 Cf. Freitag, 30.3.2001; Le Monde, 31.3.2001; Eleftherotypia, 26.4.2001; Berliner Zeitung, 15.7.2001;
Der Spiegel, 10/2001, 22/2001, 28/2001, 29/2001; The Economist, 28.4.2001; SZ, 10.9.2001; taz,
20.12.2001, 4.11. 2002; The Guardian, 19.12.2002; Die Welt, 12.7., 5.11.2002, 1.5.2003; FR, 14.1.2003.
260 This observation applies also to the Asian war theatre, see especially for Okinawa: NZZ, 9.9.1995.
261 FR, 28.7.2003; cf., e.g.: The Independent, 17.12.2002; The Times, 15.5.2003; Leipziger Volkszeitung,
14.5.2003; Neue Ruhr-Zeitung, 10.8.2003.
262 taz, 10.5.2003; cf. Der Spiegel, 12/2000, 44/2003; Kathimerini, 30.4.2002 [from The Guardian].
263 In Greece, civil war began before liberation. The fronts became blurred, and the occupiers' terror often
overlapped with the “white” and “red” terrors imposed by the two principal domestic camps. Consequently,
doubts remain about the accuracy of body counting (and attributing them in precise percentages to their
respective killers), as recently is en vogue (Stathis N. Kalyvas, “Red Terror: Leftist Violence during the Occu-
pation,” In: Mark Mazower (ed.), After the War was Over, Princeton and Oxford 2000, pp. 142-183). In
this context cf., e.g., media speculations on whether an accidentally unearthed mass grave originated from
WW II or the Civil War, or if the bones were much older (Athens News, 6.7.2001).
264 In Spain about 50,000 Republicans were summarily executed by the Franquists and buried in mass
graves between 1939 and 1946, i.e. after the “official end” of the Civil War (Der Spiegel, 43/2002).
265 Ibid.; Berliner Zeitung, 22.8., 24/25.8.2002; Eleftherotypia, 18.7.2002 [from The Guardian]; To Vima
1.12.2002 [from Le Monde]; FAZ, 21.11.2002; The Guardian, 1.12.2003.
266 “Massengrab des Spanischen Bürgerkriegs entdeckt,” Der Standard, 1.9.2003; Der Spiegel online, 1.9.2003.
267 Such as, even in model countries Norway and Denmark, appalling treatment of native women accused
of “horizontal collaboration” with the German enemy and of the offspring of such liaisons, see, e.g., FR,
2.10.1998; Der Spiegel, 34/1998, 8/2001.
268 Particularly in connection with the postwar decolonization process involving the often brutal (“Nazi-like”)
suppression by the colonial powers such as France, the Netherlands, and Belgium. See, e.g., Pierre Nora’s
reassessment of the Algerian war of independence: Die Zeit, 14.3.2002. While the German public followed
the revelations on their neighbours' offences with a certain degree of schadenfreude [gloating], in early
2004, it was shocked by new research publicized on an early case of German genocidal policy when the
Kaiser's troops systematically decimated the defiant Hereros, women and children included, in “German
South West Africa” [Namibia]. Cf., e.g., SZ, 10.1.2004 (2 articles); taz, 10.1.2004 (4 articles!).
269 Journal, [Esch, Luxemburg], 6.12.2002.
270 “Holocaust-era related assets,” a broader term than the previously used “Nazi gold,” indicated the scope
of the international conference held in Washington in 1998 and attended by over 40 states and a dozen
(mostly Jewish) NGOs. The present writer was a member of the Greek delegation. 
271 NZZ, 30.11.1996.
272 NZZ, 13.5.1995; see below.
273 The Economist, 6.5.1995; FR, 28.4.1995; FAZ, 4.5.1995. 
274 Ibidem; NZZ, 10.6.1995, 20.6.2000.
275 The Economist, 6.5.1995.
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276 MT, 9.12.1994, 12.1.1995; Daily Telegraph, 21.8., 16.12.2003; Junge Welt, 21.11.2003; Los Angeles
Times, 25.1.2004. After the waning of the perceived Soviet threat in the early '90s, anti-Japanese sentiment
in the USA increased, although, unlike before 1941, the concern now was mainly economic, as exemplified
by a bestseller just in time for the 50th anniversary of Pearl Harbor with the eye-catching title, The Coming
War with Japan. Cf. note 409.
277 Files released in 1992 shed new light on large-scale collaboration by residents of the Channel Islands,
the only German-occupied part of the UK, as well as on post-war cover-up to avoid tarnishing Britain’s image
(Athens News, 3.12.1992; Madeleine Bunting, The Guardian, 4.5.1992, 24.1.2004). British agencies had
encouraged resistance throughout occupied Europe with the sole exception the Channel Islands in order not
to expose British subjects to German reprisals. In addition, during the Cold War Britain allowed many thou-
sands of East European Nazi collaborators to immigrate because of their anti-Communist backgrounds. 
278 “Memories of war. No end of lessons,” The Economist, 6 May 1995; cf. The Economist, 20.2.1999.
279 Cf., e.g., “Tabu Vichy,” Der Spiegel, 38/2001; “Le masque de Vichy” (Interview with Robert Paxton), Le
Nouvel Observateur, 8.1.2004.
280 Cf., e.g., Die Zeit, 30.9.1994 (interview with the historian Henry Rousso).
281 SZ, 1-2.6.1994; The Economist, 6.5.1995.
282 See, e.g., Der Spiegel, 38/2001; Interview with Pierre Nora, Die Zeit, 14.3.2002. The only Jews who
arrived in Auschwitz from unoccupied territories, came from Vichy-controlled Southern France, which was
not occupied by German troops before November 1942.
283 FR, 24.1.1997, 1.4., 3.4.1998; Die Welt, 3.4.1998. Another milestone was the report by the Matteoli
Research Committee about “heirless” Jewish property (FAZ, 19.4.2000).
284 Die Zeit, 8.4.1998 (Alain Finkielkraut), 14.3.2002 (Pierre Nora); NZZ, 14.9.1998; Berliner Zeitung,
6.10.1998.
285 H. Rousso, Le syndrome de Vichy, Seuil 1990. This book caused considerable stir in French public opin-
ion.
286 Title of a book published by Rousso (together with the journalist Eric Conan) already in 1994, see also:
“Besessen von der Vergangenheit,” Die Zeit, 30.9.1994; FR, 3.4.1998; Le Monde, 7.4.1998. 
287 NZZ, 14.9.1998, 14.3.2001.
288 E.g., The Spectator, quoted in NZZ, 19.5.2001; cf. also “A Nation shamed,” The Guardian, 23.1.2004.
289 FAZ, 4.5.1995; FR, 12.8.1999; Der Spiegel, 32/1998; cf. J.H. Brinks, in History Today, June 1999.
290 See, however, “Inquiry into Belgium’s Nazi record,” The Guardian, 23.9.2002; “Belgian prime minister
apologizes for his country’s actions during the Holocaust,” Ha’aretz, 7.10.2002; “Belgian historians exam-
ine country’s role in atrocities against Jews,” The Guardian, 27.5, 28.5.2003.
291 Ian Buruma, The Spectator, 18.1.2003. Cf. also quotations in NZZ, 19.5.2001.
292 “On Liberation Day celebrations, every April 25th, the Allies’ part in the freedom business is rarely men-
tioned” (The Economist, 6.5.1995).
293 Johannes von Dohnanyi, Die Weltwoche, 23.8.2001; Wolfgang Schieder, SZ, 7.1.2002.
294 Rory Carroll, “Italy’s bloody secret,” The Guardian, 25.6.2001. Cf. another famous film, Giuseppe Salva-
tore's Mediterraneo.
295 Freitag, 29.4.1994; FR, 26.4.1994; FAZ, 22.11.1994; Corriere della Sera, 26.4.1995.
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296 “Italians grow nostalgic for the days of Mussolini,” The Guardian, 10.9.2001; The Washington Post,
22.11.2001.
297 “Criminali di guerra nostrani,” Corriere della Sera, [weekly supplement “Sette”], 28.6.2001.
298 In 1998 finally sentenced to life imprisonment.
299 SZ, 4.11.1999; Die Weltwoche, 23.8.2001; Der Spiegel, 17/2001, 38/2001; SZ, 18.11.2000, 7.1.2002. 
300 Filippo Focardi and Lutz Klinkhammer, “La questione dei ‘criminali di guerra’ italiani e una Commissione
di inchiesta dimenticata,” Contemporanea, July 2001, pp. 497-528. Not surprisingly, none of these docu-
ments had been included in the official source edition, Documenti Diplomatici Italiani.
301 “Italiani bravi boia [executioners],” La Stampa, 24.5.2001, also 9.6., 27.7.2001; Corriere della Sera,
28.6.2001; L’Espresso, 2.8.2001; L’Unità, 1.10.2001.
302 The Guardian, 10.9.2001.
303 A recent example was his invitation by the Italian Senate – in conjunction with V-E Day (Tagesspiegel,
8.5.2003). For his honouring by the staunchly conservative Germany Foundation, see Die Zeit, 8.6.2000. 
304 The Independent, 29.6.2003; cf. The Guardian, 5.7, 19.7.2003; NZZ, 18.11.2003. The term, however,
was applied also to Germany’s decision not to back Bush on Iraq as “a policy of anti-anti-Fascism,” there-
by missing “its opportunity to support the first war to overthrow a government with significant residues of
the Fascist and Nazi past since 1945.” (Jeffrey Herf, Front Page Magazine, 26.5.2003).
305 Gazzetta Ufficiale, 17.5.2003; Hagen Fleischer, To Vima, 26.10.2003; cf. Antonis Liakos, ibidem.
306 J.F. Bergier, head of the international Swiss commission, singled out, negatively, Portugal as having done
only superficial work, in contrast to the serious investigations carried out by other countries (Der Standard,
6.6.2003).
307 NZZ, 13.10.1997, 24.6.2000.
308 Sweden reflects the all-too-familiar pattern of the neutral states. For half a century the country enjoyed
an almost flawless image, since during the last stage of the war it had gradually disengaged from the Reich.
In the 1990s, US/Jewish pressure mounted concerning the tons of Nazi gold that had gone to Sweden.
Stockholm soon gave in, though it obstructed requests made by researchers outside the (inactive) main-
stream to look into the forbidden subject of Swedish SS volunteers. Only when this request was seconded
from abroad did the Swedish prime minister allow access to state archives (NZZ, 3.5.1997; Der Spiegel,
51/1999; FR, 10.1.2000).
309 NYT, 8.2.1997; FR, 21.4.1997; NZZ, 4.1.2000; Kathimerini, 4.12.2001 (translation from the NYT). 
310 Der Standard, 6.6.2003.
311 NZZ, 28.1.1997
312 NZZ, 30.11.1996, 13.10.1997, 15.9.1998, 12.7.1999; the tone of letters to the editor usually is much
sharper, see, e.g., NZZ, 16.5.1995, 25.4., 23.6., 26.6.1997. Foreign interference in one’s own (moral and
material) issues provokes anger in most countries, cf., e.g., NZZ, 5.10.1999.
313 NZZ, 14.1.1998; Generalanzeiger, Bonn, 6.11.1998; MT, 20.4.2000.
314 According to the Bergier research panel, “the Swiss authorities knowingly contributed to the Holocaust
by turning away Jewish refugees,” The Guardian, 22.3.2002; cf.: Time, 24.2.1997.
315 “Ein Mythos wurde zu Grabe getragen,” Weltwoche, 11.5.1995; “Abschied vom Mythos Schweiz,” FR,
21.4.1997.
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316 See, e.g., FR, 6.3.1997; NZZ, 23.1.1997, 14.1.1998.
317 Cf. Die Zeit, 10.2.2000, 13.6.2001.
318 MT, 8.8.1995. Cf. the even more courageous attitude of the mayor of Nagasaki (NZZ, 23.4.1997).
319 Die Zeit, 15.5.1992.
320 SZ, 1.2.2000, 14-15.7.2001.
321 Thus the Japanese Right stopped the Tenno [emperor] from apologizing for Pearl Harbor without the US
apologizing for Hiroshima (SZ, 30.5.1994, cf.: MT, 5.8.95). There is a similar stalemate between Germans
and their eastern neighbours on the expulsion issue.
322 See above section on Poland.
323 “Entschuldigen. Eine politische Mode erobert die Vergangenheit,” Die Zeit, 3.2.2000; Bulletin, 25.2.2000.
324 “Israeli president says he ‘cannot forgive,’” MT, 17.1.1996; cf.: FR, 26.4.2003; Die Welt, 21.6.2003.
325 K. Naumann, Die Zeit, 3.2.1995; Thane Rosenbaum, “The Price of Forgiveness,” NYT, 8.11.2003.
326 Expressions of sorrow were frequent but delivered after devastating earthquakes as well.
327 Cf., e.g.: Athener Zeitung, 7.4.2000; To Vima, 16.4.2000. To be on the safe side, Rau made clear that
indemnifications did not fall within his competence.
328 Wording is important, especially when different languages with diverging connotations are involved.
When Queen Elizabeth took part in a reconciliation service at a Dresden church, she conveyed regret ipso
facto but not in words. The event was a fiasco (Die Zeit, 30.10.1992; MT, 14.2.1995). Speaking in the
German parliament, W. Bartoszewski (Polish foreign minister, historian, and Auschwitz survivor) admit-
ted and regretted brutalities committed by Poles against German deportees; but this was no apology, as
the Germans mistakenly understood (cf. German press from 29.4.1995; Bulletin, 4.5.1995; NZZ,
14.10.2000).
329 L'Unità (Ed.), Memoria e giustizia, Roma 2003, p. 30. The Germans slaughtered about 5,000 members
of the Italian army’s Acqui Division on the Greek island of Kefallonia in September, 1943 (cf. note 438).
330 Visits to Israel by statesmen from countries with a guilty past, from Lithuania to Austria, usually involve
a speech in the Knesset conveying remorse (FR, 19.11.1994, NZZ, 7.1.1999; SZ, 14/15.7.2001).
331 Probably the only time Franjo Tudjman apologized for the Croatian role in the Shoah was at a Zaghreb
reception in honour of the film’s co-producer, Branko Lustig, a Holocaust survivor (FAZ, 30.3.1994).
332 “Argentine leader offers apology,” The Washington Post, 14.6.2000.
333 NZZ, 13.8.1998, 15.11.1999.
334 Der Spiegel, 43/1997, 11/2000, 16/2001, 31/2001; Die Zeit, 9.3., 16.3.2000; FAZ, 6.9.2001. A Catholic-
Jewish expert committee set up to look into the subject resigned in 2001, protesting that evidence was with-
held. In 2003 the Vatican released a large number of records in order to mitigate criticism against planned
beatification of Pius XII. These records show no collaboration but a “non-aggression pact between heaven
and hell” (Der Spiegel, 19.4.2003; BBC News, 15.2.2003).
335 FR, 2.10., 5.10.1998. Later, Stepinac´ protested against mass killings of Jews and Serb “schismatics”
but, in a 1943 memorandum to Pius XII he was still asserting that the killings were committed by lower, irre-
sponsible, organs. The Ustasˇa regime itself had made many achievements. In addition to supporting the
Catholic Church in all possible ways, it had radically reduced the number of abortions and Communists and
had wiped out pornography; all three former domains of Jews and Serbs! (Die Zeit, 27.3.1992).
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336 “GM, Ford equipped Nazi Army in WW II,” MT, 2.12.1998; The Washington Post, 30.11.1998; Die Zeit,
14.1.1999, 15.2.2001; Der Spiegel, 7/2001.
337 Newsweek Poland, 29.5.2003; World Socialist, 5.6.2003; MT, 6.6.2003.
338 Wernher von Braun was later named by Life magazine one of the 100 most important Americans of the
century, though – to the best of my knowledge – he never expressed remorse for building the V2 or using
slave labour. (MT, 12.4.1995).
339 “Newly declassified files confirm United States’ Collaboration with Nazis,” San Francisco Bay Guardian,
7.5.2001; MT, 29.6.2000 (from The Los Angeles Times); To Vima, 29.4.2001 [from The Sunday Times]. By
1955, the “Gehlen Organization” had evolved into the FRG’s main foreign intelligence agency.
340 taz, 8.5.1995; NZZ, 20.6.2000; To Vima, 29.4.2001.
341 FR, 10.1.2000; The Washington Post, 27.12.2002.
342 Ibid.; MT, 11.2.1998; NZZ, 20.5.2000; and many others.
343 Die Welt, 16.6.1998; Die Zeit, 5.8.1994; 3.2.2000. People of Japanese ancestry (110,000 from the US
and others deported from Latin America), with their only crime “looking like the enemy,” were concentrated
in camps under miserable conditions as Tokyo’s potential fifth column. After more than half a century, the
US government admitted this to have been a “national shame” and paid compensation to surviving victims
(The Washington Post, 30.9.2001; Los Angeles Times, 8.12.2003).
344 San Francisco Bay Guardian, 7.5.2001.
345 “History proves we’re doing fine,” The Washington Post, 20.7.2003; “History in the Remaking,” Los
Angeles Times, 8.12.2003.
346 Other attempts go back to the early phases of national histories. In Australia, conservative historians are
backed by the government, to rewrite the accepted notion that the white colonists had massacred the Abo-
rigines (The Guardian, 17.1.2003; The Sidney Morning Herald, 30.11.2002; FR, 10.2.2004). Cf. the “White
washers of black history” in the United States (The Miami Herald, 9.3.2003).
347 See, e.g., “Pro-Franco book a bestseller in Spain,” The Guardian, 22.4.2003.
348 Jacob Heilbrunn, “Revisionist Nationalism,” MT, 20.4.2000 (from The Los Angeles Times).
349 Mainstream US public opinion, with the champions of the current president’s entourage, promulgate an
version of history deriding as disloyal and revisionist any challenge to their account of the Iraq war, and any
other war with US involvement. (“Giving revisionists a bad name,” The Washington Post, 24.6.2003). 
350 See, e.g., NZZ, 31.3.2001; MT, 27.4.2001; Los Angeles Times, 5.12.2003.
351 “Schauplatz Tokio,” NZZ, 9.9.1995. Cf. the success of the epic film Pride glorifying the wartime leader
Hideki Tojo, who was hanged as a war criminal in 1948 (FAZ, 30-31.5.1998; Der Spiegel, 23/1998).
352 Die Zeit, 11.3.1999; taz 8.5.1995.Cf. Neo-nazis demonstrating against the Crimes of the Wehrmacht
exhibition, wearing tee-shirts with the slogan “Grandpa was o.k.” (Ostsee-Zeitung, 22.8.2003). Cf. note 88.
353 FR, 24.4.1998; Berliner Zeitung, 13.12.2000; NZZ, 31.3.2001. Los Angeles Times, 5.12.2003.
354 The Economist, 6.5.1995; NZZ, 10.6.1995; Der Spiegel, 45/2000.
355 NZZ, 1.9.1997, 18.3.1999, 31.3.2001; MT, 27.4.2001; The Guardian, 3.12.2002; The Independent,
4.12.2002.
356 Δ∞∑, 8.5.1995; ∂leftherotypia, 14.11.1995; Kathimerini, 19.9.2001, 9.6.2002. 
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357 SZ, 2.1.2004.
358 For the shades of the past on Japanese-South Korean co-organization of the World Cup soccer champi-
onship in 2002, see Der Spiegel, 41/2001; cf. Kathimerini, 9.6.2002.
359 Nihongo Journal, 1/2003; cf. NZZ, 23.11.1998; Der Spiegel, 45/2000; Los Angeles Times, 5.12.2003.
360 MT, 12.11.1996; cf. Der Spiegel, 44/2001.
361 There are though increasing voices asserting a greater need to commemorate the victims of the Gulag.
The supporters of Holocaust uniqueness are even criticized as arrogant champions of “First World” culture,
ignoring the same phenomenon elsewhere. (NZZ, 7.5., 25-26.10., 11.11.1997; 22.1., 14.3.2001; Die Zeit,
4.5.2000). A growing number of Israeli intellectuals feel awkward because the Holocaust myth has acquired
its own existence, superseding the Holocaust as an historic phenomenon (e.g., Yoram Kanink, Die Zeit,
19.8.1994).
362 See, in particular, the German government's decision – the Conservatives voting against – to erect a
memorial for gay victims of National Socialism (taz, 13.12.2003; Chicago Tribune, 14.12.2003).
363 See this explanation for the reserved Russian reaction to Schindler’s List (MT, 17.9.1994). 
364 Characteristically, Wal⁄esa and the distinctly Catholic Polish government distorted the real “meaning” of
Auschwitz by giving the 50th anniversary commemoration of its liberation an intense Christian symbolism.
At the same event, heavy criticism was stirred up by the deplorable Greek boycott of the 50th anniversary
commemoration of the liberation of Auschwitz justified by the Greeks on the grounds of the Former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia participating under the name “Macedonia” (A. Liakos, To Vima, 5.2.1995). Cf. also,
Hagen Fleischer, “Griechenland. Das bestrittene Phänomen,” in Hermann Graml, Angelika Königseder,
Juliane Wetzel (Eds.), Vorurteil und Rassenhaß. Antisemitismus in den faschistischen Bewegungen
Europas, Berlin 2001, pp. 207-226.
365 The German word for memorial/monument, Denkmal, is a loan word, constructed in the 16th century in
translation from Greek ÌÓËÌﬁÛ˘ÓÔÓ. The first component refers both to gedenken (remember, commemo-
rate) and denken (think about, reflect on). In connection with the Holocaust, because of its uniqueness, the
term Mahnmal has been preferred, containing the component mahnen, i.e. reminding debtors/sinners of their
debt/guilt as well as exhorting, admonishing wrongdoers, even potential ones.
366 For the following, cf., e.g.: “Doch eine Kollektivschuld?” Berliner Zeitung, 15.4.1996; MT, 6.5.1996; NZZ,
16.12.1996; Die Zeit, 20.6.2002; Der Spiegel, 3.6.2002.
367 The prominent writer Martin Walser, in a disputed 1998 speech, introduced the term 'Auschwitz cudgel'
[Keule] into political rhetoric, meaning the using the memory of German guilt for political ends (See, e.g.:
NZZ, 13.11.1998; Der Spiegel 49/1998, 44/2000 and 3.6.2002, Heilbronner Stimme, 4.12.2002).
368 See: Letters to the editor, NZZ, 14.5.1993; FAZ, 12.12.2000. Cf. criticism that the Western powers, which
looked away from the slaughter of 200,000 Bosnians between 1992 and 1995, “were the same ones then
opening Holocaust museums and solemnly promising, ‘Never again.’” (The Observer, 29.6.2003)
369 Bulletin, 28.4.1983, 21.4.1993. 
370 SZ, 6.6.1994, 23.8.2003; the gaffe was perpetuated in FAZ, 4.5.1995.
371 See e.g., San Francisco Chronicle, 29.11.2001 and NZZ, 24.2.2000, respectively.
372 Cf. Generalanzeiger, Bonn, 21.11.1998; Die Zeit, 25.4.2002.
373 See, e.g., FR, 7.3.2000.
374 Bernd Buchner, Die Neue Gesellschaft / Frankfurter Hefte, Juli/August 2002; cf. Financial Times Deutsch-
land, 23.9.2002; and many others.
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375 Die Zeit, 20.8.1993 [Marek Edelman]; Berliner Zeitung, 6.10.1998; cf. The Guardian, 1.5.2003.
376 Cf. the Greek press in spring 1999, passim; similarly, W. Manoschek, in: taz, 27.4.1999.
377 See, e.g., Die Woche, 7.5.1999; FR, 4.7.2000, 29.11.2001; J. Herf, Front Page Magazine, 26.5.2003.
378 The Guardian, 13.2.2003; cf. FR, 14.11.2001 and many others.
379 The Washington Post, 16.4.1999. Cf. ibidem: “Kosovo as Holocaust Analogy.”
380 See, e.g., Kathimerini, 8.5.2002.
381 SZ, 30.4., 1/2.5.1999. Goldhagen publicized similar schemes for Iraq, pleading for a more comprehensive
punishment of murderers than had been carried through in Serbia and even in Germany. (FR, 27.12.2003). 
382 SZ, 20.2., 22.2.2002.
383 The Washington Times, 7.1.2003. Bush’s visit to Auschwitz, “choreographed to serve immediate policy
objectives,” invoked Nazi horrors as a “reminder” that evil must be fought, assuming that he and his alliance
embodied “good” (World Socialist, 5.6.2003; cf. NYT, 1.6.2003; Le Monde, 3.6.2003).
384 Quotes from: The Globe and Mail, 16.1.2003; The Guardian, 13.2.2003.
385 Jeffrey Herf, Front Page Magazine, 26.5.2003; CNS News, 8.3.2003; cf. also note 196.
386 The Guardian, 13.2.2003; MT, 6.6.2003; and many others.
387 The Guardian, 25.9.2002; cf.: The Daily Telegraph, 20., 22.9.2002; The Washington Post, 24.9.2002.
388 The Boston Globe 11.6.2003; cf. The Miami Herald, 9.3.2003; FR, 27.2.1998, 14.3.2000.
389 Die Zeit, 16.11.1990; Der Spiegel, 44/2000, 23/2002. Cf. fears and resentment by descendents that the
stigma of Holocaust will stick to the Germans just as the stigma of Christ-killers stuck to the Jews
(Kathimerini, 5.5.1995, from the Wall Street Journal). On the other hand, the particular insistence by many
German scholars on the uniqueness of the Holocaust has been interpreted as a “tendency to guilt narcis-
sism” (NZZ, 22.1.2001; Cf.: Natan Sznaider, “Der Holocaust gehört uns!” Die Welt, 21.6.2003).
390 Cf. the title of a cover story in Der Spiegel, 3.6.2002, adorned with Hitler’s satanic scheme: Playing with
fire. How much Past can the Present endure? There is a similar discussion in France about Vichy, which,
according to the headlines, seems “more present than the present” and could be so for 100 more years. (H.
Rousso, Die Zeit, 30.9.1994).
391 J. Habermas, Die Zeit, 31.3.1999; cf.: NZZ, 30.1.1993, 28.12.1996; taz, 3.12.2001; Die Zeit, 24.1.,
25.4.2002.
392 Berliner Zeitung, 18.8.2003.
393 “Nazi-Linked Firm Barred from Role in Memorial,” The Washington Post, 31.10.2003; cf. “Holocaust
Legacy: Germany and Jews Debate Redemption,” NYT, 29.10.2003; Der Spiegel 45/2003.
394 “Fetisch Holocaust-Mahnmal,” Berliner Zeitung, 29.10.2003; M. Naumann, Die Zeit, 30.10.2003; Mari-
am Lau, Die Welt, 28.10.2003; “Nazi gas firm's memorial ban angers architect,” Daily Telegraph,
31.10.2003; and many others.
395 Peter Finn, The Washington Post, 31.10.2003; cf., NZZ, 27.10.2003; SZ, 27.10.2003; FAZ, 27.10.2003.
396 Berliner Zeitung, 14.11.2003; “Germany to Resume Memorial Construction,” NYT, 13.11.2003; “Berlin
Holocaust Shrine Stays with Company Tied to Nazi Gas,” NYT, 14.11.2003; and many others.
397 Die Welt, 6.6., 16.6.2003; FAZ, 4.6.2003; FR, 17.6.2003; cf. Die Zeit, 6.6.2002. 
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398 NZZ, 5.3.1997, cf. 28.1.1997. There is plenty of evidence for similar tendencies in other countries.
399 Cf., e.g., a characteristic survey of German students (Die Zeit, 11.5.2002). 
400 Michael Naumann, Die Zeit, 21.2.2002; cf. already: Egon Bahr, Die Welt, 12.11.1998.
401 NZZ, 13.11.1998; cf. Der Spiegel, 12/1999. Cf. “Jewish warnings that Germany was not in a position to
declare the end of history one-sidedly.” Der Spiegel 49/1998, quoted also in: Eleftherotypia, 17.12.1998).
402 Prominent Russians, for instance, had long advised Germans to overcome “their uptightness as a nation
and come to terms with the highs and lows of their history” (MT, 6.5.1995).
403 Russia, where war losses touched almost every family, still reserves three days to commemorate WW
II: Fatherland Defenders’ Day, Victory Day, and 22 June (anniversary of the German invasion, “Operation
Barbarossa"). Recent polls show that June 22 it is still observed by 65% of Muscovites, who visit war
museums, memorial sites, or cemeteries on this day (MT, 5.6., 22.6.2002, 3.6.2003; NZZ, 21.7.2003).
404 The Copenhagen Post, 8.5.2003.
405 FR, 23.8.2003; NZZ, 29.9.2003. 
406 The Copenhagen Post, 8.5.2003; cf. already: NZZ, 23.11.2001.
407 “Samarbejdspolitikken war et moralsk svigt,” Politiken (Copenhagen), 29.8.2003; Der Standard,
29.8.2003.
408 Die Welt, 10.5.2003.
409 “Pearl Harbor's Infamy is Echoed by 9-11,” Los Angeles Times, 7.12.2001; SZ, 7.12.2001; NZZ,
7.12.2001. Cf. also note 276.
410 Cf., e.g., SZ, 8.5.2003; ZDF-Heute, 18.5.2002.
411 Cf., e.g., Die Zeit, 22.7.1994; To Vima 24.2./ 28.4.2002; taz, 29.6., 6.7.2002; Die Welt, 25.6.2002.
412 “Schlimmes Trauma,” Der Spiegel, 15/2002; Die Welt, 16.8.2003. The Chancellor finally made up his
visit to Prague in September 2003, to attend memorial ceremonies marking the 65th anniversary of the
Munich Agreement. (“Sudeten Germans continue fight for right of return,” Ha'aretz, 3.9.2003).
413 Joachim Fest, Stuttgarter Zeitung, 9.5.2003. 
414 SZ, 5.4.1994; μerliner ∑eitung, 7.4.1994; Rheinischer ªerkur, 8.4.1994. Cf. the warlike headlines in Bri-
tish tabloids before battles against the “Huns” panzer team (quotes in: The Economist, 20.2.1999).
415 Quotes in: Der Spiegel, 1.5.2003; Eleftherotypia, 6.8.2003; Die Welt, 7.8.2003.
416 See, e.g., “Holocaust conference targets looted art: Global search of museums planned,” The Washing-
ton Times, 4.12.1998.
417 Many cases, after being shelved in the 1960s, now have been reopened, often involving extradition of
suspects from other countries and continents. (See, e.g., MT, 9.2.1999; SZ, 18.11.2000; FR, 7.6.,
10.6.2003; The Guardian, 1.5.2003).
418 This is not to be confused with earlier attempts to “Europeanize” the responsibility for WW II by con-
necting it with general cultural decadence and moral nihilism that led to a self-destruction of the continent
(See, e.g., Die Zeit, 16.11.1990; cf. Die Zeit, 25.4., 6.6., 20.6.2002).
419 Austrian-Czech relations are heavily encumbered by the past, since Austria began only a few years ear-
lier (1986) than the Czechs to confront their part in Nazi history honestly. Cf. Die Welt, 14.6.2002; FAZ,
6.2.2002 (with quotations from the notorious rightwing Austrian tabloid Kronen-Zeitung).
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420 See, e.g., Frankfurter Hefte, June 1999, p. 528.
421 The Independent, 11.10.2002.
422 Cf., e.g., Die Welt, 17.5.2003.
423 The Guardian, 28.5.2003.
424 Der Spiegel, 12/2002, p. 76; Neal Ascherson, London Review of Books, 28.11.2002.
425 Information (Copenhagen), 2.2.1998; FR, 26.11.1998.
426 Pierre Nora called it “collective suicide” (Die Zeit, 14.3.2002).
427 In 1996, Russia celebrated Armistice Day for the first time, although in WW I, too, Russia had suffered
more casualties than any other country (MT, 12.11.1996). Cf. A. Liakos, To Vima, 13.7.2003.
428 According to a favourite revisionist argument, Hitler came to power in consequence of the Versailles
Treaty in 1919 supposedly dealing much too harshly with the defeated Germans; so in this view the Entente
is at least partially responsible for what occurred afterwards (Cf. SZ, 10.4.1995; Hamburger Abendblatt,
3.12.2003). Even liberal journalists, on the occasion of Greek indemnification claims for the Distomo mas-
sacre in June 1944, justified their refutation of war compensation by arguing that many nations would oth-
erwise see their future endangered by debts stemming from the past and hence become ripe for dema-
gogues, as had been the case with reparation-stricken Germany after WW I. Therefore, it were not possi-
ble to compensate for the misdeeds of history like a car accident; “the past had to offer this sacrifice to the
future” (Stefan Ulrich, SZ, 8./9.9.2001). Cf. also the second quotation at the beginning of this study. 
429 Many celebrations were held on the 350th anniversary of the Westphalian Peace (1648), the first multi-
lateral peace congress in history and recognized as an epochal event for most of the continent. See, e.g.,
NZZ, 13.12.1996, 6.3., 17.11.1998, 17.2.1999.
430 Die Zeit, 15.2.2001.
431 Since the BdV’s president, Erika Steinbach, asked for pity also for German victims, a prominent Jewish
veteran, Marek Edelman, retorted in several interviews that, “only God can show pity for the hangmen. I am
not God.” (See, e.g.: Die Welt, 14.8.2003; Die Jüdische, 21.8.2003; SZ, 19.8., 23.8., 2.9.2003). 
432 Daily Telegraph, 7.10.2003, 12.2., 15.2.2004; FR, 20.10.2003; SZ, 1.12.2003; taz, 13.2.2004.
433 I concur on this with Pavel Machcewicz, head of the Polish “Institute for National Memory,” who also
proposes the foundation of a European Institution (Die Welt, 14.8.2003). At this preliminary stage, only a
few more references from a daily torrent of press articles will be given: Die Zeit, 20.6.2002; Die Welt, 19.7.,
27.7., 16.8., 1.9., 23.8.2003; Der Tagesspiegel, 23.7.2003; SZ, 23.7., 24.7., 19.8., 1.9.2003; FR, 25.7.,
20.8.2003; Berliner Zeitung, 15.8., 18.8.2003; Der Spiegel, 32/2003. 
434 See, e.g., the Vichy debate in France, or, in Germany, among others, the Fischer controversy on the caus-
es of WW I, the Historikerstreit, as well as the debates about the commemoration of May 8, 1945, the
Wehrmacht exhibition, the Goldhagen hypothesis of “ordinary Germans” being prone to “eliminative [i.e.,
murderous] anti-Semitism,” and, last but not least, the Holocaust Memorial issue.
435 Cf. Rzeczpospolita, 28.8.2003 and [the left-of-center] Gazeta Wyborcza, 28.8.2003, both quoted in SZ,
29.8.2003; cf. also: SZ, 2.9.2003.
436 See his essay “Auf dem Eis” in Der Spiegel, 19/2001.
437 Achitect of the Holocaust memorial in Berlin, Die Zeit, 30.10.2003; Daily Telegraph, 31.10.2003.
438 “Germany confronts Nazi atrocity,” The Guardian, 7.6.2003; The Sunday Times, 8.6.2003; FR, 7.6.,
10.6.2003; taz, 10.6.2003.
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439 “The younger the interviewees, the less knowledge, opinion and interest.” (FR, 17.6.2003); cf. MT,
25.6.2003.
440 E.g., in the Latvian context: “Youth sees history as their parents nightmare” (FR, 14.10.2003).
441 Xanthippi Kotzageorgi-Zymari with Tassos Hadjianastassiou, “Memories of the Bulgarian Occupation of
Eastern Macedonia: Three Generations,” in Mazower (Ed.), After the War Was Over, pp. 286 ff.
442 Martin Woollacott, The Guardian, 24.3.1994, also in: David Cesarani, “Lacking in Convictions: British War
Crimes Policy and national memory of the Second World War,” in Martin Evans / Ken Lunn (Eds.), War and
Memory in the 20th Century. Oxford / New York 1997, here: p. 27. One explanation for British Euro-scepti-
cism is that the British were clinging to the memories of wartime victory as a sort of comfort blanket for the
post-WW II decay of their empire. (The Economist, 20.2.1999).
443 The Daily Telegraph, 15.6.2003; Der Spiegel Online, 18.2.2003 [from The Independent]; Heilbronner
Stimme, 4.12.2002.
444 See, e.g., 24.3.1994: “The Sun Bans the Hun"; cf. headlines chanted in the stands during matches: “We'll
beat you, Fritz” or “Two world wars and one world cup.” At international matches against France, however,
the visiting supporters were treated to a chorus: “If it wasn't for the British you'd be German” (“Britain and
the war. Don't mention it,” The Economist, 20.2.1999). Cf. “How relentless references to the war are poi-
soning young Britons against Germany,” The Independent, 5.7.2003.
445 The Guardian, 9.12, 10.12., 17.12.2002; cf. already: “No end of lessons,” The Economist, 6.5.1995.
446 Echo, 29.11.2002; cf. also A. Beevor in The Times, 12.2.2003.
447 Die Welt, 24.7.2003; The Guardian, 22.10.2003.
448 Ostsee-Zeitung, 6.10.2003. In Greece, also, members of the German embassy remarkably increased
their participation at pertinent ceremonies in 2003. For the previous years, cf.: Hagen Fleischer, “¢¿ÊÓÂ˜,
ÔÏÈÙÈÎ‹ Î·È ÌÓ‹ÌÂ˜: °ÂÚÌ·ÓÈÎ¿ ÛÙÂÊ¿ÓÈ· ÛÂ ÂÏÏËÓÈÎ‹ ÁË,” To Vima, 9.10.1994.
449 Cf. the revelations that Britain – as did the United States, Canada and Australia – allowed many “anti-
Communist” ex-Nazi collaborators from Eastern Europe (8,000 from the Ukraine alone, of which 1,500 are
said still to be alive) to settle in the UK and acquire citizenship without thorough checks into their former
activities. The 1991 War Crimes Act, which passed after heated domestic debate, entitled British jurisdiction
to search for those who had slipped into the country “with blood on their hands” (Evening Standard,
15.4.1996; MT, 9.2.1999, 9.1.2001; FR, 10.1.2000). Cf. also Cesarani, note 442.
450 Cf. assessments by well-meaning observers claiming that nearly all Germans recognized their nation’s
guilt, while, however, “openly contending the right of outsiders to tell them when and how to be ashamed of
themselves” (MT, 11.5.1995).
451 “Wiesel to Head Panel on Nation's WW II Role,” Los Angeles Times, 23.10.2003; taz, 11.11.2003.
452 Daniel Brössler, SZ, 20.2.2002.
453 A recent Danish documentary gave evidence that after WW II German civilians (evacuees and refugees)
were treated “like animals” in Danish camps to the extent that in 1945 alone 13,500 died, mostly children.
This revelation stirred fierce objections, particularly from resistance veterans and the (revisionist) “Den-
mark’s Documentation Centre Against Historical Falsification” (The Observer, 9.2.2003).
454 See, e.g., the Baltic-Russian double monologue on WW II or the newly acquired “popularity” of other per-
petrators’ massacres (Katyn and Jadwebne) in German and Austrian media.
455 For a leitmotif of post-1990 discourse, see, e.g., Habermas’s speech in the Paulskirche (FR, 8.5.1995).
456 MT, 3.9.1999. “Triple” past would be even more correct, if you take into account the two-fold history
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(first Nazi, then Stalinist) of the Buchenwald concentration camp near Weimar. Cf. the complaint by the head
of the Memorial for Stasi Victims that he received “only” 1,000,000 euros annually in financial support from
the state while a multiple of this sum would go to memorials for Nazi victims (Die Welt, 6.6.2003).
457 SZ, 7.3.2002. 
458 MT, 14.2.1995.
459 MT, 18.8.1995, 16.9.2000.
460 NZZ, 23.1.2003; Die Welt, 11.11.2003; Berliner Morgenpost, 17.11.2003; and many others.
461 See, e.g.: “Der fremde Nachbar,” SZ, 30.10.2003; To Vima, 12.10., 31.10.2003.
462 SZ, 3.1.2004; taz, 3.1.2004; FAZ, 3.1.2004; Die Welt, 3.1.2004; and many others.
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